Ukraine's Strike On Samara Space Center Disrupts Kremlin Plan To Replace Starlink

In yet another example of Ukraine's strategic intelligence, Kyiv's forces struck the Russian 'space city' in Samara where its rockets and many of the electronic components that power its satellites are built and tested. Ukraine's battlefield success this year has been dramatically amplified by Russia's loss of Starlink usage. Once it lost access to Starlink communications, the Kremlin had decreed that its own replacement be developed. That work was being conducted in Samara and was reportedly close to achieving fruition.

By destroying the labs and manufacturing facilities where the work was being done, Ukraine has now derailed and delayed the Starlink replacement effort, perhaps for a significant amount of time. JL

Raj K reports in Medium:

On 15 August, Ukraine used a special modified weapon system to carry out an extremely precise and destructive attack on Russia’s Samara city. This attack directly targeted Russia’s space complex where its main Soyuz 2 rockets are assembled. Samara has been the historical center of Russian aerospace engineering. The Soyuz 2 rocket is Russia’s main launch vehicle, through which it sends its military, spy, and civilian satellites into space. With the destruction of the assembly and testing facilities, its production has completely stopped. The most sensitive part of any rocket is its navigation and electronic control system. Because of this hard strike on Samara’s testing hub, Russia’s entire space program has gone offline for the time being.

On 15 August, Ukraine used a special modified weapon system to carry out an extremely precise and destructive attack on Russia’s Samara city.

This attack directly targeted Russia’s space complex where its main Soyuz 2 rockets are assembled.

This attack is not just a shell that fell on one building. It is a direct blow to Russia’s technical sovereignty, independent military surveillance capabilities, and its global position as a superpower.

Samara city has been the historical center of Russian aerospace engineering. The Soyuz 2 rocket is Russia’s main launch vehicle, through which it sends its military, spy, and civilian satellites into space.

With the destruction of the assembly and testing facilities, its production has completely stopped.

The most sensitive part of any rocket is its navigation and electronic control system. Because of this hard strike on Samara’s testing hub, Russia’s entire space program has gone offline for the time being.

Looking at the weaknesses of the Russian defense system, it is clear that Ukraine will not hold back from attacking these complexes again in the future. This makes the chance of rebuilding them almost zero.

The weapon used in this attack is being called the Flamingo missile. You will remember that for a long time there was discussion about America sending Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, but Ukraine never received them. In the end, Ukraine made its own version.

Compared to the Tomahawk missile, the Flamingo’s warhead is more than twice as powerful.

It is a modular warhead weighing up to 1000 kg. Because of its heavy explosive power, it works like a ‘flying truck bomb’.

In terms of speed, Flamingo is a bit slower and is not equipped with high-precision technology like the Tomahawk’s. However, the heavy blast radius of the huge 1000 kg warhead easily makes up for its slight lack of accuracy.

But Flamingo also has some important limitations. The biggest problem is said to be its ability to change targets during the mission.

America has a huge satellite network and advanced command and control infrastructure.

Such a system can help any missile or drone get new information during flight and change its target when needed.

In manufacturing the Tomahawk, expensive and complex metals like titanium are used. Because of this, America can make only 60 missiles per year (that is, about 5 missiles per month).

In contrast, Ukraine has chosen simple and cheap materials like fiberglass for the Flamingo.

In the attack on Samara, about half a dozen Flamingo missiles were used. Although most of them were shot down by Russian air defense, some missiles succeeded in destroying their targets.

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Looking at the situation, it seems that if Ukraine remains capable of continuously attacking Russian space and industrial infrastructure, the situation for Russia’s own independent space capabilities will certainly become difficult.

The biggest problem with a space program is that a country does not only need to make satellites.

It needs rockets to launch them, special factories to make the rockets, separate production facilities for their engines and electronics, and strong infrastructure to keep all these safe.

If even one important link in this chain is blocked for a long time, the whole program can slow down.

If things continue like this, in the future Russia will become much more dependent on foreign partners than before for its military surveillance, communication, and intelligence needs.

As always, here China can become its first and most important option. China has its own rapidly developing satellite network, remote sensing capability, and space industry.

But depending on another country’s intelligence and satellite capability is like losing your own independent capability. Now take the example of Starlink itself. Perhaps we may see something similar with China too.

When information comes from another country, there are also political and strategic limits attached to it. China can be Russia’s partner, but it will share information only according to its own national security priorities.

This is what also makes Ukraine’s long-range strike capability important. If Ukraine can continuously produce such missiles and drones that can reach hundreds or thousands of kilometers inside Russia, then for Russia, only defending the front lines will not be enough.

On the other hand, the Samara attack exposes the strategic failure of the Russian air defense system. As time passes, Russia is proving unable to defend all the important industrial centers of its vast territory.

At this time, Russia has deployed most of its advanced air defense systems only for the security of the capital, Moscow, and highly sensitive political establishments.

The situation is such that any industrial structure of Russia located within a range of 1000 miles from the border is no longer safe.

If Russia is not able to defend national assets like its space program, then other manufacturing plants are completely unsafe.

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See, with the passage of time, the methods of war in human history have always kept developing. In earlier times, the attention of army commanders was limited only to battles fought on land.

Time changed, and naval warfare established its dominance over sea borders. By the twentieth century, airspace had become the most decisive front of any conflict.

Today, we have entered the fourth and most decisive dimension of the art of war, which is called aerospace.

This war changed a lot when Russia lost access to Starlink in February, and that was the moment that proved decisive for the whole war.

After this, Ukraine gained a very good lead over Russia: their medium-range attacks around Crimea, around the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, where Ukraine is continuously striking Russian targets, and Russia is not able to reply in the same way.

Well, after this I will not analyze who gained what and who did not. After this, Russia started trying to make its own Starlink-like satellite internet, for which it is still struggling.

But this is not so easy either. Russia’s current goal is to replace Starlink over Ukraine on a large scale with its own controlled service by the end of 2027.

For this work, about 300 satellites will be needed in the first phase. And currently Russia has only about 40 satellites in space.

Having 40 or 50 satellites in space is not, by itself, equivalent to having a useful internet network. For any satellite network to actually work, it is necessary that when any drone, soldier, or command center on the ground wants a connection, a satellite should be present above it or in the available coverage for it.

This is Russia’s current problem: the limited satellites it has can provide a connection for some time, but cannot provide continuous coverage.

To say it in simple language, it is something like this: if you have only a few satellites and they are going around the Earth, they will not stay continuously above the same place.

One satellite will come above your area for some time, then move ahead. After that, the next satellite will come. If there are not enough satellites in the network, a long gap is created between these two.

If Russia has more than 300 satellites, the network will always be available, while in the case of 40–50 satellites this is not possible.

But here Ukraine’s strategy becomes even more dangerous for Russia. If Russia has to launch hundreds of satellites, it will need to launch rockets hundreds of times.

And to make these rockets, prepare them, and send them into space, it will have to depend on some very important facilities.

That means the weakness of the whole network is not only in the satellites present in space. A large part of it is hidden in a few selected industrial and launch facilities present on the ground.

The attack on the rocket production facility in Samara is so important for this reason.

If by damaging one important factory the production capacity of new launch vehicles can be reduced, then it can become difficult for Russia to rapidly expand its satellite network.

The problem does not end there. Russia also has limited launch facilities for sending satellites into space.

Among these, the most famous is Baikonur, which is now not in Russia’s territory but is located in Kazakhstan. Russia uses it under an old Soviet agreement and pays Kazakhstan for it.

Now you must be thinking why, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia did not try to develop its own alternative launch capacity.

See, in a country that is completely drowned in corruption, building a modern space launch center is not like building any ordinary industrial complex.

For this, a very large amount of land, special security arrangements, heavy engineering, fuel and launch infrastructure, tracking systems, and other complex facilities are needed.

That means Russia’s problem is not that it has nothing in space. The problem is that right now it does not have the complete, continuous, and safe network at the level it needs as a real alternative to Starlink on the battlefield.