Putin Now Has A Deeper Strategic Problem Beyond Battlefield Failure

Thanks to Ukraine's disciplined, technologically superior capabilities, Putin's strategic challenge has gotten even worse. Not only is he failing to win, or even sustain gains, on the battlefield, but he must now defend Crimea AND his economically-critical Russian heartland industrial base, both of which are under constant Ukrainian attack. 

In addition to the drain on Russian resources - and Putin's shrinking credibility - this gives Ukraine the ability to choose the time and place of the fighting, giving it an advantage in resource deployment and potential impact. This translates into rumors about Ukrainian offensives towards Crimea, other areas of Zaporizhzhia or in the Donbas, all of which Russia must try to defend with a diminished collection of men and materiel. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

The ground war continues to tilt in Ukraine’s favor. Kostiantynivka remains contested. Analysts report a concentration of some of Ukraine’s most capable units, including the 79th, 80th, and 95th Air Assault Brigades and the 92nd Mechanised Brigade, in the Zaporizhzhia sector. This suggests Zaporizhzhia and Crimea as the “most promising” areas for future Ukrainian offensive operations. Kyiv may be preparing a move toward the Perekop land bridge as the terrain favors Ukraine’s drone edge: open steppe, reliable weather, and small, well-trained infantry operating behind masses of tactical drones. This could also another deception campaign, similar to the lead up to the 2024 Kursk operation. (But) Putin has a much deeper problem than his inability to achieve decisive outcomes on the battlefield. Russia must now defend Crimea; and the economic and industrial base of Russia, which were assumed safe but are no longer.

The ground war remains dynamic although terrain gains in the past week have been limited. The balance continues to slowly tilt in Ukraine’s favour. Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on 10 July that Russian territorial advances had slowed by more than half during the first six months of 2026. Kremlin claims to have captured Kostiantynivka remain contested and, per Ukraine’s General Staff, false; defensive operations continue within the town and along its approaches.

Graph: Russia Matters.

Analysts and the research group Tochnyi report a concentration of some of Ukraine’s most capable regular units, including the 79th, 80th, and 95th Air Assault Brigades and the 92nd Mechanised Brigade, in the Zaporizhzhia sector. Stefan Korshak’s reporting for the Kyiv Post suggests this concentration, alongside the commentary of 1st Assault Regiment commander Dmytro Perun describing Zaporizhzhia and Crimea as the “most promising” areas for future Ukrainian offensive operations. This is feeding speculation that Kyiv may be preparing a move toward the Perekop land bridge, the same axis discussed as a Ukrainian objective as far back as 2023. The terrain favours Ukraine’s technical edge: open steppe, reliable weather, and small, well-trained infantry formations operating behind masses of tactical drones.

That said, all this could also be part of another deception campaign, similar to that undertaken in the lead up to the 2024 Kursk operation, to distract attention from Ukrainian offensive preparations elsewhere. Time will tell, but we should always be looking past the obvious conclusions to ascertain the true intentions of senior commanders.

Korshak has written recently about a shift in Ukrainian infantry tactics. Russian and Ukrainian sources increasingly describe Ukrainian assaults built around light infantry carrying only ammunition and medical kits, with heavier weapons, ammunition resupply and even fire support delivered by drone rather than carried on foot, a pattern that has quietly displaced the combined arms model built around armour and mechanised infantry that both sides expected to dominate this war. According to the Ukrainian president, roughly 90% of Russian casualties are now attributed to drones, and Russian advances around Kostiantynivka, Pokrovsk and Sloviansk are being measured in tens of metres a day, among the slowest rates of any major offensive in the drone era.

Ukraine Assessment

Ukraine now holds the initiative across every layer of its strike architecture: deep strikes disabling nearly half of Russia’s refining capacity, mid-range interdiction switching off Crimea’s energy and transport links, and an anti-ship campaign that has turned the Sea of Azov into what Stefan Korshak rightly calls a maritime holocaust for Russia’s shadow fleet. A key concern, however, remains Russian strike operations with precision glide bombs. But despite Ukraine’s new advantages, none of this has moved Putin from his maximalist objectives. The ground war and its supporting mid-range strike campaign, while tilting toward Ukraine, has not produced a breakthrough.

Putin has a much deeper problem than his inability to achieve decisive outcomes on the battlefield. Russia must now defend two things simultaneously that were, until recently, treated as largely separate: first, the physical security of Crimea, whose fuel, power and transport links depend on a handful of vulnerable crossings and sea lanes now under sustained Ukrainian fire; and second, the economic and industrial base of Russia itself, whose refineries and defence production plants are often situated hundreds if not thousands of kilometres from the front and were assumed safe until Omsk was struck this week.

Russia’s air defence system, already stretched, must choose between protecting the peninsula and protecting the homeland. Ukraine’s expanding target set, which now extends from the Kerch Strait to western Siberia, ensures that every reinforcement in one region creates a weakness in another.