Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:
There is no way the Russian president can afford to end the war now. It has been a catastrophe for Russia. It has suffered over 1.2 million casualties (the true figure is unlikely to ever be fully established). It has used up a large proportion of its Cold War legacy stocks of munitions and equipment - unlikely to ever be replenished. Its economy is in trouble, it has used up much of its treasury reserves, and has become a vassal state of China. Russia has also seen the emigration of 1.3 million citizens. And it has achieved none of its political objectives. In short, Putin has nothing to show for the massive costs of the war. Accepting a negotiated settlement now, where he cannot claim a clear ‘win’ for Russia and for the Russian people, would be a big problem domestically for Putin.
Another Round of Peace Talks. There is one message that we should take away from the current round of talks to end the war in Ukraine: Putin does not want the war to end right now.
Peace talks for the war in Ukraine continue to drag out. U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, along with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Jared Kushner, and senior advisor to the U.S. President’s Board of Peace Josh Gruenbaum met with Russia’s lead negotiator Kirill Dmitriev in Miami on 31 January. These talks, like all previous discussions, were described as “productive” and “constructive.” In a social media post, Witkoff stated that:
We are encouraged by this meeting that Russia is working toward securing peace in Ukraine and is grateful for @POTUS’s critical leadership in seeking a durable and lasting peace.
The United States negotiating team is also planning to meet again with Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Abu Dhabi on the first of February.
These latest discussions are being held against the backdrop of a truce on strikes against energy facilities. At least Ukraine is sticking to this arrangement. There is no word from Russia about whether they intend doing so.
Besides this ‘energy truce’, and an exchange of fallen soldiers this week, very little else has emerged from the recent talks designed to end the current war in Ukraine. There is a very simple reason why there has been so little progress.
There is no way that the Russian president can afford to end the war now.
This is despite the fact that the war has been a catastrophe for Russia. It has suffered over 1.2 million casualties (although the true figure is unlikely to ever be fully established). It has used up a large proportion of its Cold War legacy stocks of munitions and equipment, something that is unlikely to ever be replenished. Its economy is in trouble, it has used up much of its treasury reserves, and it has become a vassal state of China. Russia has also seen the emigration of 1.3 million citizens since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, exacerbating its pre-existing demography challenges.
And Russia has achieved none of its political objectives for Ukraine that Putin discussed in his speeches on the eve of the full-scale invasion:
Ukraine has not been subjugated, and remains a free, vibrant democracy.
Ukraine’s military has not been destroyed; indeed it is bigger and vastly more capable.
Russian territory is less secure; Ukraine is able to conduct long-range strikes on targets deep inside Russia at will.
Russia’s reputation as a world power - or even as a middling power - has been degraded.
The Russian military has shown itself to marginally effective in military affairs, while showing it is highly effective at looting, raping, murdering civilians and POWs, and destroying civil infrastructure and Ukrainian cultural treasures. And while the Russian military has learned to learn better, it has only improved its performance from ‘abysmal’ to just plain old ‘barely adequate’ over a four year period.
If this was the United States four years after its 2003 invasion of Iraq, we would call this out clearly as “losing the war”.
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And what has Russia recieved in return?
Well, in February 2022 before it commenced its full-scale invasion, Russia occupied about 9% of Ukraine, including Crimea and areas of the Donbas. Since that time, it has seized around another 12% of Ukraine. According to the figures published by the Institute for the Study of War, that equates to just over 45 700 square miles captures in four years of war, or over the 1438 days of the war, about 31 square miles per day. This has come at the cost, on average, of over 850 casualties for every single day of the war.
By comparison, the United States (with a population 2.4 times the size of Russia’s) suffered an average of 24 casualties per day in 2004, the worst year for American casualties of the Iraq War.
In short, Putin has almost nothing to show for the massive costs of the war. Accepting a negotiated settlement now, where he cannot claim a clear ‘win’ for Russia and for the Russian people, would be a big problem domestically for Putin. Over the past four years, Putin has transformed Russia into a ‘war’ nation, changing school curricula, domestic media, defence industry, trading parters and other national endeavours to re-jig Russia for a long, drawn out war effort. He has to show to his people some kind of return on that investment, which at present, he cannot.
Additionally, he would also have a major challenge with the return home of hundreds of thousands of veterans, many of whom will be angry that they were not permitted to ‘fight on to victory’. Russian politicians know well what occurs when losing armies return home: political strife. Neither Putin nor his ruling clique of billionaires want that. As one recent article on this subject notes:
The Kremlin is beginning to worry about the problems with returning veterans of the war in Ukraine but does not yet have a clear idea about what to do.
On the flip side, Putin also knows that taking the rest of the Donbas by force will probably take all of 2026 (at least) and will result in another half a million casualties. And, the higher his casualties go, the less believable his strategic narrative of ‘inevitable victory’ becomes.
But, this is better for Putin than the alternative I have described above.
Therefore, Putin has continued to set the bar very high for any ceasefire: the ceding of the entirety of the Donbas to Russia, keeping Ukraine’s territory of Crimea, political accommodations from the Ukrainian government, no NATO and no foreign forces in Ukraine. Putin knows that together these are unacceptable to Ukraine and Europe, and thus, he can keep fighting. He is deliberately sabotaging negotiations so the fighting can continue.
Putin’s big problem is the President of the United States. He can’t afford to arbitrarily dismiss the American negotiations team because Putin knows that Trump is inclined to help Russia if possible. And he knows the best chance of an outcome favourable to Russia is through keeping Trump on side. At the same time, Putin knows that when he has rebuffed Trump in 2025, he has suffered few consequences.
Somehow, through peace talks, back channel discussions with Trump’s representatives, terror bombing in Ukraine, misinformation and subversion in Ukraine and Europe in 2026, Putin will be hoping to have the U.S. administration strong-arm Ukraine into an agreement favourable to Russia.
But here’s the thing with that plan. It might result in a ceasefire for a short time. But, neither party is likely to be satisfied with the solution for long. And here is where understanding Clausewitz really matters. As he writes in Chapter 1 of On War:
Even the final decision of a whole War is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered State often sees in it only a passing evil.
We know from Russia’s behaviour in the past quarter century that it has rarely signed a peace agreement that it has abided by. Any ceasefire negotiated in 2026 (if that is possible) will not settle the war. There is too much enmity, and too much disputed terrain and political ideology now between Ukraine and Russia to see any peace agreement as anything other than a temporary cessation of hostilities.
In conclusion, we should keep our expectations low for this round of peace talks, and those that follow in the short term. Neither side believes they are losing, and both believe they are capable of negotiating a better deal than those currently on the table.
The fighting and the dying - on the battlefield and by civilians in the cities across Ukraine - will continue.
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