"We Are Fighting Russia and We Know Why It Is Losing"

It is almost midway through 2026 and the dominant narrative of this war has become Russia's - and Putin's - weakness. There are many factors contributing to the supplanting of the Kremlin's now widely discredited 'inevitability' line including Ukraine's superior drone warfare and Russia's reduced access to soldiers.

But the most decisive may be the emergence of a cadre of experienced, rational Ukrainian combat leaders who know how to use information and motivate troops. The writing of a brigadier general from most militaries could understandably be written off as mere bloviating, but this one happens to be 34 years old, with four years of brutal combat to guide him. It is the the development of such commanders who are now implementing Ukraine's increasingly successful strategy. JL

Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko reports Ukraine Pravda:

The Russian military command is a rigid, vertical Soviet-style hierarchy, where every step is regulated from above. This system was created not for combat effectiveness, but to ensure political control over the army. Loyalty has always been more important than competence. Such a structure leads to operational paralysis in modern war. Ukrainian forces cultivate a command philosophy based on decentralization and empowerment developed for combat on a dynamic, non-linear battlefield. This war is not just a clash of armies, but the test of two diametrically opposed systems. Ukraine's is a network model built on trust, command culture, morale, social cohesion and the ability to adapt. (The result): a kill zone up to 20 km from the front, ambushes, search and strike operations, fire raids, pinpoint surgical counterattacks, encirclement of Russian units, hundreds of enemy prisoners, Russian equipment, warehouses, etc. burning up to 250 km.

On the eve of a full-scale invasion in 2022, Western think tanks and intelligence communities made a fundamental error in assessing Russian military power.

Their predictions, predicting the fall of Kyiv in a matter of days, were based on quantitative indicators: an army of a million, thousands of aircraft, tanks and artillery systems. This approach frightened ordinary readers, but ignored intangible but crucial factors: command culture, morale, social cohesion and the ability to adapt.

Analysts have misinterpreted both Putin's tolerance for risk and the isolation of the Kremlin's decision-making process, leading to erroneous predictions about possible escalation and Russia's response to NATO's support for Ukraine.

This analytical blindness persists to some extent. Many in the West continue to view the conflict purely through the lens of a war of attrition, where victory is determined solely by the amount of resources and the ability to mobilize more people. This is a dangerous mistake.

This war is not just a clash of armies, but the ultimate test of two diametrically opposed systems that emerged in the post-Soviet space. One system, the Ukrainian one, is a network model built on trust that unleashes human potential. Most of the changes here have been initiated and developed by ordinary citizens, soldiers, sergeants and junior officers. In particular, the transition of the Defense Forces of Ukraine to a corps system, which was promoted by Azov as a necessary step.

The Ukrainian Defense Forces, especially in units that grew out of the volunteer movement, such as Azov, have cultivated a command philosophy based on the principles of decentralization and empowerment.

This model is a modern interpretation of the German concept of Auftragstaktik (Mission Command), which was developed for conducting combat operations on a dynamic, non-linear battlefield.

The essence of this approach is that the higher command determines the purpose of the operation and the final result ("what" and "why"), that is, formulates the "commander's intention". Subsequently, the commanders of subordinate units work out the decision for approval (in cooperation with the commander, or independently). That is, "how" to achieve this goal is left to the discretion of the commanders on the ground, who have the most current situation on the battlefield.

After further adjustments or final approval of the decision, the action/operation begins. This approach requires a high level of trust and interaction between all levels of command. This creates an environment with a high level of trust, where initiative is not just encouraged, but is the basis of combat effectiveness. The unit turns into a single organism, a "family" or "team", where everyone feels their involvement and responsibility for completing the task.

This principle is not an informal practice; it is embedded in combat charters that emphasize decisiveness, suddenness of action, and demonstrated initiative to accomplish a combat mission in difficult conditions against superior enemy forces.

A vivid example of this is what the Defense Forces did in the Dobropol direction in the second half of 2025 - it is essentially a rethinking of the concept of mobile defense in the conditions of modern warfare. A giant trench, a kill zone up to 20 km from the line of combat contact, mixed battle formations, ambushes, search and strike operations, fire raids, pinpoint surgical counterattacks, encirclement of Russian units, hundreds of enemy prisoners.

The Russian military command system is the exact opposite. It is a rigid, vertically integrated Soviet-style hierarchy, where every step is regulated from above. This system was created not for maximum combat effectiveness, but to ensure political control over the army, where loyalty to the regime has always been more important than competence. As a result, such a structure leads to operational paralysis on the modern battlefield.

The key evidence of this systemic flaw is the chronic underdevelopment of junior command staff and the madness of senior officers, who are ready to commit a huge number of personnel (right down to the last soldier) to please the leadership, without departing even a step from the senior commander's plan, even if it was doomed to failure from the very beginning. This indicates a lack of flexibility in decision-making and a fear of the system to take responsibility, lest it become even worse.

In March, we celebrated the first anniversary of the creation of the 1st Corps of the Azov Naval Academy. In a short period of time, the corps' management and headquarters were formed from a list of combat officers with many years of military experience, who had participated in battles in 2014-2015, holding private and sergeant positions.

The vast majority of them have gone through all levels of management: having held command and staff positions, they have taken on responsibility, and they know trench warfare well.

1. With the assistance of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Syrsky, a full complement of corps troops has been assembled, which made it possible to fully conduct a defensive operation. All brigades are holding defense in the designated corps strip and side by side are performing combat missions at the proper level.

The problem of interaction between brigades at the junctions has disappeared, which prevents the enemy from breaking through the main line of defense in weak spots and developing success with access to the operational space.

Conducting combat and special training by instructors according to "Azov standards" is bearing fruit:

• the level of training increased during the implementation of the BZVP;
• conducting instructional and methodological sessions with junior team members and specialists;
• conducting command and staff exercises with officers of the department/staff.

This is clearly reflected in the desire of those who are training and in the quality of their performance in the assigned combat missions.

2. Attached units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, the State Border Guard Service, and the National Police perform combat missions on a par with regular units and have become an integral part of the corps. They gain combat experience, receive appropriate support, and conduct joint classes and training.

3. In the summer of 2025, the main enemy effort was concentrated in the Dobropil direction, which managed to break through a front 15 km wide and up to 20 km deep.

In cooperation with the Defense Forces, the enemy's advance was stopped, counteroffensive actions were successfully carried out to restore the lost position, and the stability of the defense was ensured.

4. On my initiative, the corps' strip is gradually increasing in order to strengthen the flanks, cover the attacked sections of the front, and increase the stability of the defense where necessary, which makes it possible to release units of neighboring corps and restore them.

5. With a clearly structured management work at the corps level, there are no problems in interacting with the SBS, DShV and attack aircraft units.

6. New staff units have been created:

• 8th JSC "Harmash";
• 41st Regiment of Unmanned Systems "Pilum";
• OZSP "Tuman";
• logistics support units (BMTZ, AB, RVB);
• 14th Assault Regiment (in the process of formation);
• Support Forces Regiment (in the process of formation);
• Medical battalion (in the process of formation).

7. Closed tactical-operational and operational depth: reconnaissance, destruction, mining. Enemy equipment, warehouses, PDD, etc. are burning at a depth of up to 250 km.

8. Medical Service and Support:

• a procedure for delivering blood to the front lines by drones has been implemented;
• conducting evacuation from the battlefield to the NRC;
• cooperation with leading medical institutions of Ukraine is carried out throughout the year;
• full compliance with international protocols;
• Work is underway on a large-scale project to rehabilitate and support those released from captivity.

9. We are developing building infrastructure: training grounds, schools, laboratories, workshops, production, warehouses, etc.

10. Corps intelligence, international cooperation, training units, a school of corinthians, and many other initiatives are aimed at scaling the values ​​of "Azov", strengthening the state's defense capabilities, and effective management methods.