Ukraine Has Retaken Over 400 Km This Year As Russian Forces Reel

2026 is half over as of today - and the war has changed dramatically in Ukraine's favor. The Russians have lost over 400 square kilometers of territory to Ukrainian counteroffensives in several sectors. And in Kostiantynivka, contrary to Kremlin propaganda, objective observers assess that the Russians have only gained a third of the ruined city, which may become yet another kill zone trap, as others have before. 

Although the Kremlin - and Putin, personally - continues to claim a false narrative at odds with reality, it is increasingly apparent that global perceptions no longer match Russian distortions. JL

The Institute for the Study of War reports:

The battlefield situation has dramatically changed in the past year. Ukrainian counterattacks liberated much of Kupyansk late 2025, over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine in Winter and Spring 2026, and several settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast since late April 2026. ISW has evidence that Russian forces maintain a presence in only 36.98% of Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces have also engaged in highly successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure, which are having cascading effects on Russian logistics and battlefield operations as well as causing gasoline shortages and economic frictions across Russia and occupied Ukraine. Putin continues to make greatly exaggerated claims that do not match battlefield realities in order to obscure the growing strain Russia faces.

Putin continues to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances that do not match battlefield realities in order to construct a narrative of pervasive Russian military success. Putin claimed to Zarubin that Russian forces are rapidly advancing in virtually all sectors of the frontline and that Ukrainian strikes are “absolutely” not affecting Russian frontline operations.[9] Putin focused his claims about battlefield successes on the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast, including Lyman, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, and Dobropillya. Putin claimed that elements of the Russian forces have cleared a majority of Lyman; advanced into Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk); are about eight to nine kilometers from Slovyansk; and are four kilometers from Kramatorsk. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in 4.3 percent of Lyman and that Russian forces have advanced to roughly 12 kilometers from Mykolaivka, 19 kilometers from Slovyansk, and 14 kilometers from Kramatorsk.

Putin claimed that the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces has seized 96 percent of Kostyantynivka and that elements of the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are clearing Kostyantynivka.[10] Putin claimed that elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) bypassed Kostyantynivka and entered Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (between Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka). ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in only 36.98 percent of Kostyantynivka and that Russian forces are roughly seven kilometers from Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka. Russian forces have infiltrated into a significant part of Kostyantynivka but have not secured control over or established enduring positions in these areas as Putin claimed.

Putin claimed that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces advanced into Hannivka (just northeast of Dobropillya) and to Dobropillya itself.[11] Putin noted that Dobropillya is only 35 kilometers from the Donetsk Oblast border (likely referring to the border north – not west – of Dobropillya), implying that it will be easy for Russian forces to quickly outflank the Fortress Belt from the west and to advance to the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary after seizing Dobropillya. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced to roughly seven kilometers from Hannivka and Dobropillya.

Putin also claimed that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces continues to expand the “buffer zone” in northern Sumy Oblast and claimed that Ukraine will need to suffer territorial losses in the area in order to “pay for its crimes” in Kursk Oblast – referring to Ukraine’s August 2024 Kursk incursion.[12] Putin claimed that Russian forces are 10.5 kilometers from Sumy City. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian infiltrators are roughly 13 kilometers from Sumy City and that Russian advances are roughly 17 kilometers from the city.

Putin briefly talked about Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction but spoke vaguely about the area, likely as the Kremlin continues to refuse to acknowledge successful Ukrainian counterattacks in and around Kupyansk in late 2025.[13] Putin claimed that Russian forces are 2.5 to five kilometers from the western edge of Kupyansk, likely meaning that Russian forces have advanced 2.5 to five kilometers further west than Kupyansk’s western administrative boundary. Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces previously launched unsuccessful counterattacks near Kupyansk and that Russian forces had encircled a large number of Ukrainian servicemembers in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (just southeast of Kupyansk). Ukrainian forces liberated much of Kupyansk and its surroundings in late December 2025, and Russian forces have struggled to retake territory in the area since, including near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[14] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces currently maintain a presence in 2.39 percent of Kupyansk and 2.77 percent of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and that Russian forces do not maintain any consolidated positions in either town.

Putin claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces have pinned Ukrainian forces on the left (east) bank of the Oskil River in the Rubsti direction south of Borova and have nearly encircled 5,000 Ukrainian servicemembers in the area.[15] Putin claimed that Russian forces are pressing the Ukrainian group from the east, north, and south and that there are only two kilometers left until Russian forces complete the encirclement. ISW has not observed any evidence indicating that Russian forces are threatening to encircle any Ukrainian forces in the Borova direction or are close to reaching the Oskil River in the area.

Putin glazed over the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces’ offensive operations in southern Ukraine and dismissed Ukraine’s 2026 advances in southern Ukraine.[16] Putin claimed that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces is advancing between one and 1.3 kilometers per day in the Zaporizhia sector. Putin outright denied any recent Ukrainian territorial liberations. Putin tried to cover up Ukrainian battlefield successes, dismissing them as Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups that occasionally infiltrate into the Russian near rear dressed as Russian servicemembers but quickly face elimination. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 400 square kilometers of territory in the Oleksandrivka direction since January 1, 2026.

Putin’s exaggerated claims of advance aim to falsely paint Russia’s battlefield position as the same – if not better – than it was during the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit. The battlefield situation has dramatically changed, however. Ukrainian counterattacks liberated much of Kupyansk late 2025, over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine in Winter and Spring 2026, and several settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast since late April 2026.[17] Ukrainian forces have also been engaged in highly successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure, which are having cascading effects on Russian logistics and battlefield operations as well as causing gasoline shortages and economic frictions across Russia and occupied Ukraine.[18] Russia’s rate of advance has slowed significantly since the summit in the face of these Ukrainian successes, with Russian forces advancing an average of 3.79 square kilometers per day in June 2026 compared to an average of 16.65 square kilometers per day in August 2025.

Putin is constructing this narrative of battlefield success in order to obscure the growing domestic strain Russia faces due to Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign. Putin acknowledged the growing gasoline shortages in Russia on June 28 during his interview with Zarubin and in a meeting with Russian government and energy company officials.[19] Putin stated that Russia must minimize the impact of Ukraine’s long-range strikes on Russia’s rear. Putin proposed measures to ensure a stable fuel supply, including tapping into gasoline reserves, maintaining the ban on gasoline and jet fuel exports, potentially extending the ban to diesel exports, quickening refinery repairs, postponing scheduled maintenance, and importing gasoline. Putin acknowledged that Russia’s quantity of air defenses is insufficient and called on the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) to expand production and for Russia to improve its air defense coordination across all structures and levels. Putin downplayed the impact of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia, however, claiming that Russia is repairing the damage quickly, that Russia’s energy issues are not critical, and that Ukrainian long-range strikes have not affected the situation on the front lines. Putin’s June 28 acknowledgment of the growing fuel crisis suggests that he likely assesses that he is no longer able to publicly ignore it. Putin’s June 28 statements come amid recent efforts to link support for the ruling United Russia Party in the September 2026 State Duma elections to Putin and his war policies personally.[20] Putin appears to be portraying Russian domestic hardships as a temporary and tolerable sacrifice necessary for Russia’s allegedly inevitable battlefield victory.