The Final Battle Of Russia's War With Ukraine May Be In the Kremlin's Corridors

Russia's war against Ukraine was always primarily about Putin's delusions than about economic or military necessity. And now, as the carefully constructed edifice of Soviet and then Russian power have crumbled due to Putin's hubris and his system's corrupt malfunctioning, it is being fought almost exclusively for his political and human survival. 

Which means the war's outcome is as likely - or more so - to be decided in the treacherous halls of the Kremlin as on the drone-blasted battlegrounds of eastern Ukraine. JL

Holman Jenkins reports in the Wall Street Journal:

A Putin-loyal oligarch, fertilizer kingpin Andrey Melnichenko suggests a lobby exists inside Russia to continue the war even in Mr. Putin’s absence, viewing the conflict as “existential” though whether he means existential for Russia or for the privileged positions of the lobbyists (is not clear. But) the problem always has been Mr. Putin. He must exit or the West must impose a settlement to prop him up at the expense of 40 million Ukrainians. Such an outcome was unrealistic four years ago when Mr. Putin first sought it. Maybe it wasn't at peak Trump, over 18 months ago. But we’re in a different place now. The future rests on a stack of wild cards, importantly in the halls of the Kremlin itself.

Weirdly, “The Wizard of the Kremlin” is in theaters now, a fictionalized movie about onetime Putin propaganda aide Vladislav Surkov, whose layered ambiguities and deceits you may remember from the election-meddling era of 2016.

Much has changed. Mr. Surkov was last reported to be on the lam. Mr. Putin, meanwhile, has become surprisingly frank in signaling his wants and needs, however unrealistic they are. Four years ago, when he was pressing hopeless strategic adjustments on the U.S. and Europe, he was unusually candid about why: His illegal seizure of Crimea posed the risk of direct confrontation with NATO if Ukraine tried to reclaim its territory.

Voilà, today a NATO-backed Ukraine is using long-range strikes to make Russia’s hold on the peninsula increasingly tenuous.

This doesn’t bode well for the Putin machine’s latest signaling binge, in which it threatens war against NATO because of its role in prolonging Ukraine’s resistance. To what end?

Even if NATO failed to rise to the occasion in a Russian grab at Estonia or other vulnerable territory, as Mr. Putin might hope, the result wouldn’t be an end to Ukrainian resistance. It wouldn’t be an end to Ukraine’s strikes deep into Russia with Ukraine’s own weapons. The likelier result would be Germany, Poland, the U.K., the Baltics and perhaps others deciding, with more urgency and less restraint, on the importance of assisting Ukraine to hold off Russia.

If anybody knows Mr. Putin’s real ask behind his NATO threats, it’s Donald Trump, since the two talk. But it’s easy to guess, especially in light of some other recent news, which we’ll get to.

Mr. Putin wants an end to Ukrainian attacks on his domestic refineries, which cause him serious trouble with his subjects. He wants, if utterly hopelessly, the war shoved back into the box it once occupied, a war that Mr. Putin had grown comfortable that he could sustain indefinitely.

The problem is there’s no Venn-diagram solution to meet Mr. Putin’s needs that the West has any power or wish to deliver.

See the other big news of the week, or at least what the Economist magazine considers big news: a Putin-loyal oligarch, fertilizer kingpin Andrey Melnichenko, in its pages penning a plea for the West to bail out Russia on basically the terms Mr. Putin failed to sell four years ago before he fatally weakened himself with a misconceived war.

The Economist makes quite a fuss about the alleged opening here. Yet, for all the dark forebodings Mr. Melnichenko uses to sell his request, it only shows how behind-the-curve Mr. Putin and his allies remain in dealing with his situation.

The West is more united than ever behind Ukraine; if any schism exists, it’s only between those still open to a deal and those keen on further weakening Russia.

Donald Trump was the only vehicle for bridging the gap and strong-arming a compromise. Only Mr. Trump (aka a U.S. president) could supply the necessary superpower atmospherics, plus payola, plus security guarantees, to push a deal through the eye of a needle.

Now even Mr. Trump couldn’t do it. A ceasefire at present lines is the best Mr. Putin could get. Gone, if it ever existed, is the idea of Ukraine ceding additional unconquered terrain to Russia.

This realistic outcome is impossible for Mr. Putin, Mr. Melnichenko more or less admits. He goes on to suggest a lobby exists inside Russia to continue the war even in Mr. Putin’s absence, viewing the conflict as “existential” though he might more clearly specify whether he means existential for Russia or for the privileged positions of the lobbyists.

In fact, all evidence suggests there are also Russian nationalists who are capable of nursing continued revanchist aims against Ukraine while recognizing that the current war doesn’t serve Russia’s interests.

The problem always has been Mr. Putin. He must exit or the West must summon the will (and gall) to impose a settlement to prop him up at the expense of 40 million Ukrainians. Such an outcome was unrealistic four years ago when Mr. Putin first sought it. It maybe wasn’t unrealistic at the moment of peak Trump, with his triumphal return to the presidency in January 2025. Or maybe it was, however dear the idea of a Ukraine sellout to some still promoting Trump-Putin collusion theories.

But we’re in a different place now. The future rests on a stack of wild cards, importantly in the halls of the Kremlin itself. The West will keep supplying Ukraine. In every other way, events are in the saddle in a manner that should give nobody a particularly comfortable feeling.