Zelensky May Be Forced To Fire Syrski and Bring Back Fedorov In Some Capacity

At a time when Ukraine's armed forces are having their greatest success against Russia since the opening invasion of Kyiv was defeated in 2022, President Zelensky's decision to fire Defense Minister Fedorov has been met by the fiercest opposition to any of his decisions since that time. Protests have erupted across the country and many are questioning Zelensky's judgement and motives. 

As a result, new reports reveal that, rather than toughing it out, Zelensky now realizes he must respond to those growing concerns. He has been meeting with military commanders, some of whom remain loyal to C-in-C Syrski and with other political leaders. It appears, at this point, that the president will either have to replace Syrski and, possibly, bring Fedorov back into government in some capacity. The implication is that Ukrainian society recognizes Fedorov and the success the armed forces have had during his tenure, represent the future, while Syrski, fairly or not, represents the corrupt Soviet past. And Ukraine wants the future. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack, Alona Mazurenko and Roman Romaniuk report in Ukraine Pravda:

Kyrylo Budanov, Zelensky's chief of staff, said "the public has been heard" and "there will be results" amid talks between Zelenskyy and military commanders. Sources say the president is seeking to replace Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine's Armed Forces. Fedorov was “results oriented”, made decisions quickly, got his way against bureaucrats, opposed and uprooted corruption, thinks technologically. He put stress on air defense, drone production and troops' treatment. The personnel issues facing Ukraine would not be met by drafting more young people but by making military service more professional. The reaction of Ukrainian society and the armed services to Fedorov’s removal showed his vision had wide support and his dismissal was not going to be quietly accepted. Fedorov was a key to the changes that were giving them the initiative in the war. Protests started and grew, from Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Lviv and many other Ukrainian cities

Fedorov and Syrskyi were quarreling; forces which preferred the old, corrupt ways of doing business were angry at him, and even that Zelensky was growing jealous of Fedorov’s increasing popularity. Then Zelensky fired Fedorov. 

To understand why this is such a terrible move, it is important to understand what made Fedorov so important, why the reasons for his removal are terrible signs for the Zelensky government, and where we might go from here.  

Kyrylo Budanov, Head of the President's Office, has said that "the public has been heard" and "there will be results" amid a series of meetings between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and military commanders. Sources are telling Ukrainska Pravda that the president is seeking a replacement for Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine's Armed Forces.

Quote from Budanov: "The situation around the recent internal changes has provoked strong emotions. I understand the people expressing their position. Caring is a force that has kept our state going all these years.

The public has been heard... The work is underway. There will be results."

Details: Budanov asked people to "stay calm" and said, "discussion is a normal thing for a free country."

Quote from Budanov: "I urge everyone not to turn on one another. The enemy is watching each of our internal disputes closely, waiting for us to start fighting among ourselves. To our enemies, I say directly: you will not get what you want."

More details: Sources within the government are telling Ukrainska Pravda that Zelenskyy is looking for a candidate to replace Syrskyi.

Among the likely candidates are Oleh Apostol, Commander of the Air Assault Forces, Volodymyr Horbatiuk, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and Mykhailo Drapatyi, Commander of the Joint Forces of Ukraine's Armed Forces, although the final decision has yet to be made.

Previously: On 20 July, Zelenskyy held a series of meetings with senior military commanders, meeting some of them for the second time in a week.

What I heard from Ukrainians about Fedorov was remarkable, here is the key part of that update about him. Rarely had I had such a unanimously positive view expressed about any Ukrainian political figure. His ideas also seemed to be the right ones.

The Ukrainians I spoke to were all very enthusiastic about the appointment. One of the first people I heard from simply wrote back “Best Possible Choice”. The overwhelming sentiments were that Fedorov was “results oriented”, made decisions quickly and effectively, was able to get his way against bureaucratic inertia, systematic and thinks technologically and “out of the box”. I could go on and on, but you get the idea….

Fedorov also was explicit about what Ukraine needs to prioritize in its military needs. He put stress on air defense, the vital importance of drone production and did not shy away from the vital question of the treatment of personnel. Fedorov was clear that the personnel issues facing Ukraine were not ones that would be met by drafting more young people—it was about making the present system work. He claimed that 200,000 soldiers have gone AWOL while up to 2 million have dodged the present systems of conscription. It was clear from his remarks that one of the key ways he sees correcting this problem is by making military service more professional across the board. Ukraine has a problem with very uneven brigade performance and command. Some units have extremely high morale and behave with extreme efficiency. Others are disorganized, poorly led and suffer from much lower morale.

Since his appointment I would go further. Fedorov revealed himself to be the most effective defense minister on the planet. He seemed to choose all the right priorities for Ukraine and improved performance in them all. Here are some quotes of his from the time he was appointed so you can see just how he had a clear (and I believe absolutely right) vision of how Ukraine needed to press ahead. Here are just some of the areas:

1. Drone production: Fedorov not only wanted to increase production, he wanted to protect and enhance supply lines to decrease Ukrainian vulnerabilities.

2. Professionalization of the military: Fedorov understood that the last thing Ukraine needed was lots of unmotivated conscripts. He wanted to make military service much more professional and appealing to draw in the right kind of motivated recruits who could fight in this environment.

3. Moving against systemic corruption: There are two kinds of arms manufacturer in Ukraine. There is a dynamic, start-up culture with companies that are adaptive and efficient, and there are some older, legacy producers who work on more corrupt practices. Fedorov wanted to support the former.

4. Mathematics of war: He just understood this as you can see from this quote.

   “Thanks to ePoints, we fully understand what is happening with drones. Soon, we will launch a revolutionary project, Mission Control: each crew will enter into the system the UAV type, destination, launch location, and more. This allows us to better understand the situation along the line of battle and the effectiveness of drone use.

   With Mission Control, we will close the entire drone cycle: procurement, delivery, and then battlefield employment. Through ePoints, we currently see only mission execution reports, while it is important for us to have the full picture, including results and accumulated experience. We worked on Mission Control functionality for two years. The next step is to launch Mission Control for artillery.

   It is very important that we have begun to calculate everything systematically. Soon, we will have complete information on drone crews: commanders, their monthly ratings, and statistics for the entire corps. We need to see the full picture to simplify and speed up management decision-making.”

Now, Fedorov did not start from a blank sheet. Ukrainian strategy had been moving in this direction before he became defense minister. There had been an understanding of the importance of increasing drone production, of decreasing Ukrainian casualties and raising Russian ones under accelerated attrition, of the importance of the long-range/mid-range strike campaign etc. However he understood all of it, and provided energy and direction that had been lacking. And, unlike earlier defense ministers, he was willing to go after corruption—hard. He also brought in the most ambitious attempt to improve the pay and conditions for Ukrainian soldiers that has ever been attempted.

All of this brought him into conflict with older, Soviet-influenced elements in the armed forces, most prominently Syrskyi. The two looked at the war completely differently. Syrskyi wanted more soldiers for tactical operations to fight over every village, and Fedorov looked to the big picture.

And the relationship between Zelensky and Fedorov also became strained. I have never been one of those to overly praise Zelensky because as a war leader he has strengths and real weaknesses. The corruption scandal of last summer showed many of the weaknesses, 

Basically Zelensky liked backing corrupt and inefficient cronies like Yermak and Syrskyi, and at one point threatened a political crisis in doing so. Here is a quote from that piece. The “he” in the first sentence is Zelensky.

The key reason is that he has seemingly prioritized loyalty over competence, and given a great deal of power to people who are of debatable abilities. The two most obvious, and they are not alone, are Andrii Yermak, the head of Zelensky’s office and Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander in chief of the armed forces.

Yermak is the most controversial. Arguably the most powerful person in Ukraine after Zelensky, its very difficult to have a conversation in the country without someone complaining of his personalization of power and the damage he has (allegedly) done to the war effort. Yermak has seen other major figures go (Danilov, Zaluzhny, Resnikov, etc) while his power has grown. From what I hear there is now an unhealthy culture of trying to suck up to Yermak about many in the diplomatic community in Kyiv, as he is seen as the real power behind the throne.

Clearly, also, Yermak is serving at Zelensky’s behest and Zelensky is in no rush to replace him. If anything, Zelensky seems to like having Yermak around as everyone can blame Yermak for things that go wrong (exonerating Zelensky unconsciously).

Syrskyi is also in post, it seems, because of his loyalty to Zelensky more, many would argue, than for his competence in post.

In firing Fedorov and protecting Syrskyi last week, Zelensky was once again showing his worst side as a war leader. He was protecting loyal incompetence over what was better for the country. There can be no sugar coating of the pill on this.

Fedorov, thankfully, chose not to go quietly. When his dismissal was made clear, he gave a press conference in which he outlined his vision point by point and described what he was trying to achieve. Here is an English-language translation of the press conference, which really is too long and detailed to quote, but provides a great glimpse into why he was so important.

Here is just one example from it—when Fedorov admits he wanted Syrskyi and Syrskyi’s key deputy, out. The Bolding is mine for emphasis.

What solutions were proposed at the time? Radical personnel decisions, including replacing both the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. I promised today that we needed to speak as adults. In reality, we have no other choice if we want to defeat the enemy asymmetrically and with minimal losses, in a system where strong commanders and leaders are allowed to develop rather than being suppressed, written off, sent away, reprimanded and held back. A modern organisation built around technology requires leadership in management. It involves numerous sensors, working with IT specialists and intelligent people, and attracting talent despite limited resources and the absence of high salaries. It requires an entirely different model of management.

The reaction of Ukrainian civil society and elements of the armed services, to Fedorov’s removal showed that his vision had a wide base of support in Ukraine and that this move was not going to be quietly accepted. Ukrainians understood that Fedorov was a key part of the changes that were giving them the initiative in the war. They understood the importance of his outlook and why his fights to improve soldiers’ lives and to cut back corruption were so important. Protests started—and actually grew. Here was a picture from Kyiv—there were also protests from Odesa, Kharkiv, Lviv and many other Ukrainian cities (large and small).

The dissension in the armed forces seems to have been extremely worrying for Zelensky. Many of the best and most effective units had members willing to speak up against Syrskyi and for Fedorov—and at the same time, Syrskyi was pressuring them to support him.

This really is a crucial moment. The firing of Fedorov, if it is allowed to stand along with the keeping of Syrskyi, will not mean that Ukraine will lose the war. However it will mean higher casualties, more corruption, less flexibility and more Soviet style thinking. I can think of nothing worse.

So right now as I am writing we are still facing the worst week of the war as we have:

Fedorov out and Syrskyi in.

However the mood music seems to be heading to—Fedorov back in some position and Syrskyi under threat. If things evolve into:

Fedorov back and Syrskyi out—it will be the best week for Ukraine in years