Decimus reports in Daily Kos:
The Ukrainian Armed Forces, constituted in the Soviet mode could not last long against Russia. General Zaluzhnyi recognized the immediate need for militias and privately funded volunteer units to meet the initial onslaught and that stood in the breach as the armed forces gathered itself. Then came Ukraine’s corps system which gave commanders independence and flexibility. General Syrskyi appointed young proven leaders from the volunteer units. The young commanders rewarded that confidence by fighting the Russians to a frazzle. Some of Ukraine’s current best units like the 1st Corps and the 3rd Corps are led by men who were civilian volunteers. General Drapatyi has taken the decentralization drive further to unwind a Soviet command model by granting combat-tested NCOs real authority, clear career paths, and expanded responsibilities. Drapatyi is shifting a centralized officer-dominated system to one where sergeants have decision-making power.The Ukrainian Armed Forces, originally constituted in the Soviet mode could not last long against Russia if it were to continue fighting in that mode. It had to change … fundamentally and quickly. General Zaluzhnyi recognized the immediate need to accommodate individual militias and privately funded volunteer armed formations in order to meet the initial post-Crimea Russian onslaught against Ukraine in the Donbas. The Azov Battalion, Aidar Battalion, Donbas Battalion were some of the more prominent private volunteer units that sallied forth and stood in the breach as the still relatively wobbly formal armed forces gathered itself:
Ukraine’s ‘Battalions’ Army, Explained.
https://medium.com/@Hromadske/ukraines-shadow-army-b04d7a683493
These battalions, often made up of activists who had participated in the Maidan Revolution of 2013 were initially self-funded, crowdfunded or backed by oligarchs such as the now fugitive billionaire, Ihor Kolomoisky who personally funded the Dnipro Battalion and also helped the afore-mentioned units. Several of these erstwhile private units were eventually formally integrated into the Ukrainian state security apparatus, principally the National Guard in 2015. The Carpathian Sich which is also now fighting as a formal unit of the Ukrainian armed forces dates as far back as 1938 when it rose up as a Ukrainian nationalist group to fight against Hungarian efforts to annex their part of the vast Carpathian mountain region which bestrides several modern central European countries.
In his turn General Sirskyi realized that the old top down command structure was not nimble enough to meet the intensity and the tenor of the Russian push to swallow up Ukraine. In the middle of a hot unpredictable war, Sirskyi pushed to reform the command structure … taking away the day-to-day supervision of the frontline units by the myriad of command headquarters. The existing structure was tedious, slow and often late to the exigency at hand. It was time to buck the old established army command and delegate decisions down to the commanders who were right there on the firing line.
Thus came Ukraine’s own unique corps system which gave commanders independence and flexibility based on having their own fully self-sufficient, self-sustaining mini-armies, as it were. The various airborne assault and rapid response units, which the notorious micro-managing commander-in-chief kept under his own direct control, augmented the corps and pitched in wherever help was needed. Syrskyi, against much institutional and political push back, appointed as commanders mostly young proven leaders from the erstwhile volunteer fighting units of 2014 mentioned above. A lot of old regular army heads were retired from active service. Doing so did not endear Sirskyi to the established order. But he had Zelenskyy’s support so he got it done. The young commanders in turn rewarded their boss’ confidence by fighting the Russians to a frazzle. Some of Ukraine’s current best frontline units like the 1st Corps and the 3rd Corps are led by men who were previously civilian volunteers.
We have now entered the Drapatyi era of overall command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The relatively young 43 year old chief gained his initial national notice during the fight for the Donbas in 2014; famously in a swashbuckling BMP(armored vehicle) demolition of a check point set up by the Russian-backed separatists in the city of Mariupol. As commander of all ground forces under Syrskyi, Drapatyi and his boss did not always see eye to eye.. But even then wherever Syrskyi placed Drapatyi, the man excelled. Prominently, it was Drapatyi who after being sent to quell the infamous Putin ballyhooed Russian “capture” of Kupiansk, led in routing the Russians and clearing out the infiltrators within the city of Kupiansk … sending them on a skedaddle which still continues. Putin had to eat a big serving of rancid crow after that one.
It’s been roughly a month and half since Drapatyi became the CinC of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He has not wasted any time putting in motion his vision of what the Ukrainian army should be like. A lot of reorganization of top command, the publication of his “People First” Leadership Principles which sets out the approach and expectations incumbent upon commanders during wartime … principally protecting personnel, fair service conditions, innovation and leaner command structures among the priorities
Drapatyi sets out leadership principles for Ukraine’s Armed Forces
Today comes news that General Drapatyi has taken the drive towards DECENTRALIZATION a step further in the effort to unwind a Soviet-inherited command model and reform the sergeant corps by granting combat-tested NCOs real authority, clear career paths, and expanded responsibilities. Drapatyi aims to shift from a centralized officer-dominated system to one where sergeants, who are closest to the realities on the ground, have genuine decision-making power.
He recognizes that sergeants now perform critical combat functions … such as integrating new arrivals, managing logistics, and leading troops in battle in addition to training up recruits.
He personally met yesterday with all the senior sergeants in the army, putting the highlight on the importance of the role of Sergeants and other Non-Commissioned Officers and the fact that such a role deserves clear and specific codification regarding pay, transparent promotion procedures, and the division of duties between sergeants and officers to improve overall combat effectiveness. By elevating the status of sergeants, Drapatyi also seeks to boost troop morale and implement his leadership principle that combat experience must translate into professional authority and responsibility:
Ukraine’s new top commander is pushing to unwind a Soviet-inherited command model mid-war. He wants combat-tested sergeants to have real authorityMore here:
Drapatyi meets senior NCOs, sets tasks for reform of Ukraine’s sergeant corpsBy publicly shinning the bright light of the highest level of command on the role of Sergeants and NCOs, General Mykhailo Drapatyi is letting it be known that the army of ADAPTIVE INDOMITABLE UKRAINE is firmly on the way to purging itself of the old Soviet-style system in which high ranking officers and commanders just push orders down to the ranks expecting total obedience, even to clearly unreasonable and even suicidal missions without any input from the ranks … especially from the most important and key cogs that make any army go … combat-tested Sergeants and Non-Commissioned Officers
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