The Overwhelming Problem With Reports of A Russian Northern Offensive

A 'surprise' Russian offensive from bases in Belarus south to threaten Kyiv continues to make the rounds. But it is unlikely for a number of very good reasons, not the least of which is that it would be far from a surprise given the advanced state of Ukrainian and NATO intelligence.

Further, Ukraine would quickly strike Russian troop concentrations in Belarus, any advance would be under constant surveillance and attack, and, the Russian army's rate of advance this year has been less than 100 meters a day, meaning it would take the Russians two and a half years to reach Kyiv. This is, thus, likely an effort to get Ukraine to deploy troops needed elsewhere to the north. But the Ukrainians are clearly wise to this gambit. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

Reports continue to emerge of a Russian offensive through Belarus into Ukraine. (But) Russia’s invasion of February 2022 was a thrust south from Belarus to capture Kyiv. It failed. Now, any build up would be visible to Ukraine. The Ukrainians would strike Russian troops - and the leader of Belarus can't do anything about it. Russia would be unable to assemble large, high-quality formations without impacting Russian forces on the southern and eastern fronts. Plus, the distance from Belarus to Kyiv is 90 km - but Russian rates of advance have been less than 100 metres per day in their offensives this year . Thus, a Russian advance from Belarus would be impossible to hide, subject to pre-emptive attacks, under constant surveillance and attack. And if the Russians were able to advance at current rates, it would take them two and a half years to reach Kyiv. The plan the Russians tried in 2022 would not be possible now. The Ukrainians have fought this battle - and won.

Reports continue to emerge of a potential Russian offensive through Belarus into northern Ukraine. This is hardly the first time such rumours have emerged, and we should recall that Russia’s initial phase of its full-scale invasion of February 2022 was an offensive thrust south from Belarus to capture Kyiv. As history records, it failed. That does not mean the Russians have given up on re-executing their plan in the hope of a better result this time.

In a closed door briefing this week, Deputy Head of the Presidential Office Pavlo Palisa briefed journalists that Russia’s military leadership had been tasked with preparing several options for a ground offensive in northern Ukraine, with Kyiv and Chernihiv identified as key objectives. While the president of Belarus has played down any threat that his nation poses to Ukraine, his nation has an ongoing railway infrastructure construction program in the south of his country that might support a Russian build up.

Let’s assume for a moment that the Russians do decide to launch an offensive.

First, their build up would be highly visible to NATO satellites and other sensors, as well as the early warning networks of the Ukrainians themselves. The Ukrainians would probably consider strikes on concentrations of Russian troops, if detected. While this might upset the leader of Belarus, he is not really in a position to do anything about it.

Maps from the 2022 Russian invasion of northern Ukraine. Source: "The Battle of Irpin", British Army Review

Second, the Russian forces that would be advancing on Kyiv would be very different than those employed in 2022. A large proportion of the Russian force the advanced south was the better quality Russian airborne or VDV forces including 76^th Guards Air Assault Division, the 98^th Guards Airborne Division, the 106^th Guards Airborne Division as well as the 40^th and 155^th Separate Marine Brigades. These were accompanied by nine Battalion Tactical Groups and supported by a separate advance by the Russian 41^st Combined Arms Army from the northeast towards Chernihiv. It is unlikely the Russians would be able to assemble such large and high-quality formations without a major impact on Russian forces fighting on the southern and eastern fronts in Ukraine.

Third, the concept of operations the Russians tried to execute in 2022 – an airland operation to establish a forward operating base, rapid force build-up there and a quick advance on the Ukrainian capital – would probably not be possible now. Not only are the Ukrainians wise to such approaches, but they have also fought this battle before and won. They know the ground and every possible avenue of approach. And the drone saturated environment means that airland operations using rotary wing aircraft would now be a Pickett’s Charge kind of operation.

Finally, the shortest distance from the border with Belarus to Kyiv, using an overland route, is just over 90 kilometres. A July 2026 report from CSIS has explored the issue of rates of advance in the war in Ukraine since 2022. With dense minefields, human-built obstacles to enhance natural obstacles, increasing drone saturation and range along with the application of artillery and infantry in defence, Russian rates of advance have been less than 100 metres per day in their main offensives in places such as Sloviansk, Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka.

Image: CSIS

As the CSIS report notes:

Russian forces have leaned on infiltration tactics, moving forward in small groups to attempt to slip between Ukrainian positions rather than assault them head-on. This avoids the catastrophic losses of massed assault but is lethal in its own way. Many of these soldiers are detected and struck while crossing the ground of the kill zone, and the relentless volume of small attacks produces the casualties described earlier in this analysis. When successful, such tactics take ground only in small pockets rather than collapsing defensive lines. Even where Russia concentrates its resources, as in the two-year campaign that eventually took Pokrovsk, it has not been able to punch through Ukraine’s defensive lines and advance quickly.

Thus, any planned Russian advance from Belarus would be impossible to hide, highly likely to be subject to pre-emptive attacks, and under surveillance and attack from Ukrainian short, mid and long-range drones for the entire duration of any advance. And if the Russians were able to advance on a continuous basis, assuming they improve their ability to do so to 100 metres per day, it would take them around two and a half years to reach Kyiv.

The tactical and strategic math does not work for the Russians for a northern Ukraine operation.