3rd Ukrainian Corps' Lyman Counteroffensive Has 'Operational Momentum'

Operational momentum means that the success of Ukraine's counteroffensive north, east and now south of the Lyman sector and into Luhansk, means that Ukrainian commanders can use the gains they have made to expand both the scale of their attacks and the scope of the overall assault because the Russians are struggling to respond to the multiple threats they now face on various points of the front. 

This is making it harder for the Russians to redeploy troops from one threatened sector to another because there are simply too many problems for them to address at one time. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

Operation Vivaldi is a large, real-time proving ground for integration of UGVs into land formations, and the development of new tactical and operational methods to break out of defensive and positions. The counteroffensive has built not just tactical but operational momentum. These victories liberate Ukrainian areas from occupation, provide a morale boost for Ukrainians, and demonstrate that offensive manoeuvre is possible in eastern Ukraine. The 3^rd Corps reorganised its command systems before the offensive began, used drones to execute deep operations by striking Russian fuel pipelines and supply depots, used uncrewed ground vehicles extensively to support the infantry, and deployed ground-based radio beacons to keep its drones flying through heavy GPS jamming. This dimension of the Ukrainian counteroffensive – the return of offensive manoeuvre – matters perhaps even more than the amount of Ukrainian territory liberated over the last couple of months. 

The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps used its media releases this week to show that its counteroffensive north of Lyman has built not just tactical but operational momentum. On 20 September, the commander of the 3^rd Corps, Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi, announced the liberation of Shandryholove, Derylove and Drobysheve in the second phase of Operation Vivaldi. “As promised, I am reporting good news,” he said, claiming a further 40 square kilometres retaken.

His corps now claims about 125 square kilometres regained across both phases and more than 3,000 Russian casualties, including 800 in the latest phase, figures that remain unverified. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed during the week that the second phase demonstrated a limited capacity for tactical mechanised manoeuvre, supported by drones and uncrewed ground vehicles, and by 25 September was reporting that Ukrainian advances north of Lyman were continuing and prompting Russian disinformation efforts. These victories liberate Ukrainian areas from Russian occupation, provide a morale boost for Ukrainians going into a tough, cold winter, and demonstrate that offensive manoeuvre is possible in eastern Ukraine.

This dimension of the Ukrainian counteroffensive – the return of offensive manoeuvre – matters perhaps even more than the amount of Ukrainian territory liberated over the last couple of months. Howard Altman has provided a detailed account in The War Zone, describing how the 3^rd Corps reorganised its command systems before the offensive began, used drones to execute deep operations by striking Russian fuel pipelines and supply depots in depth, used uncrewed ground vehicles extensively to support the infantry, and deployed ground-based radio beacons to keep its drones flying through heavy GPS jamming.

Image: @ab3army

The Kyiv Independent reported that Russia’s elite Rubicon drone unit to be withdrawn from the sector after heavy losses. This is a significant pointer to the conduct of future drone operations, and how they are employed to shape and support offensive operations on the ground.

The 3^rd Corps during the week also released information on three important aspects of UGV integration into ground operations from its ongoing Operation Vivaldi:

• First, it described how it re-roled heavy bomber drones as motherships to carry UGVs to the flanks and into the rear of Russian positions to blind enemy drones as part of the recon battle.

• Second, it released a synopsis of how it employed UGVs to support infantry operations as well as provide logistic support.

• Third, a video about the employment of breaching UGVs and their integration into offensive operations was released by the 3^rd Corps.

Remotely controlled breaching by UGV. Image: @ab3army

The deputy commander of 3rd Corps also provided an update on the planning and conduct of the counteroffensive, which you can read here.

This is a large, real-time experiment and proving ground for integration of UGVs into traditional land formations, and the development of new tactical and operational methods to break out of defensive and positional concepts of operation. I expect every Western military will be watching these developments closely – or at least I hope they are.

While there is speculation about just how far Ukrainian forces have penetrated into Russian-occupied territory, Meduza found no visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces had reached or crossed the Chornyi Zherebets River. And the 3^rdCorps offensive is far from the only fight at present. Both Ukraine and Russia are massing forces farther south, where Russia is pressing towards Druzhkivka, Dobropillia and Orikhiv.

Operation Vivaldi has seized the initiative on the ground in one sector of the frontline. There is clearly more occurring that we will hear about in due course. But Russia is still conducting its slow-rolling offensive, albeit with minimal gains, across other parts of the east and south of Ukraine. It is also not clear whether Ukraine has sufficient manpower to be able to build momentum with similar sized offensives in different parts of the frontline over the coming months or into 2027.