The "Quiet" Ukraine Oleksandrivka Offensive Keeps Making Gains

While fighting in the Donbas, including Operation Vivaldi, consumes much of the world's attention, Ukraine's southern offensive, comprising parts of three oblasts, continues to gain territory and inflict casualties on Russian forces.

The primary significance of this operation is that it demonstrates how Ukrainian troops, fighting on multiple fronts - and often without the resources available to those in the Donbas, - are also pushing the Russians back, suggesting that the Kremlin's military is stretched beyond its capacity to accomplish the tasks Putin has set for it. JL 

Ryder Blackthorn reports in Frontline Signal:

For months, the attention on Ukraine’s counterattacks has been dominated by headlines out of Lyman, Kupiansk and Dobropillia. (But), another major Ukrainian offensive has been quietly running across the intersection where Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts meet. The offensive on the Oleksandrivka front remain underway. More importantly, Ukrainian forces already control several additional settlements that have not yet been added to the publicly announced results of the operation and up to ten more settlements may be added to that list. The offensive began in January, initially towards Huiliapole, and has continued through two major offensive phases. The campaign has survived the loss of initial surprise, heavier drone pressure and extended logistical lines. September reporting showed that the front was still moving after the larger spring and summer phases

For months, most of the attention on Ukraine’s counterattacks has been focused elsewhere, dominated by headlines out of Lyman, Kupiansk and Dobropillia. Meanwhile, another major Ukrainian offensive has been quietly running across the intersection where Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts meet. On October 1, Air Assault Forces Commander Oleh Apostol said offensive operations on the Oleksandrivka front remain underway. More importantly, he said Ukrainian forces already control several additional settlements that have not yet been added to the publicly announced results of the operation. Apostol said up to ten more settlements may eventually be added to that list, explaining that the military is deliberately keeping current results quiet so Russian forces have less information about where to send reserves or reinforce threatened areas. Ukraine is not saying it is about to capture ten villages. Apostol said Ukrainian forces already hold several additional settlements, while as many as ten could eventually be added to the published total as the campaign continues. The offensive itself began on January 29.

This Has Been Going On Since January

By August, Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces said Ukrainian troops had restored control over 26 settlements and more than 745 square kilometers during the Oleksandrivka operation. Twelve of those settlements were listed in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, ten in Donetsk and four in Zaporizhzhia. The military separately reported that Ukrainian forces had searched for and destroyed Russian troops that infiltrated Ukrainian rear areas covering more than another 300 square kilometers. Ukrainska Pravda’s investigation suggests that the 745-square-kilometer total should not be read as one continuous block of newly liberated ground. Some areas were retaken outright, while others had to be cleared of Russian groups that had infiltrated behind Ukrainian positions. The battlefield was messy, and once you get into what Ukrainian troops actually encountered, that becomes one of the most interesting pieces of the operation. 

Ukraine Launched It Because Russia Was Planning Something Else

Ukrainska Pravda identifies former Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi as the initiator of the Oleksandrivka offensive. In written responses provided to UP, Syrskyi said Ukrainian planners concluded in the second half of 2025 that Russia intended to attack not only around Pokrovsk but also along the Huliaipole axis. According to Syrskyi, the Russian plan called for breaking through around the Huliaipole-Dobropillia line and eventually threatening Ukrainian forces around Orikhiv. Ukraine’s answer was to attack on the neighboring Oleksandrivka axis. Syrskyi said the goal was to disrupt Russia’s plans, inflict losses and straighten the Ukrainian frontline. He also said the Ukrainian attack struck toward the rear of Russia’s planned offensive grouping and forced Moscow to redirect forces. According to Syrskyi, Russia moved some elements of its 90th Division away from the Pokrovsk area in response. 

That redeployment claim comes from Syrskyi and should be treated as his account of the operation. The wider outcome is easier to see. The Russian offensive toward Orikhiv that Ukrainian planners had feared did not materialize during the spring-summer campaign in the form they expected. Ukrainska Pravda assessed the Oleksandrivka operation as an important part of disrupting that plan, though public evidence cannot tell us exactly how much of the outcome came from this offensive compared with other battlefield factors. Russia was preparing to create another problem for Ukraine; Ukraine attacked somewhere Russia now had to worry about instead.

It Was Really Two Offensives

Calling Oleksandrivka one uninterrupted eight-month push makes the campaign sound much cleaner than it was. Ukrainska Pravda found that the operation actually consisted of two separate offensives with a short break between them. The first began early in 2026 north of Huliaipole.

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Approximate directions of the defence forces’ advance on the Oleksandrivka front | Credit: Ukrainska Pravda

Ukrainian Air Assault and assault troops pushed northwest and northeast using both heavy equipment and small infantry groups. According to UP, Ukrainian forces advanced roughly 9 to 11 kilometers into Russian positions. The original plan appears to have been more ambitious. UP reported that at least one part of the plan called for Ukrainian forces to push another 10 kilometers or more and reach deeper into the Russian rear from the direction of Uspenivka. That didn’t happen. A senior Ukrainian participant in the operation told UP that Ukraine did not have enough forces to carry the attack that far. Ukraine advanced and disrupted Russian plans, but it also ran into the same problem nearly every offensive eventually does: troops, equipment and logistics are not unlimited. The first operation then helped create the conditions for a much wider second attack.

Then Ukraine Opened More Than 50 Kilometers of Front

The second offensive began on May 5 across a stretch of frontline more than 50 kilometers wide, roughly from Nove Zaporizhzhia in Zaporizhzhia Oblast to Filiia in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. UP assessed that the operation aimed to push Russian forces as far as possible out of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, generally toward the Komar and Velyka Novosilka area. Additional Air Assault formations arrived for the second phase, including the 78th, 79th and 80th brigades, while the 95th Brigade remained heavily involved. Ukrainian troops interviewed by UP said the first two to three weeks of both offensives were particularly effective because Russian troops did not initially understand the scale of what Ukraine was doing. Some of those Ukrainian troops also said Russian soldiers appeared reluctant to report the Ukrainian advance accurately up their own chain of command.

Ukraine also used infiltration to keep the offensive moving. Instead of clearing every Russian position from the front, small groups slipped through gaps, bypassed occupied tree lines and established positions deeper in the Russian rear. Reconnaissance elements then cleared some of the isolated positions left behind. There is a strange symmetry there. Russia has repeatedly used small infiltration groups to muddy the frontline and appear in areas that look secure on a map. Ukraine was now using a similar idea against Russian positions, except Russia had already been doing it to them too.

The Frontline on the Map Wasn’t Always the Frontline on the Ground

Ukrainian personnel interviewed by Ukrainska Pravda said that when the second operation began, internal reporting had understated how deeply Russian troops had infiltrated in some sectors. UP reported Russian groups operating two to ten kilometers deeper than Ukrainian units had been led to expect. Ukrainian troops preparing to attack forward sometimes discovered Russian soldiers inside what was supposed to be their own rear. UP documented examples around Andriivka-Klevtsove, Kolomiitsi, Oleksiivka and the forest east of Velykomykhailivka. Before some Ukrainian units could continue attacking east, somebody first had to clear Russian positions behind them. That helps explain why liberated, retaken and cleared do not always describe exactly the same thing here. A Ukrainian unit can hold a road while Russian infantry hide in a nearby forest, and another small group can slip through a gap between established positions. The map eventually catches up, but the people on the ground have to sort out the mess first.

Then Russia Started Catching Up

Ukraine’s advantage from surprise wasn’t going to last forever. According to Ukrainian personnel interviewed by UP, Russian forces began reacting much more aggressively after the first few weeks of both offensive phases. The Russian Rubicon drone unit was rapidly transferred into the Oleksandrivka area, while Russian formations opposite the Ukrainian advance brought additional reserves forward. Russian troops also began mining roads and placing ambush drones near junctions where Ukrainian vehicles would be forced to slow down. Ukrainian units responded by creating dedicated drone crews to fly those roads, search for the waiting drones and destroy them before logistics vehicles moved through.

One Ukrainian UAV commander interviewed by UP said that after his vehicle became stuck during the spring mud, somewhere between 30 and 50 Russian drones were sent against it. That remains one soldier’s account rather than a number independently confirmed by the outlet, but it gives some idea of the pressure Ukrainian logistics were operating under. Every kilometer forward also made the road behind Ukrainian troops longer. Ammunition, food, fuel, batteries, replacement troops and drones all had farther to travel, while casualties had farther to come back.

Some Ukrainian Infantry Walked 20 Kilometers Before the Assault Started

UP’s Ukrainian sources described logistics routes stretching 10 to 20 kilometers or more in parts of the sector. One battalion commander said his infantry sometimes walked about 20 kilometers just to reach the line of contact, then they still had to assault. Rivers made the situation more difficult. The Oleksandrivka sector is crossed by several waterways, including the Vovcha River, and temporary crossings were vulnerable almost as soon as they appeared. One Ukrainian commander told UP some bridges or pontoons could be destroyed within roughly half an hour of being installed.

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Visual for better understanding where the Ukrainian forces were traveling. The distance is a estimate using the ruler. | Screenshot Taken by Author | Website: DeepStateMAP | День 1682 | Map of the war in Ukraine

Ukrainian troops used boats where possible. UP obtained footage showing two paratroopers crossing one river in an inflatable boat with their equipment before continuing toward a clearing operation. Other soldiers went through the water themselves. According to one Ukrainian commander, troops who swam across had dry clothing dropped to them by drone on the other side. Some of these gains were made by troops who had already walked for hours or crossed a river before the assault even began.

The Offensive Is Moving in a Different Direction Now

That brings us back to October. Apostol said the first stage of the operation generally developed from north to south, while the current movement is running more from west to east. He did not identify where the newest movement is taking place. For now, Apostol’s statement tells us Ukraine says the offensive is still producing results, but not enough to independently map those newest gains. September gives us something firmer to work with.

September Shows the Front Was Still Moving

On September 23, ISW reported recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Oleksandrivka. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces had liberated Shevchenko, penetrated roughly 2.5 kilometers toward Burlatske, advanced north of Vilne Pole and reached northern Pavlivka. Mashovets assessed that Ukrainian forces had advanced roughly eight kilometers in the broader area since early August. Those are Mashovets’ battlefield assessments relayed by ISW, rather than territory independently confirmed in full by the institute.

A few days later, reporting from the Russian side added another layer. ISW reported on September 27 that Russian milbloggers acknowledged Ukrainian forces had retaken Perebudova east of Oleksandrivka. Those Russian sources also said Ukrainian troops had entered Komar, where fighting over control of the settlement was continuing. Russian milbloggers described the Piddubne-Myrne-Komar line as one of the places where Russian forces were having the greatest difficulty advancing. None of that tells us whether those settlements are among the unnamed locations Apostol referred to, but it does establish that Ukrainian offensive activity continued well beyond the summer.

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Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from 2024 to 2026, during a visit to the Oleksandrivka front | Source: Ukrainska Pravda

Russia was still attacking too. ISW reported limited Russian offensive operations southeast of Oleksandrivka on September 29 and 30 without a confirmed Russian advance. The same pattern continued into October 1. That is only a snapshot. Russia can move reserves, Ukrainian logistics can become overstretched, weather can slow both sides, and a section of front moving today can stop next week. But as October begins, September reporting showed continued Ukrainian movement in the sector, including Russian-source acknowledgement of the loss of Perebudova and fighting around Komar.

Eight Months Later, the Offensive Is Still There

The Oleksandrivka campaign has survived the loss of initial surprise, heavier drone pressure and extended logistical lines. September reporting showed that the front was still moving after the larger spring and summer phases, while Russian sources acknowledged the loss of Perebudova and continued fighting around Komar. Apostol now says several additional settlements are already under Ukrainian control, while the publicly announced total could eventually increase by as many as ten. Until Ukraine identifies those locations and outside mapping catches up, the newest territorial claims remain Ukrainian military claims from an active operation.

But the broader timeline is much harder to miss. The Oleksandrivka offensive began in January, continued through two major offensive phases and was still producing battlefield movement during September. It survived Russian reinforcements and much heavier drone pressure, and the direction of the current push has changed as the campaign developed.