For Past 2 Months, Russia Could Only Replace 75% of Losses Inflicted By Ukraine

Data reveal that the Kremlin's ability to replace its losses in Ukraine is diminishing. In historical terms, this is a signal that the Russian army is getting weaker because it cannot regenerate itself, meaning that its ability to pose a threat is declining. 

Ukraine identified this potential and announced a plan to inflict 50,000 Russian casualties a month while reducing its own by greater use of aerial and land drones. But the supply side of the equation is that Russia is running out of manpower inside the country and in adjacent Central Asian nations, as well as from tricking or cajoling other young men from poor countries around the world. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

Ukraine is causing losses significantly above Russian replacement rates. In December 2025 and January 2026, with figures supported by western intelligence agencies, Russia's losses were, 33,200 lost and 27,400 replaced, then 30,618 lost and 22,000 replaced. So for two months the Ukrainians have caused 63,818 losses which the Russians have only been able to replace with 47,400. This is statistically a very large gap, with new troops only making up for 75% of the losses suffered. To go from equal loss/replacement levels to a 25% gap in a short period is striking. It also happened because the Russians (are) struggling to attract new recruits. Armies tend to get relatively stronger or relatively weaker. They rarely tread water for long periods. The trajectory over the last two months is that the Russian army could be getting weaker.

One of the reasons that in my research I try to steer people away from seeing individual battles as decisive (or in many cases even that important) is that history tends to greatly distort their impact.¹ Writers, readers, film-makers, etc, like to make battles dramatic as events, not surprisingly, as it makes what happens during them seems that history is in the balance. In reality, individual battles decide very little. They usually cause far fewer losses than one thinks and effect the trajectories of a war only in small ways.

far more important in understanding the course of a war is to follow longer term trends of losses caused, losses experienced, and new forces/equipment generated. As a war progresses, if one side starts experiencing losses at a higher rate than they can replace, that is not a good sign for them. This kind of thinking has influenced the Ukrainian strategy for 2026 as I have mentioned a few times most recently is last week’s Ukrainian victory strategy piece. The Ukrainians have a goal of inflicting 50,000 casualties a month on the Russians, on the assumption that the Russians can replace approximately 30,000 of these. This latter figure was the Russian replacement rate in 2025.

Note: The third part of the Ukrainian strategy is to reduce their casualties even further at the same time.

Now the Ukrainians are not yet getting close to the 50,000 a month target for Russian losses, but in their claims for December 2025 and January 2026, claims that are being supported by different western intelligence agencies, they are finally causing losses for the Russians that are significantly above the Russian loss rates.

The specific claims are:

December 2025: Russian losses 33,200—Russian new recruits 27,400

January 2026: Russian losses 30,618—Russian new recruits 22,000

Note: With the weather being so cold and difficult in January, attacks could have been down and Ukrainian drone usage was probably made more complex.

So overall for two months the Ukrainians claim to have caused 63,818 losses which the Russians have only been able to replace with 47,400 forces. This is actually statistically a very large gap, with new troops only making up for about 75% of the losses suffered.

This is also a marked change from 2025 overall, when the Ukrainians said that they were able to inflict approximately as many losses on the Russian (410,000) as the Russians were able to recruit during the same period (406,000).

To go from approximately equal loss/replacement levels to a 25% gap in a short period is striking. It is also worth noting that it happened because the Russians seem to be struggling to attract new recruits. This is not a surprise, as the Russian casualty-heavy way of fighting is not one that is likely to win them many eager new sacrificial lambs the longer the war goes on. In the past they have tried to get around this problem with massive financial incentives, however there are signs now that this enticement is losing its appeal. The Russians are also trying to lure/trick young men from other parts of the world to join their military, but that is probably not a war-winning tactic.

The Russian way of war, which too many brain-dead propagandists like to present as some inexorable steam-roller of suffering that cannot be beaten, is actually not effective as a long-term strategy. It is one of the reasons that the Russian inevitable victory argument, so beloved of Donald Trump and some others, is so wrong-headed. The Russian way of fighting actually contains the seeds of Russian defeat—if Ukraine’s friends want to support Ukraine to take advantage of that fact.

Wasting Your Own Soldiers Is Normally Not A Way To Win

Now this is only two months so we need to be careful. Perhaps recruiting in a terribly cold winter was down for other reasons and will snap back. However if it continues and the Ukrainians are able to raise their monthly total of inflicted losses to 40,000 (I think 50,000 is ambitious so will go for the lower target for now), that will mean that even the small Russian advances should ground to a halt.

Armies tend to get either relatively stronger or relatively weaker. They rarely tread water for long periods. The trajectory over the last two months is that the Russian army could be getting weaker. That is a story of note.