Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:
Not only have the Russians gained little since the end of 2022, their loss to advance ratio has gotten to the point that it is arguably the worst in modern military history. Russian battlefield fatalities in Ukraine are more than 17 times greater than Soviet fatalities in Afghanistan during the 1980s, 11 times greater than during Russia’s First and Second Chechen Wars in the 1990s and 2000s, and over five times greater than all Russian and Soviet wars combined since World War II. How small the Russian advances in Ukraine have been (is exacerbated by the fact that) as the war goes on, the advances get smaller and smaller. The Russian offensive (which has failed) to take Chasiv Yar might be the most self-harming in military history.
First of all I need to offer a disclaimer. I am a non-resident Senior Associate of CSIS and I am proud to have that relationship. While many think-tanks in Washington and elsewhere have trimmed their colors shockingly to get in line with the Trump administration’s policies (which are weakening the USA terribly), CSIS has remained a bedrock of solid, dispassionate research. You can see that in one of their most recent reports, which is available for free download in its entirety here. Please do take a moment and get yourself a copy.
While far too many people, in the most senior of positions, accept Kremlin talking points about a super-powerful Russia and its inevitable victory over Ukraine (I also discussed this problem this week in my piece on a Victory Strategy for Ukraine), this report, written by Seth Jones, an excellent historian, and Riley McCabe, an up and coming research star, puts three key questions in perspective. They are Russian (and Ukrainian) losses, Russian gains in relation to these losses, and Russia’s economic and technological resources. For each they show that far from being a great power marching to victory, Russia is a “declining power” making tiny advances at a shockingly high cost.
Let me take you the three points so you can see how important this report is.
Russian Losses: Sometimes people talk about Russia losing 1.2 million soldiers (probably minimum estimate) and do not realize just how shocking this figure is historically. When compared to major power performance in the 20th and 21st centuries, the Russians are losing soldiers at an unprecedented clip. Here is one excerpt which puts these losses in some context.
These numbers are extraordinary. No major power has suffered anywhere near these numbers of casualties or fatalities in any war since World War II.18 For example, U.S. battlefield casualty and fatality numbers are significantly lower, with the United States suffering 54,487 battle deaths during the Korean War, 47,434 deaths during the Vietnam War, 149 deaths during the 1990–1991 Gulf War, 2,465 deaths in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, and 4,432 deaths in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.19 Russian casualties and fatalities are also remarkable from a historical Russian and Soviet perspective (see Appendix A). Russian battlefield fatalities in Ukraine are more than 17 times greater than Soviet fatalities in Afghanistan during the 1980s, 11 times greater than during Russia’s First and Second Chechen Wars in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively, and over five times greater than all Russian and Soviet wars combined since World War II.
Russian Gains: What the report then really hammers home is that such losses have been suffered for shockingly small gains (with some very effective graphics). Not only have the Russians gained little since the end of 2022, their loss to advance ratio has gotten to the point that it is arguably the worst in modern military history. It compares badly to British advances during Battle of the Somme, for instance, which are often historically described as horrific in battle losses for the land gained. Here is one chart that shows just how small the Russian advances in Ukraine have been historically (and note how as the war goes on, the advances get smaller and smaller in relative terms).
I particularly like the continuing reference to Chasiv Yar at the top. This battle has been going on for two years. However focus has left it because Russian advances have basically stopped and instead reporters and analysts talk about Pokrovsk and Kupiansk as there has been slightly more movement in these places. However take a look at Chasiv Yar. After two years of attacks and untold losses, the Russians have still not taken the whole town. Just to reinforce that, here is a map of the front line around Chasiv Yar today (down to a 2-kilometer map gauge).
And here is the same map 2 years and 1 month ago.
The front line in 761 days has moved maybe 8 kilometres. The Russian offensive to take Chasiv Yar might be the most self-harming in modern military history.
Russian Economic Strength: Having discussed high Russian casualties and low Russian gains, the paper then gets to one of the factors for such lack of success—the weakness of the Russian economy. In a nutshell, the Russian economy is simply not that strong and is struggling to support a winning war effort. It is burning through its cash reserves, its growth is stagnating, and it is not competitive in high tech. One chart shows after the original large spurt in economic growth brought about by the massive spending right after the full-scale invasion (entirely predictable) Russian growth has stalled badly (not predictable).
To have such anaemic growth in 2025 and 2026 (projected) shows just how the Russian economy is running on fumes.
You add these points up and it reinforces the point that the Russian war machine is underperforming and Ukraine can win. I know that might not be a shock to regular readers here, but it needs to be stressed and shared more widely. Hopefully this excellent report can help do that.























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