Russia's Undertrained and Manned Motor Rifle Brigades Bear Brunt of Losses

The core of the Russian army is made up of Motor Rifle Brigades - motorized infantry. 

And they are being decimated by ineffective, often suicidal tactics, poor training, inadequate equipment and corrupt officers. Their casualties are staggering. JL

Amarsanaa Jegal reports in Medium:

"In the fifth year of the Russia–Ukraine war, the Russian force suffering the heaviest losses is its infantry. Motor rifle brigades, which bear the main burden of the Russian's offensive operations, are losing enormous numbers of soldiers.” The list of the heaviest losses is headed by the 15th Motor Rifle Brigade. Reports suggest its soldiers suffer not only in frontline combat but also as a result of violence, intimidation and demands for money by their commanders. The 30th Motor Rifle Brigade, based in Samara, came second. All five of the motor rifle brigades with the highest losses took part in the battle for Avdiivka, where Russia lost 16,000 men. The poor training of Russian motor rifle units had been highlighted early in the war.

In her article, Infantrymen Reduced to Rubble: What We Know About the Russian Army’s Losses, Olga Ivshina, a correspondent for BBC News Russian, highlights that “in the fifth year of the Russia–Ukraine war, the Russian military force suffering the heaviest losses is not its tank or missile units, but its infantry. Motor rifle brigades, which bear the main burden of the Russian army’s offensive operations, are losing enormous numbers of soldiers, yet Moscow continues to recruit new personnel and send them to the front to replace those killed.”

Working together with Mediazona and a team of volunteer researchers, the BBC has identified 285,023 Russian military personnel whose deaths have been confirmed through open sources. This is not the full number of actual losses; it is a record only of those whose deaths could be verified with documentary evidence. According to the investigation, the combined number of confirmed deaths among the five motor rifle brigades that have suffered the heaviest losses has reached 15,312. These units have been at the forefront of the Russian army’s offensive operations since the second half of 2023.

The list of the heaviest losses is headed by the 15th Motor Rifle Brigade, known as the “Black Hussars”. Previous investigative reports about this unit contained accounts suggesting that soldiers may have suffered not only in frontline combat but also as a result of violence, intimidation and demands for money by their own commanders. Some families claimed that their relatives may have been killed by fellow Russian servicemen for refusing to comply with their commanders’ demands.

The 30th Motor Rifle Brigade, based in the Samara region, came second. Before the war, this unit had been reorganised for mobile operations, but it was not adequately prepared to face the prolonged and fierce resistance encountered in Ukraine. Western analysts concluded that deficiencies in communications, supplies and coordination between units made the situation even worse.

Losses among Russian motor rifle units began to rise sharply towards the end of 2023. Before that, the heaviest burden of offensive operations had been borne by the Wagner mercenary group. During the months-long battle for Bakhmut, Wagner began using a tactic in which small groups of infantrymen were sent ahead towards fortified Ukrainian positions. This forced Ukrainian troops to open fire and reveal their positions, after which Russian artillery would destroy those locations. The Russian army’s motor rifle units later began using this method extensively, despite the enormous loss of their own soldiers it caused.

To replace its losses, the Russian army continually recruits new contract soldiers. According to the BBC investigation, at least 41 per cent of the confirmed deaths among soldiers from the 30th Brigade were voluntary contract servicemen.

One of them was 28-year-old Timofey Fedotov. Before the war, he worked at a factory in the Perm region, earning approximately 25,000 roubles a month. However, by 2023, his fines and loan debts had reached 200,000 roubles, so he signed a contract with the army towards the end of that year. He fought in the Avdiivka sector and was captured by Ukrainian forces in February 2024. He was subsequently returned to Russia through a prisoner-of-war exchange, but was sent back to the front. He was eventually killed in August 2026.

His story is not an isolated case. The BBC investigation identified 152 people who had been captured, returned to Russia through prisoner exchanges, sent back to the front and subsequently killed. The actual number is likely to be even higher. This shows that the Russian army is addressing its manpower shortages not only by recruiting new soldiers but also by sending people who had previously been removed from the war back to the frontline.

All five of the motor rifle brigades with the highest losses took part in the battle for Avdiivka. Russian forces captured the city in February 2024, but this victory came at an enormous human cost.

At the time, Russian military correspondent and pro-war Z-blogger Andrey Morozov criticised his military command’s tactics, accusing it of repeatedly sending poorly trained infantrymen against Ukrainian fortifications. He estimated that Russia had lost 16,000 men in the battle for Avdiivka. Following the publication of his article, Morozov was harshly criticised on Russian state television and took his own life shortly afterwards.

The poor training of Russian motor rifle units had also been highlighted by Western analysts in the early stages of the war. For example, in May 2022, during an attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets River, Russia’s 74th Motor Rifle Brigade repeatedly tried to establish a crossing without adequate intelligence, fire support or security preparations. Ukrainian forces detected the attempts and destroyed them with artillery, yet Russian soldiers continued to make the same attempts.

Nevertheless, Russian infantry has adapted to a certain extent as the war has progressed. Instead of operating in large formations, soldiers have learnt to attack in small groups and penetrate gaps in Ukrainian defences. In an April 2026 study, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) noted that the increasing use of small drones on the frontline was making Russian infantry operations increasingly dispersed.

This new Russian offensive method involves sending small groups of one or two soldiers into grey zones that are not yet fully under Ukrainian control. Their objective is to reach Ukrainian positions, find somewhere to hide and hold that position until additional forces arrive to organise supplies and support. However, when drone operations slow down because of weather conditions, Russian forces return to attacks using armoured vehicles. In other words, although the Russian army is changing its tactics and adapting to the threat posed by drones, infantry continues to bear the main burden of its offensive operations.

The most striking part of the BBC investigation is its estimate of the actual number of Russian military deaths. Military analysts believe that the 285,023 deaths identified through open sources may account for only 45–55 per cent of the actual total. This estimate excludes people whose deaths have not been made public and bodies that have been left on the battlefield. On this basis, the actual number of Russian soldiers killed may have reached between 518,224 and 633,384.

If the losses suffered by the armed forces of Donetsk and Luhansk, which fought on Russia’s side, as well as North Korean troops, are added to this figure, the total becomes even higher. According to the BBC, between 21,000 and 23,500 soldiers from the Donetsk and Luhansk forces may have been killed by the end of 2022. In addition, the names of 2,304 North Korean soldiers who died fighting on Russia’s side in 2024–2025 have been identified. This produces an estimated total of between 541,528 and 659,188 military personnel killed among the forces that fought in support of Russia.

The Russia–Ukraine war has become more than a struggle over weapons, military equipment and territory. The example of the Russian army shows how military operations are being sustained by replacing enormous human losses with newly recruited contract soldiers and by sending captured soldiers who have returned home back to the frontline. However, changing tactics and replenishing manpower cannot reduce the actual cost of the war. On the contrary, this investigation shows the emergence of a system in which ever more human lives are sacrificed to capture a single position or advance a few kilometres.

Since the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine war, the Russian army’s human losses have reached historically high levels. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, on 1 November 2026, the Russian army lost 54,400 soldiers in October through deaths and serious injuries. This was the highest monthly figure since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. On 21 October, Russian military losses reached 2,250 soldiers in a single day, setting a daily record.

He also emphasised that the Ukrainian army liberated 96.2 square kilometres of territory in October, which was 10.4 square kilometres more than the territory captured by Russia.

According to estimates by The Economist, total Russian military casualties since the beginning of the war — including those killed and wounded — may have reached between 1.4 million and 2.1 million. The Economist estimates that between 374,000 and 770,000 of them may have been killed.

According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, total Russian military losses had reached 1,590,270 by 1 November 2026. Approximately 54,400 casualties were recorded in October alone. This figure does not represent the number of people killed; it is the combined total of those killed, wounded and other categories of military losses.

Ukrainian records also indicate that Russia has lost 12,451 tanks, 25,622 armoured vehicles, 51,755 artillery systems, 591,605 drones, 452 aircraft and 356 helicopters. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defence has not updated its official information on military losses since September 2022.

According to some Western and independent political analysts, ending the war could pose a major domestic political risk for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Those who support this position argue that, after such enormous losses of human life and economic damage, ending the war without achieving a clear “victory” could provoke criticism from the elites and nationalists, potentially triggering domestic instability and opposition.

All of this confirms that the Russian army has de facto lost the war that has now entered its fifth year. Yet Vladimir Putin cannot stop the war he himself initiated without risking the loss of his position. Consequently, rather than ending it, he continues fighting and moving towards complete defeat.

The main issue, therefore, is that peace negotiations are merely a show designed to buy time. It has become clear that the war will not end as long as Vladimir Putin remains in power. But this raises another question: what, then, is the main issue?

The answer lies in the fact that Russia officially withdrew on 1 November 2026 from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which it had joined in 1997 under the Council of Europe.

According to the Council of Europe, the Russian authorities formally notified it of their decision to withdraw from the Convention on 30 October 2025. Under the established procedure, the decision came into force one year later, on 1 November 2026. As a result, Russia ceased to be a party to this Convention, which operates within the framework of the Council of Europe to prevent torture, and officially became a country that tortures people.

At the same time, Russia’s parliament, the Duma, is preparing to approve the 2027 Russian federal budget — a plan to print empty roubles intended solely to finance the war. This is not a state budget; it is a plan that will bring about economic default.

Thus, history is repeating itself in Russia: the Putin regime will collapse, and the Russian Federation will disintegrate. This will be the first confirmation that a dictatorial system in which those in power never change is becoming a thing of the past. This is the main issue hidden behind the Russian army’s losses.