Russia's 2026 Offensive "One Of the Most Extraordinary Wastes In Military History"

To put it succinctly: in 2026 Russia has lost more land than it gained, have hardly advanced anywhere on the front, are losing 6,000 more soldiers monthly than they can replace - and those trends have accelerated during the spring-summer campaign season in which Russia historically posts its biggest gains.

Combined with the economic losses inflicted by Ukraine's long range strikes on oil refiners, storage and military manufacturing, it is little wonder that Putin is trying to change the conversation by threatening Europe, though with what he can actually threaten it given his abject failure in Ukraine is a question yet to be answered. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

What we have seen this summer and spring has been a Russian offensive that will go down as one of the most extraordinary and bloody wastes in military history. The Ukrainians have liberated more territory from Russia than the Russians have seized—during the Russian spring/summer offensive season. At the same time, Russian troop losses have continued to trend upwards. Over the last four weeks, the Russians have lost 36,080 troops in combat. That is a daily number of 1,289, which would work out to almost exactly 40,000 during the month of August. Russia is losing 6000 more troops a month than it can raise. So, the Russians have hardly advanced, have lost more land than they have gained, are losing considerably more soldiers every month than they can generate, and are facing serious internal questions about how to find more soldiers, for a summer of failure.

This week, as there have been no Russian breakthroughs (ho, ho) there has been much less reporting of the Russian summer offensive and, amazingly, hardly any mention of the Ukrainian manpower crisis which the press wrote about constantly in 2025 and which major analysts were claiming was going to lead to a Ukrainian failure that year.

What we have seen this summer and spring has been a Russian offensive that will go down as one of the most extraordinary and bloody wastes in military history. It is worth looking at the Deep State map of the main areas of the fighting on March 21, 2026 (first day of Spring) and today.

The most notable change is the Ukrainian recapturing of land in the middle of the line (the green area to the east of Pokrovske). There are tiny shifts in Russia’s favor in other places, but you do need to look hard to see them.

What this means is that in all probability the Ukrainians have liberated slightly (and I do mean slightly) more territory from Russia than the Russians have seized—during the Russian spring/summer offensive season. The exact amount is impossible to know, but it is worth noting that both Deep State and the Institute for the Study of War are estimating that over the summer Ukraine has taken more land from the Russians than the Russians have from them—while disagreeing slightly over the specific figure over the last four weeks. During that time, Deep State has Ukraine taking a net of 3 square miles from Russia, while ISW has Russia taking 20 square miles from Ukraine. If you want to see both tabulations in a helpful metric, Russia Matters has put them together here.

And at the same time, Russian troop losses have continued to trend upwards. Over the last four weeks, Ukrainian intelligence has estimated that the Russians have lost 36,080 troops in combat. That is a daily number of 1289, which would work out to almost exactly 40,000 during the entire month of August.

Btw, I just checked and the Ukrainian claim of Russian losses for the last 24 hours was exactly 1,400—so the final figure might be over 40,000.

This is an unsustainable loss rate, unless Russia finds a new way to generate large number of manpower. The Guardian, in a piece published on August 28, estimated that Russia is losing 6000 more troops a month than it can raise. Here is a quote from that piece:

“We estimate that the gap between the number of people Russia is losing to casualties and the number they’re being able to recruit is around 6,000 a month at the moment,” one western official said.

To change the trajectory on those losses Russia will either have to greatly increase the number of soldiers they are recruiting from the rest of the world or Putin will have to enforce a greater mobilization across Russian society. When it comes to recruiting from around the world, Shaun Pinner just released a really interesting piece about how many POWs in Ukrainian custody are coming from outside Russia.

When it comes to internal mobilization, the Ukrainians interestingly still say that Putin is hoping to force more soldiers from the periphery into the army, another 300,000 after the upcoming elections. That remains his plan, they say, because he still does not want to enforce a general mobilization on Moscow or St Petersburg.

This “peripheral” mobilization will not be easy as these areas have already been combed through for soldiers—those forced in now will be the lowest of the low in priority list.

So, the Russians have hardly advanced this summer, have probably lost more land than they have gained in the last few months, are losing considerably more soldiers every month than they can generate, and are facing some pretty serious internal questions about how to find more soldiers.

What we are seeing is a summer offensive of failure.