Ukraine learned some very hard lessons from its failed 2023 counteroffensive in Zaporizhia. And is now serving it back to the Russians in double measure. The much anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive, for whatever reason, was slow in coming. Russian General Surovikin used the time to make his defensive lines more formidable. Those elaborate multi-layered lines with miles of dense frontal mine fields, enfilading firing positions and hardened dugouts backed by Ka-52 “Alligator” helicopters are still visible in the above map. A new name had entered military history … the Surovikin Line. Just as it was for the Ukrainians in the summer of 2023, the Russians have run smack dab into the Ukrainian defensive rock wall in the very same area
Orikhiv Direction, Zaporizhia Oblast, Ukraine. The Russians had skedaddled across the Dnipro River and abandoned Kherson city on November 11, 2022. But before they did that Russian General Sergey Surovikin had profitably used the time to begin constructing heavily fortified defensive works on the west central Zaporizhian steppe behind which his army retreated.
The much anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive, for whatever reason, was slow in coming. Surovikin used the additional time to make his defensive lines even more formidable. Those elaborate multi-layered lines with miles of dense frontal mine fields, enfilading firing positions and hardened dugouts backed by Ka-52 “Alligator” Assault helicopters are still visible in the above map. A new name had entered military history … the Surovikin Line.
The settlement of Mala Tokmachka was where then Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief, General Valerii “Yoda” Zaluzhnyi and his planners decided to start Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. The Battle of Mala Tokmachka, June 7-9, 2023. Ukraine threw forward some of its best trained mechanized units, especially the renowned 33rd and 47th Mechanized Brigades, bristling with their brand new western-NATO kit.
The Russians were waiting for them. Somehow they knew this was the jump off point and had triangulated and zeroed in massive artillery and other long fires. The resulting carnage inflicted on the Ukrainians was a huge propaganda bonanza for the Russians. Videos and pictures of littered and burning American Bradleys, German Leopards, etc, etc., were all over the media for weeks, trumpeting the news that Russian arms were much superior to their western counterparts. Mala Tokmachka was perhaps a foreshadowing of the long, brutal and costly futility which finally came to a halt after Ukraine made it as far as the village of Robotyne but could not overcome the Russian defenses at Verbove and Novoprokopivka. Zaluzhnyi’s dream of marching to Tokmak and on to Melitopol and to the Sea of Azov ended. Along with his own military career.
Since then the Russians have steadily clawed back much of the area Ukraine had liberated at such a huge cost. The Russians are now fighting well out of their own Surovikin defensive line and out in the open sandy plains of Southern Zaporizhia, threatening to take the major Ukrainian logistical base at Orikhiv and even sweeping around both the left and right(Huliaipole) flanks of the Ukrainian defenses to take under tube artillery Zaporizhia city, the home of over 700,000 people and the administrative capital of Zaporizhia oblast:
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9, 2026
The Russian command likely hoped that Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction would complement Russian advances near Orikhiv, which would in turn enable Russian forces to advance toward Orikhiv from the east and west and later enable advances toward Zaporizhzhia City itself.
But just as it was for the Ukrainians in the summer of 2023, the tables have turned and the Russians have also ran smack dab into the Ukrainian defensive rock wall in the very same area:
As of March 9, 2026, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed the terrain control in eastern Zaporizhzhia Oblast, showing continued Russian advances in the western and southern sectors. Recent developments indicate Ukrainian efforts to resist Russian offensives, particularly near Robotyne and Verbove, where Ukrainian forces have reportedly repelled Russian advances. The contact line remains fluid, with both sides conducting localized operations.
And the Russian attempts to wheel around the eastern flank of the Ukrainian defenses(at Huliapole) have also ran into the current gonzo Ukrainian counter in that area which to date has pushed the Russians back and out of over 400 Sq km of Southern Ukraine:
Ukrainian forces are successfully counterattacking not only in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions but also in western Zaporizhia Oblast. These counterattacks are generating tactical, operational and strategic effects that may disrupt Russia’s spring-summer 2026 offensive campaign plan. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 9 that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces (GoF), which includes the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and operates in western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, has “virtually halted” advances near Orikhiv and in the area just south of Zaporizhzhia City, west of Orikhiv.[1] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian counterattacks in the Richne-Prymorske direction (both south of Zaporizhzhia City) forced Russian small groups to retreat from northern and central Prymorske. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of Novoyakolivka and northern Lukyanivkse (both southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) and noted that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces south of Pavlivka (just south of Novoyakolivka). Mashovets reported that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to advance near Orikhiv itself, attacking southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Robotyne and Danylivka, and west and northwest of Orikhiv toward Mali Shcherbaky in the direction of Novopavlivka without success.
More in depth and fascinating reasons why Russia has ran into the same rock wall that Ukraine did in 2023:
The Russians slowed down a lot near Hulyaipole, they donʼt have the strength to attack Orikhiv
Since the end of last summer, the Russians have been trying to combine their offensives on Hulyaipole and Orikhiv in order to then advance towards Zaporizhzhia. To do this, they conducted large mechanized assaults. In some places, the Russians were able to realize their plan, but not in the Orikhiv direction — all offensive operations there ended in complete defeat.(emphasis mine)
And the knock-on strategic effects for the Russians are being felt farther afield from Zaporizhia Oblast itself ... possibly affecting Russian decisions in Kherson and Donetsk oblasts:The counterattacks in southern Ukraine are also having strategic effects in other parts of the theater. Mashovets assessed on March 9 that the Dnepr GoF may have to pull elements from Kherson Oblast to help Russian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast contend with the Ukrainian counterattacks.[16] Mashovets noted that it will likely be difficult to pull forces away from the Kherson direction as the Russian command has previously redeployed Dnepr GoF VDV and assault elements to other areas of the theater, including to the Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka directions in Donetsk Oblast.
Would Russia dare pull troops from the Eastern banks of the Dnipro and leave the ZNPP(Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant) area weakened? The Ukrainians are already gathering and training their riverine fast assault units at nearby Nikopol, for just that possibility … ready to pounce on the slightest Russian weakness in that area. The Russians are quite aware of this and have regularly shelled Nikopol to forestall the growing Ukrainian build-up. Interesting times ahead in that area. Stay tuned.
ADAPTIVE INDOMITABLE UKRAINE learned some very hard lessons from its failed 2023 counteroffensive in Zaporizhia. And is now serving it back to the Russians in double measure
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