The Crucial Lessons From Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi Victory

It is important to point out that most of the crucial lessons from the success of Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi are not weapons, or troop numbers but the intangibles that drive how the tangible assets are organized, deployed and led. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

On October 19, Brigadier General Biletskyi announced the end of Operation Vivaldi. The 3rd Army Corps liberated 277 square kilometres and put Russian losses at more than 8,000 killed and wounded, with 270 prisoners and the 144th Division routed. He said Ukrainian casualties were one seventh of Russia’s and the enemy's key objective for 2026 has been destroyed. The strategic significance of this operation is measured not in kilometres, but in the fact that the enemy's main plan has been thwarted. The key insights from this victory are: shaping and deception in advance of the battle are crucial, as is operational security/secrecy; maneuver is still possible in the drone-dominated battlefield, especially as the role of drones and robots is executed effectively; learning, adapting and leadership remain the decisive difference between winning an losing armies. 

On 19 October Brigadier General Biletskyi announced the end of Operation Vivaldi. According to Censor.NET, he said the 3rd Army Corps liberated 277 square kilometres and put Russian losses at more than 8,000 killed and wounded, with 270 prisoners and the 144th Division routed. He said Ukrainian casualties were one seventh of Russia’s.

Biletskyi also said the operation’s main value is that Russia’s operational plan in the east of Ukraine was disrupted, noting that:

The enemy's key objective for 2026 has been destroyed. Therefore, the strategic significance of this operation is measured not in kilometres, but in the fact that the enemy's main plan has been thwarted. That plan was to encircle the entire Donetsk region, including Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, advancing towards Barvinkove and capturing Donetsk region through two converging attacks. This plan has been disrupted.

Moscow intended to push from a bridgehead on the Chornyi Zherebets River towards Sviatohirsk and split Ukrainian forces east of the Oskil. The corps has reached that river, which shortens the front and gives it a better defensive position.

Brigadier General Biletskyi also stated this week that “The Ukrainian army can conduct offensive operations against a numerically superior enemy” and that a frontal assault on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk would be “quite costly, bloody and by no means certain to succeed”. He identified Dobropillia as the only area where Russia has had some success.

Having followed this operation closely, I have listed seven key insights that might be drawn from it at this early stage. I am sure there will be many more as we learn more about Vivaldi:

1. Shaping and Deception. That shaping operations and deception well in advance of the operation were crucial is hardly a new lesson, as shaping and deception operations were critical in almost every 19^th and 20^th century military operation. That said, a crucial element in modern war is suppressing the drone-saturated close and deep areas controlled by the enemy as well as denying enemy drones’ visibility of friendly preparations (except those parts of the deception plan). These shaping and deception activities take months, and require considerable integration of tactical, operational and strategic capabilities. It also demands considerable patience from senior military – and political – leaders.

2. Operational Security. Just as it did with the Kursk incursion, and the operations in southern Ukraine earlier in 2026, the Ukrainian armed forces sustained a blanket blackout about reporting their offensive operations during Vivaldi. This is extraordinarily difficult to achieve in the modern world and requires the willing acceptance by journalists of limitations on their reporting. This, again, is nothing new. During the Second World War, the allies would at times limit reporting before and during the initial stages of an operation.

3. Manoeuvre is still possible. The operation shows that manoeuvre is not dead, but it has changed shape. Tanks are not dead but are used differently in different phases of an operation than in previous eras. At the same time, wheeled and tracked mobility is still crucial if a successful shaping phase, and break-in battle, are to be exploited and enemy positions destroyed in depth and large amounts of terrain recaptured and friendly towns liberated.

4. Expansion of Autonomous Attack. The 3^rd Army Corps used a large array of ground and aerial vehicles during the offensive. There was a myriad of roles played by drones, including ISR, attack, deception, flank security, deep operations, counter-drone operations, resupply and casualty evacuation. None of these functions are new but they are being executed differently by drones and human-machine teams.

5. The information fight. Violence and influence have always been two sides of the same coin. So, it was in Operation Vivaldi. The Ukrainians used deception to shape the perception of Ukrainian intentions in the minds of Russian commanders. They suppressed information about the offensive when it suited their requirements but then opened up about the operation to counter the Russian “inevitable victory” narrative.

6. Learning and adapting. The 3^rd Army Corps will have learned much from executing this operation, and it is probably already adapting processes, structures and tactics. Other Ukrainian Corps were also watching, and will keen to have their turn at implementing an operation based on the lessons from 3^rd Corps. The Russians, who have been fast followers for the duration of the war, will also have been watching closely. They are sure to be evolving their own offensive and defensive doctrines for Ukraine as you read this.

7. Leadership. Good leadership is the decisive difference between winning and losing armies. Good leaders ensure that robust planning and wargaming takes place well before the first warning order for an operation is issued. They ensure that they have in place the right subordinate leaders, and that these leaders have the right authorities and sufficient flexibility in executing a high commander’s intent. Importantly, good leaders are able to provide purpose to their people. Finally, good leaders should be good story tellers, so they can explain not only the purpose of their operations to soldiers, but the importance and results of those same operations to politicians and civilians. This appears to have been the case with the Commander of the 3^rd Army Corps for Operation Vivaldi.