The Reason 2026 Is Likely To Be Putin's Worst Year In Ukraine

For Russian soldiers and their overlords in the Kremlin, 2026 is not the year it all gets better. 

There are no magic new weapons, drafts of eager replacements, or sudden improvements in logistics. If the first 12 days of the year are any indication, it is not just more of the same - it's worse. Piecemeal infantry infiltrations in a variety of sectors have been wiped out, there are no reserves massing to support breakthroughs - even if the Russians were finally capable of making them. And there is no prospect of the Ukrainians giving up: in fact, just the opposite. The biggest problem for Putin is that his cronies and oligarchs are getting tired of both the continued failure and the economic opportunity cost. Which is why 2026 could be the year is forced to seek some sort of face-saving peace. JL

Amy Knight comments in the Wall Street Journal:

The year has started badly for Vladimir Putin. As of Sunday, the war in Ukraine has lasted as long as Soviet involvement in World War II. Stalin’s forces made it to Berlin in that time, but Mr. Putin’s progress has been modest. Last year Russian troops captured less than 1% of Ukrainian territory. The U.S. military’s swift capture of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and his wife further highlighted Russia’s military weakness. Another embarrassment for Putin came when the U.S. seized an oil tanker escorted by the Russian navy. Russia’s military spending in 2025 is five times that of 2021. (But) in November 2025, oil and gas revenue had fallen 34% from the previous year. Putin's war-weary entourage—and oligarch cronies—might well pressure Mr. Putin to come to the table with a peace plan.

The year has started badly for Vladimir Putin. As of Sunday, the war in Ukraine has lasted as long as the Great Patriotic War, as Moscow refers to the Soviet involvement in World War II: 1,418 days. Stalin’s forces made it to Berlin in that time, but Mr. Putin’s progress has been more modest. Last year Russian troops captured less than 1% of Ukrainian territory. At this pace, it will take Russia another year to reach the Donetsk border and control the area Mr. Putin is demanding Ukraine hand over as a precondition for peace.

The U.S. military’s swift capture of Venezuela’s dictator Nicolás Maduro and his wife on Jan. 3 further highlighted Russia’s military weakness. As Russian political analyst Abbas Gallyamov observed: “The brilliant success of the Americans, who showed with Venezuela what a ‘special military operation’ really should look like, further demoralizes the inhabitants of Russia—both ordinary people and the elite. The contrast between the highest efficiency of the U.S. military and intelligence services and the striking inefficiency of their Russian colleagues is simply too stark.” That Mr. Maduro was a crucial ally of the Kremlin made it worse.

Another embarrassment for Mr. Putin came Wednesday, when the U.S. seized an oil tanker south of Iceland that was escorted by the Russian navy. Pro-war Russian social media whose posts reach millions voiced outrage. “Your ships are seized,” one blogger wrote, “and in response to these slaps in the face you only express concern, instead of tearing out the enemy’s liver.”

Adding to Mr. Putin’s problems, his longtime associate Dimitry Kozak, who recently resigned over the war in Ukraine, last month published an ambitious program of reform in a leading Russian media outlet. In the view of Russian political expert Oleg Ivanov, “the document is really impressive for its courage, especially against the background of current political rhetoric. In fact, it is a program of deep transformation of key state institutions, designed to respond to global and internal challenges.”

Mr. Putin can always pressure Mr. Kozak into silence. But when Mr. Putin announced in February 2022 his plans to invade Ukraine, Mr. Kozak wasn’t the only member of his security council to warn against going forward. The council’s head, Nikolai Patrushev (who has been demoted but remains on the council), voiced reservations.

Others who dutifully supported Mr. Putin’s war have reason to be unhappy. The war in Ukraine has been costly. From early 2025 to mid-October, according to the Economist, at least 100,000 Russian soldiers have died. The front line has been replaced by a “kill zone” where drones destroy up to 80% of equipment and manpower on both sides.

Russia’s total military spending in 2025 has been estimated at 15.5 trillion rubles—in nominal terms, five times that of 2021. That doesn’t include the cost of maintaining the Ukrainian territories Russia has occupied or payments to soldiers and their families. In November 2025, oil and gas revenue had fallen 34% from the previous year. To plug a record 2025 budget deficit (expected to be $72 billion, or 2.6% of gross domestic product) and fund the war effort, Russia’s value-added tax on goods and services rose on Jan. 1 from 20% to 22%.

That raises the cost of living for ordinary Russians, who are increasingly anxious to see the Ukraine conflict end. A poll by the Levada Center shows that Russian public opinion on the war has shifted significantly. In December 2024, 37% thought the war should continue, and 54% wanted peace talks to begin; a year later, only 25% favored a continuation of the conflict and 67% wanted peace negotiations to begin.

High interest rates to fight war-driven inflation have stifled investment. Oleg Deripaska, a loyal Putin oligarch, recently posted a link to a Russian newspaper editorial that was unusually critical of the government’s failure to cultivate a healthy investment climate. The editorial asserted that “next year cannot be navigated by relying on inertia,” and urged the country’s leadership “to focus on establishing a reliable and developed capital and financial market.” Adding to the Putin elite’s frustration, its members can’t access their billions of private assets tied up in European banks.

On Thursday Russia flatly rejected a plan put forth by European and Ukrainian negotiators for a peacekeeping force to guarantee a future cease-fire. That night the Russian military conducted a devastating strike against the Lviv region, deploying its hypersonic Oreshnik ballistic missile for the second time in the war.

Mr. Putin is able to stifle ordinary Russians’ discontent with the war by employing the state’s powerful repressive measures. But he can’t continue this conflict without support from his Kremlin entourage. That support could be undermined if the U.S. provided Ukraine with the arms it needs to counter Russia’s drones and missiles. So challenged, war-weary colleagues—and oligarch cronies—might well pressure Mr. Putin to come to the table with a peace plan that Ukraine could accept.