Ukraine's Counteroffensive Disrupted Russia's Donetsk Advance For This Year

The Kremlin's plan to take all of Donetsk this year was never considered realistic given Russian forces weaknesses - especially the lack of a strategic reserve to continue attacking in small units, let alone exploit hypothetical breakthroughs. But Ukraine's southern counteroffensive, which has forced the Russians to redeploy troops from Donetsk to the south has now all but cancelled the Kremlin's Donetsk hopes. 

The Ukrainians' counteroffensive continues, largely because the ostensible Russian advances of the past year have often been by small groups of soldiers who are frequently not in communication with each other. This has made them easy for the Ukrainians to roll up. Since the lack of a significant reserve makes such setbacks more dangerous than they might have been a year or two ago, the Ukrainians are in a position to keep pushing the Russians, thereby forcing the Kremlin to reassess what is possible for their depleted units. JL

Alex Stezhensky reports in New Voice of Ukraine:

Ukrainian forces' counteroffensive on the southern front that has already disrupted Russian plans for the coming (year). The counteroffensive has produced “tactical, operational and strategic effects.” Russia’s Dnepr group has effectively halted its offensive near Orikhiv and south of Zaporizhzhya. The 400 square kilometers captured so far includes territories that had never officially been recognized as lost —  where only small Russian groups had entered. Drone reconnaissance discovered the map did not match reality: Russian forces controlled a much smaller area than they believed. Russian counterattack attempts failed. Collapse of Russia's broader summer offensive is 'coming into view' and the Kremlin’s ambition to fully capture Donetsk Oblast will not be realized this year.

Russian battlefield losses have exceeded the number of new recruits for three consecutive months, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said on March 13, highlighting growing strain on Moscow’s war effort. At the same time, Ukrainian forces have launched a counteroffensive on the southern front that has already disrupted Russian plans for the coming campaign. NV, together with military analysts, examined the operation’s early results and what it could mean for the battlefield in the months ahead.

Earlier, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that despite Russia mobilizing 40,000–43,000 people every month, it is losing up to 45,000 troops every four weeks due to desertions, battlefield casualties and the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone technologies.

But that is not the only positive news for Ukraine’s Defense Forces from the front line. On March 9, Syrskyi said a Ukrainian counteroffensive operation in the Oleksandrivsk sector — at the junction of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts — is ongoing. Since it began, Ukrainian forces have restored control over more than 400 square kilometers of territory. 

According to the commander-in-chief, the Defense Forces are attempting to seize the operational initiative. “For the first time since 2024, when we conducted the Kursk offensive operation, our troops in one month have regained control of more Ukrainian land than the enemy captured during the same period,” he said.

Syrskyi added that although Russian forces maintain nearly a threefold manpower advantage, active Ukrainian operations have forced them to postpone planned offensives, close gaps in their defenses and redeploy troops from other sectors.

In late January Ukraine’s Defense Forces launched something not seen for some time — large-scale counteroffensive actions. While the Kremlin was preparing its spring-summer campaign with its main blow aimed at the “fortress belt” in Donetsk Oblast, Ukrainian units unexpectedly attacked in the south along the border between Zaporizhzhya and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

As a result, according to Oleksandr Komarenko, head of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, by early March the Defense Forces had liberated almost all previously occupied areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and continue advancing.

The counteroffensive, according to military expert Viktor Kevliuk, produced “tactical, operational and strategic effects.” Russia’s Dnepr group has effectively halted its offensive near Orikhiv and south of Zaporizhzhya. Moreover, the Kremlin’s entire spring-summer offensive plan is now under threat.

What was actually liberated

Ukraine’s southern counteroffensive began on Jan. 29, when Ukrainian units attacked Russian forces on two interconnected sectors — the Oleksandrivsk sector in eastern parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the Huliaipole sector in eastern Zaporizhzhya Oblast. According to the plan, advancing formations were to push Russian troops beyond their main defensive lines and disrupt preparations for Russia’s spring campaign.

The first week brought rapid successes. Units of the 95th Separate Air Assault Brigade and other formations of Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces cleared several villages of Russian groups and advanced 10–12 kilometers deep into enemy-occupied territory.

Units of the Skelia 1st Mountain Assault Regiment of the Air Assault Forces advanced about 12 kilometers in the area between Nove Zaporizhzhya and Dobropillia, broke through Russian defenses and surrounded about 60 Russian soldiers. 

Experts say the success was made possible by several factors: the surprise factor, dense fog that prevented enemy FPV drone operators from operating effectively, and Russian communication problems caused by disruptions to Starlink.

The operation had been planned and coordinated by the Air Assault Forces, Roman Pohorilyi, co-founder of the DeepState analytical project, explained in an interview with Radio NV. In his view, this demonstrates the effectiveness of a model in which assault units operate under the command of an experienced branch of the military with the necessary infrastructure. 

Syrskyi spoke of 400 square kilometers of liberated territory. Independent analysts offer more cautious estimates. The Institute for the Study of War calculated about 279 square kilometers. Pohorilyi clarified that if one speaks of the “red zone” that actually came under Ukrainian control, it amounts to about 80 square kilometers, and up to 200 when including the “gray zone” where fighting continues.

According to Pohorilyi, the figure of 400 square kilometers likely includes territories that had never officially been recognized as lost — villages where only small Russian groups had entered.

Since mid-February, the Ukrainian advance has slowed and the fighting has taken on a more positional character.

Nevertheless, the counteroffensive exposed serious problems within the Russian army. To illustrate them, Kevliuk cited a story from intelligence sources. A commission from the headquarters of Russia’s 29th Army arrived at the command post of the 36th Motor Rifle Brigade and asked to see the combat map. After conducting a drone reconnaissance flight over the same area, it discovered the map did not match reality: Russian forces controlled a much smaller area than they believed.

“The enemy acted in small infiltration groups and drew the front line along their positions. But there was neither tactical communication nor command between those groups,” Kevliuk explained.

When Ukrainian forces launched counterattacks, these groups proved easy to isolate and eliminate. That is why the first week of the offensive was so successful: Ukrainian forces were essentially clearing territories of scattered enemy units that lacked coordination.

In the Zaporizhzhya sector near Orikhiv — southeast of the regional center — the situation proved even worse for Russian forces. Significant forces were deployed there against Ukrainian troops: the 58th Combined Arms Army with several motor rifle divisions and airborne units. Yet they failed to hold their positions.

Military expert Kostyantyn Mashovets wrote on his blog that in Prymorske — the shortest distance from the front line to Zaporizhzhya from the south, on the bank of the Dnipro River — Russian forces were forced to abandon the northern and central districts of the settlement.

Further east, Ukrainian forces completely cleared Russian “infiltrators” from Novoiakivlivka. In Stepnohirsk — slightly east of Prymorske — after fierce fighting Russian troops lost the northern part of the town and now hold only the district of high-rise apartment buildings near the children’s music school and several blocks on the western outskirts. 

Russian counterattack attempts failed. In the areas of Bilohiria and Mala Tokmachka, Russian forces attempted to break through toward Orikhiv from the southeast without success. Attacks south of Orikhiv (Robotyne–Novodanylivka sector) and southwest of the city (Mali Shcherbaky–Novopavlivka sector) also failed.

“At present, units of Russia’s 58th Combined Arms Army are essentially forced to repel Ukrainian counterattacks instead of continuing their own offensive,” Mashovets concluded. 

These developments forced Russian command to urgently redeploy reinforcements to the south. The 39th Motor Rifle Brigade and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade were transferred from near Pokrovsk.

However, the situation near Huliaipole remains difficult. According to Pohorilyi, the city itself is “practically lost,” and the initiative there is not currently on Ukraine’s side.

Dmytro Filatov, commander of the Da Vinci 1st Separate Assault Regiment, whose unit is currently fighting in the Huliaipole sector, confirmed in a conversation with Donbas.Realii that Huliaipole is almost fully occupied. But he said this forms part of the broader Ukrainian plan to stop Russian forces.

Filatov explained that his unit has conducted successful assault operations deep into enemy territory and will continue such actions to prevent Russian troops from reaching artillery range of Zaporizhzhya.

He also said he understands Syrskyi’s operational plan in the south. If it succeeds, Ukraine’s Defense Forces will achieve two goals at once — liberate all of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and stabilize the front near Zaporizhzhya.

Russian plans under pressure

Russian military command now faces a far more complicated operational situation than at the beginning of 2026, Kevliuk believes. Ukraine’s Defense Forces have tied down and slowed Russian troops in the Huliaipole and Oleksandrivsk sectors. At the same time, Russian headquarters must adapt quickly to communication problems caused by the blocking of Starlink.

As a result, Russian forces cannot consolidate the positions they reached in autumn 2025.

“The success of the Defense Forces is partly due to the fact that Russian troops did not track their own advances achieved through infiltration tactics, and these groups failed to secure their positions,” the expert said.

 

Ukraine’s ability to exploit these tactical mistakes deprived Russian forces of the staging positions needed for a spring-summer offensive, he added. The enemy’s intention to reach Zaporizhzhya now appears unrealistic.

In addition, Russian forces appear to lack strategic reserves. According to Mashovets, Russian troops near Zaporizhzhya will either continue attempts at a broad operational envelopment of the Orikhiv defense area from the west — which would require significant resources — or switch to more limited tactical assaults on Orikhiv itself. It appears the enemy will choose the second option.

Politically, such attacks could be presented as success — “we broke into another settlement.” But operationally it would mean abandoning the large-scale offensive on Zaporizhzhya.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive has not canceled Russia’s plans, the experts interviewed by NV say — but it has already disrupted the timeline of Moscow’s offensive campaign. At the same time, the collapse of Russia’s broader summer offensive is beginning to come into view.

And the Kremlin’s ambition to fully capture Donetsk Oblast will almost certainly not be realized this year.