Luhansk Ground Controlled By Ukraine Has More Than Doubled This Fall

The strategic implications of Ukraine's latest maneuvers reveal that not only did they stop the Russian assault on the Fortress Belt, but has, by more than doubling the amount of territory it now controls in Luhansk, has narrowed Russian options for further action. 

The implication is that Russia has lost not just territory it controls, but has been put at a disadvantage regarding its future plans. That Luhansk is one of the oblasts Putin insists must be handed to him as a precondition for 'peace' makes the irony that much more enjoyable. JL

Giorgio Provinciali reports:

Territory controlled by Ukraine in Luhansk oblast (one of those Putin insists is part of Russia and must be ceded in any peace agreement) has more than doubled, from 40 square kilometers to more than 100.The Russian command had been forced to transfer part of the 1st Tank Army’s units, easing the pressure on Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi. The resources committed to containing the Ukrainian counteroffensive have limited what Russia has available for other operations. The result that emerges is therefore a narrowing of Russia’s options, which has prevented Russia from turning occupied territory into a base for further advances. Every new Ukrainian position exposes the enemy’s rear further, and every resource Moscow commits to containing the pressure makes that territory harder to supply, observe and defend. In the space once called the “front line” the land from which the next Russian offensive can be launched is shrinking .

North of Lyman, Russia is paying a price far beyond the surface area of the territory it has lost. Operation “Vivaldi” has not only dismantled a key component of russia’s campaign to seize the Donetsk oblast’ agglomeration, compromising the setup from which its forces were meant to develop the northern outflanking of Ukraine’s fortified belt, but has also worn down its connections, reducing russia’s ability to sustain the forward positions that depended on that salient. Our reading from the field concerns above all the relationship between terrain, supply and freedom of maneuver. The russian army has lost operational depth because the space behind that gray volume we once would have flattened into a single dimension by calling it the “front line” has grown steadily more exposed and less usable for massing men, resupplying units and preparing new attacks.

The Russian salient that was meant to open the way to the Donbas thus ended up compromising the entire logistics chain that fed it, forcing the occupiers to fall back beyond the Zherebets River 

The meaning of the maneuver emerges from the geography. At an October 19 press conference, reported directly by “hromadske”, the commander of the “Center” Grouping of Forces, Andrii Biletskyi, explained that russia’s “Zapad” grouping was meant to advance from its bridgehead on the Chornyi Zherebets toward Sviatohirsk and Rubtsi. The northern outflanking was supposed to combine with pressure on the Dobropillia sector, thereby threatening the rear of the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk agglomeration. With the northern arm of the pincer meant to strangle that agglomeration lost, the possibility of turning those two pressures into a converging maneuver was nullified.

The salient thrust toward the Ukrainian rear, which was meant to join up with the one north of Lyman by overrunning Zelena Dolyna, became vulnerable the moment its supplies had to pass through a few exposed crossings, ultimately costing russia the pressure on Kolodiazi and Novoliubivka as well. Striking its logistical continuity forced the russian command to spend resources holding the positions already reached, and in the end it lost those too. Vivaldi thus acted precisely on this relationship: the ground taken from the russians also eroded the conditions they needed to press on with their offensive.

In Luhansk, the territory controlled by Ukrainian forces has more than doubled.

The most explicit political and military step came on October 19 and follows the reading we have given the operation from the start regarding Ukrainian advances in Luhansk oblast’. Novoliubivka is in fact in that oblast’, and it is not the only settlement in the area that the russians no longer control. As early as September 19 we wrote about Ukraine’s recapture of Hrekivka. Now Makiivka, too, is no longer under russian control. Answering Interfax-Ukraine, Biletskyi himself attributed to Vivaldi an expansion of the territory controlled by Ukrainian forces in Luhansk oblast’. Specifically, the agency reports a jump from about 40 to more than 100 square kilometers, with firmer Ukrainian control over several settlements.

Our observations find narrower confirmation in an analysis published on October 19 by Ukrainian military analyst Kostiantyn Mashovets, who reported an advance of about 1.5 kilometers along the Novomykhailivka–Makiivka axis, and in a same-day report in which ISW recorded Ukrainian advances southeast of Borova, citing russian-sourced mapping that would acknowledge Ukrainian progress northwest of Makiivka. Mashovets also describes a 6.5-kilometer push from the Nove–Katerynivka line toward Novoliubivka, reaching the western edge of the (former) village.

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The administrative border between the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts runs through a continuous operational space. It therefore makes sense to study the pressure north of Lyman and that in Luhansk together, while keeping the attribution of individual actions distinct.

A testimony from October 21 clarifies the mechanism. Speaking to “Suspilne”, 66th Mechanized Brigade spokesman Vasyl Denysiuk said that Ukrainian forces have pushed the russians back toward the Chornyi Zherebets and hold the crossings in the sector under fire control. According to the unit, this hampers the transfer of russian infantry to the right bank of the river, that is, westward. Denysiuk added that the russians keep trying to reinforce their positions, including with reserves drawn from other axes.

But the operational consequences are already significant: riskier resupply, harder rotations, and less continuity in reinforcement arrivals. That is how the russian grouping near Nove has been progressively cut off logistically, without being sealed in a tight encirclement.

On October 17 the 66th Brigade had already linked its infantry advance to moving its drone operators forward, bringing within reach russian armor in Luhansk that had previously been out of range. The same day, footage circulated of a strike on a TOS-3 Drakon on the Lyman axis. Although no publicly verified geolocation places it in Luhansk, the connection between these elements helps explain why even relatively modest advances can weigh far beyond their extent.
Moving strike assets forward exposes the russians to further logistical pressure in the rear, which can in turn weaken positions that block further advances. The continuity of this cumulative effect depends on Ukraine’s ability to sustain reconnaissance, communications and the availability of equipment. And it is precisely there that American pressure on Ukraine made itself felt, where the russian army was in the greatest difficulty. The malfunctions induced in the Starlink and Starshield network hampered the ability to press on, while the cryptic proposal to allow use of that network up to 300 km inside russian territory would have actually handed moscow an advantage, as we wrote on October 17. After the setbacks suffered by the Rubikon unmanned unit, the russian army in fact had time to deploy FPV operators of the 50th Varyag Brigade of the 20th Army to that area north of Lyman, in an attempt to rebuild specialist capabilities in a sector under Ukrainian pressure.

The ability of Ukraine’s Armed Forces to operate during that blackout produced effects that rippled into neighboring axes. On October 14 Biletskyi stated that the russian command had been forced to transfer part of the 1st Tank Army’s units, easing the pressure on Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi and exposing a very clear military problem: the resources committed to containing the Ukrainian counteroffensive have limited what russia has available for other operations.

The failure of the northern maneuver has reduced the russian threat to the ‘fortress belt’, but the defense of the cities and lines of communication remains an open battle.

On the southern flank in particular, the picture is very demanding. As the Ukrainian General Staff reports in its latest bulletin, while the russians attacked just three times on the Lyman axis, they tried a full 23 times on the Kostiantynivka axis, and in the Pokrovsk sector they attempted to break through 19 times, including toward Dobropillia, within 24 hours.

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Assessing how lasting the result is will require watching how far the Ukrainians manage to consolidate, how vulnerable the crossings remain and how quickly the russians can rebuild the capabilities they have lost. The result that emerges is therefore a narrowing of russia’s options.
The value of “Vivaldi” and the signals from Luhansk fit into this process, which has prevented russia from turning occupied territory into an effective base for further conquests.

Every new Ukrainian position exposes the enemy’s rear further, and every resource moscow commits to containing the pressure makes that territory harder to supply, observe and defend. In that gray volume we once called the “front line”, the space from which the next russian offensive can be launched is shrinking as well.