Russian Battlefield Losses, Crimean Threat, Deepen Putin's Strategic Risk

Ukraine has exposed Putin's failings as a military strategist by simultaneously destroying his troops and armor at the front, degrading his logistics behind them and attacking the military-economic infrastructure inside Russia itself.

The Russian dictator's problem is that he cannot defend all of them simultaneously, especially as Ukraine continues to strike air defense assets which are difficult to replace. The result is that whichever of his resources or forces he tries to protect exposes the vulnerability of the others, reducing the impact of all and miring his war in a reactive, defensive crunch. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

Russia is facing a deepening strategic dilemma It's gains for 2026 have tapered off to a handful of kilometres, significantly less than the preceding two years. Ukraine’s deep strike campaign is forcing Russian air defences to disperse across a vast arc from occupied Ukraine through the Caucasus into the Russian interior. The destruction of Russian air defence assets compounds this. The Crimea and Azov campaigns are degrading occupied Crimea’s logistics, power grid and support to Russian operations against Ukraine. Russia cannot protect Crimea, secure Azov shipping and shield its interior energy and industrial base simultaneously. Ukraine’s strategy compounds Russia’s problems by choosing targets that are cheap to strike and expensive to defend, forcing Russia into a permanently reactive posture. Every resource Putin commits to defending Crimea or Russia's infrastructure from Ukrainian strikes is not available to sustain offensive operations at the front.

On the ground, Ukraine’s 1st Azov Corps repelled a large, mechanised attack by forces from two Russian armies and a tank division near Dobropillia on 22 July. Ukrainian forces destroyed tanks and a Sarma multiple rocket launcher for a claimed 123 Russian dead. Zelensky said this week that Russia is preparing to receive a further 30,000 North Korean troops, warned of a fresh wave of Russian mobilisation, and said intelligence pointed to another mass missile attack within 48 hours.

Independent tracking by the Institute for the Study of War and Deepstate (reported by Russia Matters) shows Russia’s territorial gains for 2026 have tapered off to a handful of square kilometres. In the past month, Russia gained only 10-15 square miles of Ukrainian territory. This is significantly less than the figures for the preceding two years. Territorial gains and losses are not the only, nor the best way of assessing progress in a war, but this information does provide a useful data point on where we are in this war.

Image: Russia Matters.

Interestingly, Russian casualties apparently show a high ratio of killed to wounded. In his latest statement, President Zelenskyy described Russia so far in 2026 suffering 225,000 casualties, of which it is claimed that 131,000 were killed.

If Zelenskyy’s figures are correct, this represents Russian combat casualties having a 1.4:1 killed to wounded ratio.

This balance of killed to wounded is out of whack with historical norms, which are normally about 3-13 wounded for every death. In the First and Second World Wars, the ratio was around 1:2 to 1:3. The Vietnam War saw a ratio of about 1:4. Iraq and Afghanistan saw a ratio of 1:13. Iraq and Afghanistan are outliers because of the heavy preponderance of casualty evacuation assets, better treatment and allied focus on the golden hour. A report for the Harvard Belfer centre notes the following reasons for the decline in deaths compared to those wounded in war:

• Preventive Care: Better preventive care means that military personnel are less likely to contract diseases that would hinder their ability to fight effectively. Improved childhood nutrition, immunization campaigns, and modern field sanitation work together to decrease the spread of disease among soldiers living in close quarters. With lower disease rates, military units are more likely to be able to fight with a full complement.

• Battlefield Medicine: Medics and doctors are much better equipped and organized to deliver medical care to the battle wounded than they were in the past. The global diffusion and adoption of protocols such as the U.S. Trauma Combat Casualty Care program, which provides guidelines for the delivery of front-line medical care, increase the likelihood that an injured soldier will receive prompt medical attention.

• Evacuation: Injured military personnel are transported to medical facilities much more quickly today than in the past.

• Protective Equipment: The development and use of personal protective equipment greatly increase a soldier’s odds of survival. The two areas of the human body most vulnerable to fatal wounds are the head and the trunk. From the end of the Middle Ages through much of the twentieth century, however, these areas were typically unprotected. Today, helmets and body armor are standard for U.S. military personnel.

So, what are the reasons for the disparity we are seeing in the war in Ukraine?

First, the data could be wrong. As good as the Ukrainian and allied intelligence services are, they could simply be wrong. A second explanation is, as Zelenskyy describes, the appalling Russian battlefield medical services. This is almost certainly part of the explanation but does not provide a full picture of such a transformational change in combat casualty figures. A third, and probably more likely driver, is the saturation of drones in the tactical space. Not only are they able target individuals above and below ground, whether they are static or moving, it also slows or prevents entirely logistic support and casualty evacuation operations.

It is early days yet, and we need more data – and more analysis of that data – before coming to any definite conclusions. But this is certainly an issue which we should monitor closely because it could have a potential impact on force design, medical support and other issues related for future military operations.

Image: @GeneralStaffUA

Assessment: Russia’s Deepening Dilemma

Russia is now facing a deepening strategic dilemma.

Ukraine’s deep strike campaign, with its broadening scope and accelerating tempo, is forcing Russian air defence assets to disperse across a vast arc running from occupied Ukraine through the Caucasus into the Russian interior. The ongoing destruction of Russian air defence assets is only compounding this issue.

At the same time, the Crimea switch-off and Azov anti-ship campaigns are degrading occupied Crimea’s logistics, power grid and support to Russian operations in occupied Ukraine to the point of a declared state of emergency, while forcing Moscow to redirect naval drone units, normally committed to the front, into a defensive maritime role. Russia cannot fully protect Crimea, secure its Azov shipping lanes and shield its interior energy and industrial base simultaneously. Something has to give, and so far the Russian strategic response has largely been improvised and disparate rather than strategic and systemic: emergency compensation payments, jury-rigged refinery shielding, and a reactive reshuffling of Russian forces.

Ukraine’s current war strategy compounds Russia’s problems by choosing targets that are cheap to strike and expensive to defend, forcing Russia into a permanently reactive posture.

This does not mean Russia is close to a battlefield or strategic collapse, however. Its core force generation and industrial base remain intact, and territorial gains, though slim recently, have not yet been reversed by the Ukrainians. And, as Ambassador Zaluzhnyi recently wrote, now is not the time to assume Russia has lost the war.

But the strategic cost of Russia resolving this dilemma – if it is possible to do so – will be very significant. Every additional unit and other resource that Putin commits to defending occupied Crimea or its rear-area infrastructure from Ukrainian mid-range strike operations is something not available to sustain offensive operations at the front or defend the Russian homeland. Another mobilization of troops in Russia after September’s elections will potentially increase domestic unrest as well as placing a greater burden on the Russian economy. But if Putin feels his retention of occupied Crimea is imperilled, and Ukraine launches more offensive operations, he may see mobilization as the lesser risk.

The potential commitment of more North Korean troops demonstrates, Putin is becoming more indebted to his partners in North Korea and China, which may have a long-term strategic impact.