Putin Knows He's Losing - And Needs An Exit Strategy

Even as Putin's statements of defiance and his wanton attacks on Ukrainian civilians become more horrific, the reality is that he is losing - and knows it. He desperately needs an exit strategy, but it has to be one that does not result in him being thrown out of a high-rise building window. 

A negotiated peace cleverly disguised as a victory of some sort may be his only option. But his options are narrowing and Ukrainian advances on the ground his time is short. 

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon reports in The Telegraph:

Putin needs an exit strategy. His difficulties are mounting. Ukraine has regained the strategic initiative. The governor of annexed Crimea has declared a state of emergency after fuel shortages and power outages hit Sevastopol. This amounts to a public admission that Russia's military can no longer guarantee the security of Crimea, a territory Putin has long portrayed as untouchable. If he can present any agreement to the Russian people as something short of a complete defeat, he may yet secure a managed retirement from power and thus may just be able to leave via the stairs rather than the window! There may still be room for a negotiated settlement, but for the Kremlin this prospect is narrowing rapidly, and killing more civilians in Ukraine is unlikely to help.

President Putin has publicly acknowledged for the first time that Ukraine's deep-strike drone and missile campaign is causing significant concern across Russia. In another notable departure, he referred to the conflict as a "war" rather than the Kremlin's preferred term, the "Special Military Operation" – a telling admission for a campaign that has now dragged on longer than the First World War.

Now he has set Kyiv on fire in a cowardly attack killing at least 13 people, including two children.

I witnessed Putin's "scorched earth" policy in my 10 years in Syria, hunting for evidence of his and Assad's war crimes. It did not work there and nor will it in Ukraine.

Although, the Russian president may take some solace from the UK's paltry defence investment plan, which appears to give him another four years before we once again have a credible conventional military deterrence.

But however weak Britain may be, Putin's difficulties are mounting. The governor of illegally annexed Crimea has declared a state of emergency after fuel shortages and power outages hit Sevastopol. This extraordinary development amounts to a public admission that Russia's military can no longer guarantee the security of Crimea, a territory Putin has long portrayed as untouchable.

The declaration follows weeks in which Ukrainian drones have appeared to operate with near impunity across western Russia, including over Moscow and St Petersburg. Despite re-deploying some of Russia's most advanced air defence systems away from the front lines to protect the capital, the Kremlin continues to struggle against Ukrainian innovation and adaptability.

Most damaging of all, however, is Ukraine's systematic campaign against Russia's oil infrastructure. For years, oil revenues have funded Putin's war machine. Now those revenues are under increasing pressure, and ordinary Russians are beginning to feel the consequences.

Fuel shortages, soaring prices, and growing economic uncertainty are bringing the reality of the war home to a population that has largely been shielded from its costs. 

Western intelligence assessments suggest Russia is suffering casualties of around 30,000 personnel each month while replacing only a fraction of those losses. As a result, the prospect of wider mobilisation and forced conscription is becoming a genuine concern in Moscow.

Russia's elite have been content thus far to see ethnic minorities, prisoners, and contract soldiers bear the burden of the fighting. It is an entirely different proposition if their own sons and daughters are required to serve. Should Putin lose the support of Russia's urban middle class and influential elites, his position could rapidly become untenable.

The Kremlin may now be approaching what military strategists call a culminating point, the stage at which an offensive force can no longer sustain its momentum and risks strategic failure unless conditions change dramatically. 

Putin effectively has two choices: escalation or negotiation. The overnight attacks on Kyiv residential areas may herald the beginning of this escalation. 

Many of his most vocal supporters on Telegram continue to demand the use of nuclear weapons. They have been making the same argument for years. Putin, however, understands the reality.

The use of even a single nuclear weapon would almost certainly provoke a massive Western response. Nato's conventional military power alone could inflict devastating consequences on Russia's already-overstretched armed forces. This prospect will no doubt be discussed at the Nato summit next week in Turkey.

That leaves negotiation. 

Peace may now represent Putin's best opportunity to preserve both his regime and his personal security. However, his bargaining position is considerably weaker than it was a year ago when President Zelensky was under immense pressure and Ukraine's future support appeared uncertain.

Today, Ukraine has regained the strategic initiative. Crimea itself can no longer be assumed secure, and Kyiv may see little reason to accept a settlement that leaves large parts of Ukrainian territory under Russian occupation. Putin's preferred formula of freezing the conflict along current lines becomes increasingly difficult to achieve if Ukrainian forces continue advancing and Russian capabilities erode in turn.

Some commentators argue that because Ukraine has inflicted such severe damage on Russia's military that Western defence spending can now be reduced. Such thinking fundamentally misunderstands deterrence. It was precisely the failure to deter aggression that helped create the conditions for this war. Europe and the United Kingdom should be drawing the opposite lesson: credible military capability remains the foundation of peace.

President Trump could still play a decisive role, and perhaps he will at the summit next week?

If Moscow becomes convinced that Washington's support for Ukraine is unwavering and that any expectation of favourable treatment from a future US administration towards Russia is misplaced, the pressure on Putin to negotiate seriously would increase dramatically.

Ultimately, Putin needs an exit strategy. If he can present any agreement to the Russian people as something short of a complete defeat, he may yet secure a managed retirement from power and thus may just be able to leave via the stairs rather than the window!

There may still be room for a negotiated settlement, but for the Kremlin this prospect is narrowing rapidly, and killing more civilians in Ukraine is unlikely to help.