Why Russia's Amassing 50,000 Troops Is No Longer A Major Offensive

There was a time, a few years ago, when the threat of 50,000 Russian troops amassing anywhere along the front constituted a serious threat. But as this war has evolved, with drones and artillery hyper focused on any movement near the front, let alone heading towards it, many more than 50,000 will be needed given that Russia has been losing over 1,000 troops a day for well over a year now. That is especially true given the fact that the Russians are advancing on scooters and golf carts rather than companies or battalions of armor. 

So while the tempo of Russian activity has picked up, assessment of the maps in both Ukraine's east and north suggests that this is no longer a sufficient force for a major breakthrough. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

In today’s war fighting, 50,000 troops against defensive positions is enough for a small offensive, but not for a full scale invasion. With defensive firepower and UAVs in large numbers, the Russians can make problems for the Ukrainians with their high-casualty, small chunks of land attacks, but it will not be sustainable after a few weeks without significantly more forces. Do not expect dramatic change in the front line. Do expect lost of small attacks, some small advances, and lots of destruction. If the Russians do the attacking and the Ukrainians take advantage of that—so much the better.

One of the weird differences in how the war has been reported over the last years is that when the Russians disperse their forces and launch offensive operations which are not self supporting because they are so spread apart, they are usually praised for their military efforts and doom is widely forecast. Think about the Kharkiv Offensive which started just over a year ago, which the press described at first as an operation that could lead to Ukrainian collapse (when actually it was a Russian strategic failure).

On the other hand, when the Ukrainians, on internal lines, launch their offensive on Kursk, that was quickly described as a dangerous risk that was bound to go wrong.

I bring this up because the Russians seem once again to be launching some kind of wide-spread unconcentrated offensive operations (hold your horses before you panic). In the last two weeks one element of this operation has started up in the Sumy Oblast—thousands of kilometres of front from the main fighting in the Donbas. Over the last few days there were lots of reports that the Russians have concentrated about 50,000 troops on the border with Sumy and have started advancing into Ukraine. Zelensky himself used this number in one of his addresses and stated that the Ukrainians were expecting Russian attacks there. Here is the Deep State map of the area as of this morning (with scale in the bottom right).

The Russians have advanced about five miles into Ukraine over the border in the last two weeks. In the last few days the Russian attacks in the Sumy area have picked up and that, as long as the even bigger attacks in the Donbas, have led to some judgements that the Russians have started their major Summer Offensive.

Of course, in today’s war fighting environment, 50,000 troops against defensive positions is enough for a small offensive, but not for a full scale invasion. With defensive firepower and UAVs in large numbers, the Russians can make some problems for the Ukrainians with their high-casualty, small chunks of land attacking techniques, but it will not be sustainable after a few weeks without significantly more forces. Maybe the best way to describe what they were doing was given by Mykola Bielieskov in his Atlantic Council report of what the coming summer offensive by the Russians might entail.

Russia’s strategy continues to rely on costly frontal assaults, but the nature of these attacks is steadily evolving. Russian troops now increasingly employ motorbikes and other improvised vehicles to advance in small groups and infiltrate Ukraine’s defensive lines. These assaults are backed by strike drones, glide bombs, and artillery, making it difficult for Ukraine to direct reinforcements to hot spots or provide medical and engineering support. The end goal is to force Ukrainian tactical withdrawals and inch further forward.

Certainly this kind of tactic is what we have seem from the Russians in the Donbas over the last month, as they have made a few small gains. In the Donbas, the Russians have been maintaining a relatively high tempo of offensive operations for the last month—though interestingly in a relatively small area. The are operating, in the area between Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar (which is an area that they have been fighting in for well over a year).

Here is a map of the area, to give you an idea of the relatively small size involved (includes a distance marker in the bottom left). The distance (by road) from Chasiv Yar to Pokrovsk is just over 50 miles (89 kilometers).

Here is this area within the context of the front line—its pretty small.

Now during the month of May, the Russians made some very small advances in this area. Here is the map on 30 April, so you can see. The Russians have expanded the central bulge by somewhere between 5-10 miles.

So we see a definite uptick in Russian offensive operations, in very disparate theaters. There are even reports that the Russians are about to start offensive operations in another area, Zaporizhzhia oblast. General Syrskyi mentioned that in a statement yesterday where he also implied that a more general Russian offensive is now underway.

Of course all of this happens after the Russians have already been attacking for at least the month of May as well. So what is occurring? Well it would be most accurate to say that with the better Spring/Summer weather the Russians are increasing the tempo of what they have been doing. They are pressing to take “inches” wherever they can. Its a strategy based on the Russian assumption that they are ultimately in control of when the fighting stops; that with Trump in the White House that any Ukrainian territory they seize now is one they can hold onto when a “ceasefire” is eventually reached. It allows them to spread out their forces in these unsupported attacks and launch these series of attacks.

Would they be doing this if the US were still strongly backing Ukraine? That is questionable. Its a very high casualty/high loss form of fighting and it is not sustainable. However they could keep it this summer if they do not have any fear that Ukraine will be supported to try and take back its territory.

So do not expect dramatic change in the front line, and be cautious about those who get all panicky—there remains an analytical community functioning which is keen to spread the narrative of an excellent Russian military to justify past failures. However, do expect lost of small attacks, some small advances, and lots of destruction. If the Russians do the attacking and the Ukrainians take advantage of that—so much the better.