Russia Loses More Ground Due To Ukraine Assaults, Logistics Strikes

Combining assaults on the battlefields at the front with mid-range drone attacks on Russian logistics routes, Ukrainian forces have gained significantly more ground in May. 

The near and mid range initiatives work in tandem by putting pressure on Russian units at the front which then face difficulties with resupply and reinforcement, making them less capable of fending off the advancing Ukrainians. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

In the  week from 12 to 19 May, Russia lost a net 29 square miles, a significant reversal attributed partly to Ukrainian interdiction of Russian logistics across southern Ukraine and partly to Ukrainian counterattack operations in the north.  Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kharkiv Oblast as well as in the Kupyansk, Borova (Lyman) and Hulyaipole directions as Ukrainian forces seize and hold local initiatives. Ukraine has been prosecuting a systematic and increasingly effective interdiction campaign against Russian logistics across southern Ukraine and along the land bridge connecting Russia to Crimea. This campaign, operating in the 50-to-150-km range, is the most consequential military development of recent months as it disrupts or destroys Russian forces, supplies and command systems behind or en route to the front before they can be used.

The picture on the front line this week is one of sustained, high-intensity combat in which Ukraine has achieved notable local advances while the broader positional map remains contested. According to the Russia Matters War Report Card of 20 May 2026, Russian forces registered a net loss of 69 square miles of Ukrainian territory over the four weeks from 21 April to 19 May. In the single week from 12 to 19 May, Russia lost a net 29 square miles, a significant reversal that analysts attribute partly to Ukrainian interdiction of Russian logistics across southern Ukraine and partly to Ukrainian counterattack operations in the north.

In northern Kharkiv Oblast, Ukrainian forces have achieved meaningful advances. The ISW assessment of 19 May 2026 reported that Ukrainian forces had recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast as well as in the Kupyansk and Hulyaipole directions. These are not spectacular breakthroughs, but they represent Ukrainian forces seizing and holding local initiative in a sector where Russia’s subordinate main effort is to push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and threaten Kharkiv City from the east.

This was followed up by Ukrainian forces reportedly executing a mechanised counterattack in the Borova direction and advancing up to five kilometres into the Russian defences. According to the latest report from the Institute for the Study of War, Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked forward positions of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army, while Russian forces were regrouping. The Russian’s exaggerated claims of success from military leaders like Gerasimov are providing opportunities for Ukrainian forces to exploit weak points in Russia’s defensive line. 

Ukraine has been prosecuting a systematic and increasingly effective interdiction campaign against Russian logistics across southern Ukraine and along the land bridge connecting Russia to Crimea. This campaign, operating in the 50-to-150-kilometre range, is arguably the most consequential military development of recent months. Described as Middle Strike operations or Mid-Range Strike, these constitute what military doctrine defines as interdiction: military actions designed to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy military forces, supplies and command systems behind or en route to an area of tactical engagement before they can be applied against friendly forces.

In a detailed analysis published on 17 May 2026, Stefan Korshak argued on his Substack that Ukraine has effectively found a way to cut Crimea off from the Russian mainland through drone-based interdiction of supply routes rather than the ground offensive Western analysts had anticipated.

Image: @Osinttechnical

The campaign appears to be executing operations along three lines of effort.

Line of Effort 1 appears to be Ukraine disrupting Russia’s Trans-Tavrian rail link, a new line running from Taganrog through Mariupol to Melitopol intended to provide an overland rail connection independent of the Kerch Bridge. Ukrainian special forces and the GUR began ambushing Russian fuel trains with drones from around May 2025, blocking the single-track line and destroying repair trains sent to clear it. By late 2025, Russia could only run infrequent armoured freight trains on an existing route closer to Ukrainian lines. The rail link remains out of action.

The second Line of Effort appears to be the highway from Melitopol to Mariupol, as well as other connectors to this route. From mid-2025, Ukrainian drones began patrolling the Melitopol-Mariupol highway, hunting Russian military trucks. This capability expansion reflects both the scaling up of Ukrainian drone operations in the immediate rear and the introduction of new medium-range strike systems: the Bulava, RAM-2X, and Blyskavka drones for strike and the Shark for persistent reconnaissance. Russian military bloggers have been openly complaining about the truck-hunting operations on the Melitopol-Mariupol route.

A third Line of Effort is maritime strike aimed at isolating Crimea from the east. At sea, Ukrainian forces struck two Russian patrol boats protecting the Kerch Bridge on approximately 30 April 2026, and a subsequent sea drone strike on 4 May 2026 destroyed an FSB patrol boat and its crew. These strikes degrade not just Russian naval combat capability but the security infrastructure protecting Russia’s most important Crimean logistical asset.