What Happens When Putin's New Mobilization Fails?

Putin's ground war has stalled and shows no signs of correcting the inefficiencies and incompetences of the past four-plus years. There are rumors he is beginning to implement a quiet 'soft' mobilization so as not to spark further popular resentment, but given Ukraine's success to date in thwarting increased Russian and North Korean troop deployments with drones, mines and counterattacks, there is little reason to believe the corrupt Russian system is capable of - or interested in - change to correct that.

The question then is, what will Putin do when his latest mobilization fails? China has reportedly nixed the nuclear option so further sabotage and provocation to keep Europe off balance look like the most probable tactics. But if the US midterm elections this fall return the Congress and Senate to Democratic control, his options will be further limited by their support for Ukraine. Either way, the war's evident failure means he has to continue it or risk being overthrown and eliminated himself. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

Putin is rapidly running out of options for achieving even his minimalist goals for Ukraine, which would be the capture of all of the Donbas. But even that appears increasingly unlikely for the Russian ground forces. Putin will hope that the injection of a few hundred thousand extra troops might get him over the line, but even that is a doubtful proposition given the increases in effectiveness we have seen the Ukrainians demonstrate in 2026. He could double down, do more mobilization and step up the use of chemical weapons or even i`ndicate his willingness to employ nuclear weapons. However, his nuclear sabre rattling in the past has not shifted Ukrainian determination to hold on to their territory. And NATO has now moved beyond being deterred by these kinds of threats.

Putin is rapidly running out of options for achieving even his minimalist goals for Ukraine, which would be the capture of all of the Donbas. But even that appears increasingly unlikely for the Russian ground forces. Putin will hope that the injection of a few hundred thousand extra troops might get him over the line, but even that is a doubtful proposition given the increases in effectiveness we have seen the Ukrainians demonstrate in 2026.

Thus, if Putin’s additional troops don’t help him capture the Donbas in the coming year, what other options does he have?

First, he could immediately declare a ceasefire and hope that the Trump administration gives him credit for being a first mover in making peace and supporting his territorial claims in negotiations with Ukraine. It is possible, but it does not achieve any of Putin’s long-held claims on Ukraine and it is unlikely he will ever give up on these. It would also create problems for Putin at home – he will have all but nothing to show for (by that time) over 1.5 million casualties. Good luck creating a narrative of victory around that in Russia or elsewhere.

Second, he could double down, do more mobilization and step up the use of chemical weapons or even indicate his willingness to employ nuclear weapons. However, his nuclear sabre rattling in the past has not shifted Ukrainian determination to hold on to their territory. And NATO has now moved beyond being deterred by these kinds of threats by Putin. However, if serious intelligence came to light that Putin had given orders for potential nuclear strikes in Ukraine, this could change the stance of America and NATO. But it might also see China intervene to prevent the use of Russian nuclear weapons as it has apparently done in the past. Putin would not want that. So, this too is an unlikely pathway for Putin if his mobilization fails to secure the military objectives he wants to achieve.

Finally, Putin could choose a strategy of “hold in Ukraine, strike elsewhere” to deliver something that approximates a victory – and to test further the NATO alliance. While I am not calling this probable, it may be the most likely option for Putin in the event of a mobilization failure. It is likely he could secure a military victory in a short, sharp campaign against a Baltic nation while causing a crisis in NATO. With that he could potentially justify to the Russian people his disastrous strategy of the past five years. Importantly, would nations such as Spain or America come to the aid of “a small nation in eastern Europe and risk nuclear war” is a key question. Putin may see much to gain from such a split within NATO.

Mobilisation has not even commenced yet, so this is just speculation. But it is worth pondering just how the mobilisation effort might contribute to Russia’s war effort - and how might the situation be exploited if this mobilisation fails to change Russia’s fortunes.