Plitka Analysis reports in Ukraine Pravda:
Ukraine forced the Russian Navy to flee Sevastopol for 'safer' Novorossiysk. Yet Russian warships have found no sanctuary there: Ukrainian drones, missiles and uncrewed surface vessels continue to strike the Russian fleet. Russia's frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov, armed with cruise missiles, are the Black Sea Fleets most important warships. In August, long-range jet-powered drones, Neptune cruise missiles, uncrewed surface vessels and other assets hit: both frigates, a small missile ship and a patrol vessel. The strikes also hit an air defense radar station, an oil depot and an oil-loading jetty. The August attack left the frigates critically damaged. Geography put these warships at a disadvantage. Novorossiysk Bay is wider than Sebastopol's so cannot block Ukrainian weapons from reaching it. Novorossiysk, also, is not a repair centre, and has limited facilities for dockyard work.
It was a few years ago that Ukraine's defence forces forced the Russian Navy to flee occupied Sevastopol for the safer port of Novorossiysk. Yet Russian warships have found no sanctuary there either: Ukrainian drones, missiles and uncrewed surface vessels continue to strike terror into the Russian fleet.
On the night of 8-9 September, the defence forces launched another strike on Novorossiysk using drones and domestically-produced Neptune missiles. It is there that the Russian frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov are based, along with a number of other warships that launch Kalibr missiles on Ukrainian cities.
This remarkable operation is just one part of a major naval campaign Ukraine launched in 2026, bringing together forces from several key security agencies. The goal is to destroy what remains of the Black Sea Fleet and leave it incapable of launching cruise missiles.
Analysts from the Plitka Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) community have examined the recent strikes on Russian frigates exclusively for Ukrainska Pravda, detailing how Ukraine's defence forces are gradually disarming the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Novorossiysk.
The retreat from Sevastopol
Sevastopol is a strategically important base for Russia's Black Sea Fleet. The Kremlin once cited the need to control Sevastopol, which it described as the "key to control of the Black Sea", as a justification for its occupation of Crimea. Ironically, just a year and a half into the full-scale war, the city began to rapidly lose that strategic importance.
On 13 September 2023, Storm Shadow cruise missiles struck the Sevmorzavod shipyard in Sevastopol. The strike damaged the dock, and the resulting fire destroyed the large landing ship Minsk and the submarine Rostov-on-Don. Nine days later, another strike hit the Black Sea Fleet headquarters.
Satellite imagery from early October showed that Russia's main surface ships armed with cruise missiles had been moved to Novorossiysk, farther away from Ukraine's reach. The frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov were the most significant examples, as they are two of the Black Sea Fleet's most important warships. The Admiral Makarov has served as the fleet's flagship since the cruiser Moskva was sunk.
The logic behind the redeployment was simple: to move the ships out of range of Ukrainian weapons. Novorossiysk lies more than 300 km from the front line, has a naval base in the Geoport area and is protected by coastal air defence systems.
Geography, however, puts these warships at a disadvantage. Sevastopol Bay is narrow, with an entrance that can easily be blocked by booms. Novorossiysk Bay, by contrast, is wider, and Ukrainian aerial and naval weapons can reach its military harbour and the oil terminal's jetties.
The Admiral Essen and the Admiral Makarov are two of the few Black Sea Fleet ships capable of firing Kalibr cruise missiles. Each is equipped with an eight-cell universal vertical launcher.
Ukraine's defence forces were not going to leave them untouched. In 2026, things took a truly petrifying turn for the two ships.
How Ukraine has attacked Novorossiysk in 2026
In March, the Ukrainian military carried out its first combined strike, sending up to 200 drones into the attack alongside missiles. The Admiral Essen was hit in the middle of the superstructure, and the resulting fire raged for around 18 hours.
Satellite imagery analysis showed that the section housing the ship's defensive and threat-detection systems had been burnt out. The damage affected the PK-10 launchers for passive countermeasures, the TK-25 electronic warfare system, the Fregat-M2M detection radar and the MP-90 Orekh target illumination stations. Without the Orekh stations, the ship's air defence system cannot guide missiles against incoming targets. Ukraine's General Staff officially confirmed that both frigates, the Admiral Essen and the Admiral Makarov, had been damaged.
In April, attack drones from Ukraine's 1st Separate Drone Centre struck the Sheshkharis oil terminal in an operation supported by long-range strike capabilities. The Russian frigates were also hit during the strikes.
Satellite analysis by the OSINT community CyberBoroshno showed that the Essen had taken a hit to the bow that night, around the A-190 100mm gun mount, directly above the MGK-335M Platina hull-mounted sonar system. Its distinctive white radar domes made it possible to identify the ship in satellite images. The Makarov, meanwhile, was recorded as having been hit near its berth and vertical launch systems.
In late May, Novorossiysk came under a two-day raid by the 1st Separate Drone Centre, led by Robert "Magyar" Brovdi, Commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces. This time, the drones came for the Essen from the side rather than from above, skimming in at the waterline despite the ship's air defences.
In August, a major joint operation brought together Defence Intelligence of Ukraine's Department of Active Operations and Department of Unmanned Systems, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Navy and the State Border Guard Service, working in coordination with the General Staff. The forces deployed Palianytsia long-range jet-powered drones, Neptune cruise missiles, uncrewed surface vessels and other assets.
By the end of the night, four vessels had been confirmed hit: both frigates, a Project 21631 Buyan-M-class small missile ship and a Vasily Bykov-class patrol vessel. The strikes also hit a 30N6E radar station belonging to an S-300 air-defence system, the Grushovaya oil depot and an oil-loading jetty.
The August attack appears to have left the frigates critically damaged.
A through-hole is visible on the satellite image of the Makarov, directly over the eight-cell 3S14 universal launcher that fires Kalibr missiles. Because the missile warheads are not normally kept on board in port, the strike did not trigger a detonation. The launcher silo itself, however, was destroyed. Further damage can be seen on the stern superstructure, where the dome of the Kentavr-NM1 secure satellite communications station has been destroyed, and the nearby antenna mast of the Positiv-M1.2 3D radar system has been damaged.
The Essen has taken a different kind of beating. Multiple fires have left the deck around the missile silos blackened with soot, and the PK-10 passive countermeasure launchers and the TK-25 electronic warfare station have been rendered inoperable. The ship remains afloat, and its main weaponry is most likely intact. Four consecutive strikes have nevertheless compromised its close-in defences and detection systems.
The image shows the extent of the damage, but not how deep it goes. A hole in the deck around the launch system is clearly visible. Satellite imagery cannot reveal whether the launch system module beneath the Makarov's deck has been destroyed or whether the damage is limited to the structures above it. The same uncertainty applies to the Essen's superstructure: it is impossible to tell how extensively its interior has been burnt out. Neither the Russian side nor the Ukrainian authorities has released a detailed damage assessment.
That said, the damaged launch tubes could seriously affect the ships' ability to launch Kalibr missiles on Ukraine. The 3S14 is not a standalone structure that can simply be removed and replaced. It is a module integrated into the hull. On Project 11356R frigates such as the Makarov and the Essen, it is recessed into the bow, between the 100mm A-190 gun mount and the superstructure.
The size of the module gives an idea of just how difficult it could be to repair. The Russian export brochure for the 3S-14E launcher lists its height at 9,580 mm – almost ten metres down into the hull – its length at 3,760 mm, and its width at 1,970 mm. The module weighs 14,000 kg and has eight missile launch positions. In other words, this is not a unit that can simply be lifted out by crane from any quay.
In theory, the module is repairable. The deck above it would first have to be opened up so that the launch system could be accessed from above and the upper-deck structures could be cut through. The module would then have to be removed and replaced using cranes capable of handling its weight. All systems linked to the launch mechanisms would also have to be rebuilt.
It sounds like a complex operation, but one that the Russians are capable of carrying out. The Black Sea Fleet has historically relied on the shipyards of Sevastopol for major repairs. However the port has become too dangerous, which forced the frigates to flee several years ago. Novorossiysk was built as a home port, not a repair centre, and has very limited facilities for dockyard work of this scale. As a result, even a partially damaged ship can be effectively out of action for the long term: there is simply nowhere to carry out the necessary repairs.
Interestingly, the August attack hit more than just the two frigates. The Essen and the Makarov stole the headlines, but a comprehensive analysis of the imagery by the Exilenova+ community shows that the damage in the harbour was far more widespread. Traces of damage were also found on five other vessels, each playing a specific role at the base:
- A minesweeper that ensures safe passage out of the bay and provides mine protection for the navigation channels
- The Priazovye, a medium-sized intelligence-gathering vessel responsible for signals intelligence and air surveillance for the Black Sea Fleet
- A Vasily Bykov-class patrol vessel equipped with a Tor-M2KM containerised air-defence system
- The Viktor Cherokov, a naval arms transport vessel used to carry munitions
- A dry cargo vessel near the outer harbour wall; its type is difficult to determine from the photograph.
The Exilenova+ analysis also pinpoints the home port of the 4th Submarine Brigade, which operates the Varshavyanka-class submarines that carry most of the Black Sea Fleet's Kalibr missiles. There are no visible signs of damage to the submarines in the images. Even so, the fact that the area was targeted suggests that the strike zone encompasses the entire base rather than being limited to individual berths.
The strikes have not stopped – the latest came only a few days ago. On the night of 8–9 September, Ukrainian forces struck the Novorossiysk naval base again. Defence Intelligence of Ukraine said operators from its Department of Active Operations took part in a joint deep-strike operation that targeted the base's infrastructure and the frigate Admiral Essen. A fire broke out on the ship's superstructure. An analysis by Ukrainian military outlet Defense Express found that the strike hit the forward part of the superstructure, destroying the bridge and several control stations for the ship's weapons and equipment.
On the same day, the Ukrainian Navy said the weapon used in the attack was a domestically produced Neptune missile. The following day, it clarified that the missile was the extended-range version, known as the Long Neptune.
The Navy stated: "Satellite imagery confirms that the ship's upper superstructure was hit. The damage sustained prevents the ship from carrying out combat missions. The missile carrier will require lengthy and costly repairs."
Why stay in the line of fire?
The obvious question is: if the ships are attacked so frequently, why not take them out into the open sea? The answer is that leaving the harbour would expose them to Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels and anti-ship missiles.
This was how the Russian Navy lost the cruiser Moskva, the large amphibious assault ship Tsezar Kunikov and several other vessels between 2022 and 2024. While in port, the ships at least had the protection of coastal air defences and access to a nearby repair base. In 2026, however, even the ports have become dangerous: the harbour is fully exposed to Ukrainian strikes.
Russians even captured Kalibr launches directly from the harbour on video. The roofline of a distinctive high-rise building and a lower landmark visible in the footage were identified on a satellite image. Their lines of sight intersect at 44.7072, 37.7798, revealing the filming location on the eastern shore of Tsemeskaya Bay. The military harbour lies directly across the water.
In other words, the Russian missile carriers are firing from berths inside the city harbour, under the cover of residential neighbourhoods, rather than moving out to firing positions in the open sea.
Conclusions
A flagship without a strike capability. The Admiral Makarov has become the de facto flagship of the Black Sea Fleet since the Moskva cruiser was sunk in April 2022. Damage to its 3S14 launch system and the destruction of its satellite communications station have stripped it of both capabilities: it can no longer launch Kalibr missiles or coordinate operations. Restoring these capabilities will require a factory-level repair.
The redeployment to Novorossiysk has failed to provide the safety the Russians were seeking. The ships were moved from Sevastopol to put them beyond the reach of Ukrainian strikes. Yet in 2026, combined attacks have repeatedly reached them at their berths, more than 300 km from the front line – five times in just six months. There is nowhere else for them to retreat to in the Black Sea. It is a closed basin.
The missile carriers have turned into floating batteries. Ships built to operate at sea are now firing from the harbour walls because venturing out is more dangerous than staying moored. This works as long as the harbour remains operational. The Black Sea Fleet's strike capability has become tied to a single point on the map – and that point is already under fire.
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