Russia's Ukraine War Has Expanded To Battle For Russian Homeland

With its increasingly impactful long range strikes on Russian economic targets, Ukraine has succeeded in an accomplishment few knowledgeable observers would have thought possible even a year ago: it has changed the 'strategic geography' of the conflict from a battle on Ukrainian soil to a war that now encompasses and affects the Russian homeland. JL

Jonathan Riley reports in The Geopolitical Economist:

A Russian net gain of only five square miles from 4 August to 1 September 2026, in strategic terms, are not the gains of an army on the verge of victory; but of an army making costly, local progress across a heavily contested war zone. Russian forces can infiltrate and pressure Ukrainian defenses, but cannot converting that into significant breakthroughs. Statistics from the last six months do not show Russia achieving decisive success. The slowing rate of advance suggests Ukrainian defenses, drone warfare, and attrition are imposing real limits. Ukraine has enough technological initiative to make the war costly for Russia far beyond the front. Its deep-strike campaign and software-enabled targeting have changed the strategic geography of the war. Russian refineries, airfields, depots and command nodes are increasingly part of the battlespace. This means Russia cannot treat the war as only in Ukraine, but as a campaign fought in the Russian homeland as well.

The Russia-Ukraine War is now in a phase of conflict akin to two boxers in the 12th and final round of a match, and the winner will be the one who can keep punching and take the most punishment.

This war in Ukraine will come down to which side is willing to take the most punishment and make the greatest sacrifices.

Again, that is why the Russia–Ukraine war has entered a phase in which the most important changes are measured less by sweeping manoeuvre, and that was the state of the war in the early days during Russia’s botched invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Today the war in Ukraine has become a war of attrition, which statistically favours the Russians, and the only way Ukrainians will actually be able to win in the bloody calculus of arithmetic is to inflict a high casualty rate.

For every Ukrainian killed on the battlefield, there must be eight Russians killed in turn.

At the moment, critical statistical data is hard to come by, but what we do know is that Russians have over 1.2 million casualties, with over 500,000 of them killed in active combat. As for Ukrainians, the estimates put their casualties at 55,000; others put them much higher at around ¼ million.

During this war in Ukraine, it has become a conflict of attrition; both sides have had similar experiences to the First World War, which was fought between the Central Powers of Imperial Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Ottoman Turkey against the Allied powers of Imperial Russia, Great Britain, and France, which the United States later joined in 1917.

Similar to what happened during World War I with the development of the tank, which was used to break the bloody stalemate of the trenches of World War I, the war in Ukraine is also driving the development of drone warfare for both combatants.

It is believed that whichever side ultimately masters this new frontier of warfare will win the war in Ukraine.

One of the hallmarks of this conflict will be the future roadmap for how conventional wars of the 21st century will be understood and waged, marked by attrition in lives, money, and research and development; incremental changes in territorial control; and rapid technological adaptation.

As for this piece of writing, it will focus on the last six months of the Ukraine-Russia war, which has remained intensely violent but has not produced the kind of breakthrough either side would need to achieve a decisive military outcome.

The Ukrainians and Russians are only seeing advances in inches and miles, which again reduces the entire conflict to a punch-drunk slugging match, and the war is now coming down to which nation will break first and which will ultimately rally to victory.

Russia has continued to attack along a broad eastern and southern front, especially in Donetsk Oblast over the last six months.

At the same time, Ukraine has combined defensive operations with local counterattacks and an expanding campaign of long-range strikes against Russian military, industrial and energy targets.

In this period, the war has looked increasingly like a contest between Russia’s willingness to absorb heavy losses for limited advances and Ukraine’s effort to offset its human resources on the battlefields of Ukraine and ammunition constraints through drones, air defence and international support.

It is now believed that Russia still controls roughly one-fifth of Ukraine’s internationally recognised territory, including Crimea and occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. However, its recent advances have been slow.

The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russian forces consolidated positions in or seized about 90 square kilometres across the entire theatre in August 2026, while Russia Matters’ September report card found only modest net gains over the preceding four weeks, depending on whether DeepState or ISW data are used.

These statistics point to a central paradox: Russia retains the initiative in many sectors and continues to inflict severe damage, yet its territorial returns remain small compared with the scale of the Russian lives being lost and equipment destroyed or damaged.

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2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine Phase 1 animated gif Wikimedia

The Costs of War: Statistics from the Last Six Months

The human cost of the war has risen sharply in 2026. United Nations reporting indicates that in the first six months of the year, monitors confirmed 1,396 Ukrainian civilians killed and 7,978 injured.

June was particularly severe, with at least 293 civilians killed and 1,990 injured; July was worse still, with OHCHR reporting 437 civilians killed and 2,610 injured, the highest civilian death toll since May 2022.

These numbers are conservative because UN casualty figures require verification, but they are still enough to show a marked escalation in harm to civilians.

The main driver has been Russia’s increased use of long-range missiles and drones against cities and infrastructure far from the front, while short-range drones have also become a leading source of casualties near the contact line.

It’s also the use of Russian double-tap tactics, in which they attack a civilian area, then wait for rescue personnel and other civilians or even military personnel to come to try and clear the area and rescue people under the rubble.

The Russians then quickly follow with a second attack on the same location, a deliberate attempt to injure more Ukrainian civilians. Hence why this tactic is inhumane: it’s a war crime, and why it’s called a double tap.

As for Military casualty figures, they remain harder to verify because both governments treat losses as sensitive and often release selective or strategic estimates.

Ukrainian authorities claimed that Russian forces suffered 39,290 casualties in June, 42,860 in July and 42,020 in August 2026.

Even if these figures cannot be independently confirmed, they suggest the scale of Moscow’s personnel trading for tactical gains.

Al Jazeera reported that these summer figures were about 25.8 per cent higher than the losses claimed in spring.

Ukrainian sources also estimate that Russian recruitment is below these monthly casualty totals, at roughly 32,500 recruits per month.

If broadly accurate, this implies that Russia’s current tempo may be manpower-intensive, requiring further mobilisation, higher cash recruitment bonuses, expanded recruitment, or greater reliance on lower-quality formations.

Territorial statistics reinforce this picture. ISW assessed that Russian forces seized or consolidated about 90.35 square kilometres in August 2026, averaging 2.91 square kilometres per day, for a total of 123.53 square kilometres, including infiltrations.

By comparison, ISW noted that Russian forces seized 505.55 square kilometres in August 2025, showing a much slower rate of advance than a year earlier.

Russia Matters, using DeepState data, recorded a Russian net gain of only five square miles from 4 August to 1 September 2026, while its ISW-based calculation gave a larger but still limited figure of 40 square miles for the same period.

In strategic terms, these are not the gains of an army on the verge of a rapid victory; they are the gains of an army making costly, local progress across a heavily monitored and contested war zone and mined battlefield.

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Ukrainian self-propelled artillery in Donbas Creative Commons licenses

The Current State of the Front Lines

The front line remains long, dense, and difficult to move through. Open-source map projects and conflict trackers describe active combat across Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, with the most politically important Russian effort focused on the Donetsk “fortress belt” — the chain of urban positions around Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.

Moscow’s long-standing objective has been to capture all of Donetsk Oblast, but its progress toward that goal remains incomplete.

ISW reported in early September that Russian forces had a presence in a large portion of Kostyantynivka but had not fully seized it, despite months of infiltration and urban fighting.

The city’s contested status illustrates the character of the war: Russian forces can penetrate, infiltrate and pressure Ukrainian defences, but converting that pressure into operationally significant breakthroughs remains difficult.

In the north-east, the Kharkiv and Lyman directions remain strategically important because they threaten approaches to major cities and transport corridors.

Russian claims of major progress around places such as Svyatohirsk or Kozacha Lopan have been disputed by open-source analysts and Ukrainian officials.

ISW’s September assessments state that some Russian claims were not supported by available evidence and that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations, especially around Lyman and Oleksandrivka.

In the south, the lines in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson remain shaped by minefields, artillery, drones and the Dnipro River.

These sectors have not produced dramatic changes in recent months, but they continue to absorb resources and remain vulnerable to strikes against logistics, bridges, depots and command posts.

Overall, the front line is best understood as a state of flux due to the fog of war and misinformation, with both combatants trying to maintain high morale among their respective populations and to secure support from their Western backers for Ukraine and, for Russia, its support from China.

This war cannot be understood from just lines on a map, but rather as one of ever-changing front lines that include trenches, tree lines, ruined towns, drone launch sites, electronic warfare systems, artillery positions, logistics routes, and air-defence bubbles.

Both sides can see much of the battlefield through drones and satellites, which makes large concentrations of troops and armour extremely dangerous. This transparency favours dispersion, camouflage and short, violent assaults rather than mass manoeuvre.

As a result, battles are often fought for individual buildings, industrial zones, villages and field positions. The war is not frozen, but it is constrained by surveillance, mines, attrition and the difficulty of sustaining forces under constant observation.

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Ukrainian Soldiers Drive T-84 Tanks While on Manoeuvres Creative Commons licenses

How the War Is Going for Russia

Russia’s position is mixed. On the one hand, it retains significant advantages in population, defence-industrial depth, missile and drone production, and the ability to maintain pressure across multiple sectors simultaneously.

It has also adapted from the early failures of 2022, building layered defences, expanding drone use, refining glide-bomb and missile tactics, and sustaining a war economy despite sanctions.

Russia continues to occupy a large portion of Ukraine and can threaten Ukrainian cities with long-range strikes. Its leadership appears prepared to accept high casualties and economic distortion in exchange for incremental progress and political leverage.

On the other hand, the statistics from the last six months do not show a Russian army achieving decisive success. Its gains are geographically limited and costly.

The slowing rate of advance compared with 2025 suggests that Ukrainian defences, drone warfare, minefields and attrition are imposing real limits.

Russia’s continued emphasis on Donetsk may also reflect political necessity rather than military opportunity: capturing the oblast remains a declared objective, but repeated deadlines have passed without success. It also means that if Russia can take Donetsk, it can pursue a peace that saves face.

Even where Russian units infiltrate Ukrainian urban areas, they often do so in dispersed groups that may complicate Ukrainian defence but do not automatically create a breakthrough.

Russia can keep attacking, but sustaining the tempo may require more mobilisation, further strain on the economy, and continued acceptance of heavy losses.

Russia’s long-range strike campaign has had more visible effects.

By launching larger drone and missile salvos, Moscow has targeted Ukraine’s power grid, transport nodes, cities and civilian infrastructure.

Recent reports indicate that Russia has increasingly used jet-powered drones that are faster and harder to intercept than earlier propeller-driven models.

Ukrainian officials cited in public reporting said that interception rates for propeller drones can exceed 90 per cent, while jet-powered variants have been intercepted at lower rates.

This development improves Russia’s ability to impose costs away from the front, although it does not necessarily translate into ground success. It also forces Ukraine and its partners to spend expensive air-defence missiles, interceptor drones and aircraft sorties against relatively cheap targets.

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Ukraine Bombed City Creative Commons licenses

How the War Is Going for Ukraine

Ukraine’s position is also mixed, but in a different way. Militarily, Ukraine has prevented Russia from turning its material advantages into decisive operational gains.

It has defended key cities, contested Russian claims, conducted counteroffensive operations in selected sectors, and expanded deep-strike campaigns against Russia itself.

Ukraine’s long-range drones have targeted refineries, depots, air-defence systems and military-industrial sites, with some assessments arguing that these attacks have reduced Russian refining capacity and forced Moscow to divert resources to air defence.

Such strikes do not end the war by themselves, but they impose costs, complicate logistics and demonstrate that Russia’s rear areas are no longer secure.

Ukraine’s challenges remain severe.

It is defending a large front against a larger adversary while relying on external support for key military capacities such as air defence, ammunition and high-end weapons.

Civilian casualties have risen sharply because Russia has increased long-range attacks, and energy infrastructure remains vulnerable as another winter approaches.

Ukraine must also manage manpower constraints, training demands and the strain of continuous mobilisation.

Even successful defensive warfare is costly when villages, towns and infrastructure are destroyed in the process. The country’s strategic problem is therefore not simply to hold the line, but to hold it while preserving enough forces, political unity and economic resilience to continue fighting.

Nevertheless, Ukraine has shown a strong capacity for adaptation. Its drone ecosystem, software-based command systems, volunteer engineering networks and decentralised innovation culture have allowed it to compensate for shortages in traditional firepower.

Kyiv Post reporting in March 2026 described a sharp acceleration in Ukrainian long-range drone attacks, rising from roughly two long-range strike targets per day in late 2025 to around four separate targets per night in the first quarter of 2026, with larger salvos of 100–200 drones crossing into Russian airspace.

These figures show how Ukraine has tried to shift the war from a contest fought only in the trenches to one that also pressures Russian industry, logistics and political confidence.

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Ukraine Russia War Map Wikipedia

Assessment: Who Is Gaining Advantage?

The last six months do not point to a simple answer. Russia has the advantage in mass, persistence and the ability to sustain offensive pressure. It can mobilise more people, produce or acquire large numbers of drones and missiles, and keep Ukrainian air defences under constant strain.

It also benefits from holding prepared positions across occupied territory and from being able to choose where to attack along a broad front. If the measure is who currently occupies more land and who is initiating more ground assaults, Russia retains the stronger immediate battlefield initiative.

Yet Russia’s advantage is not translating into rapid victory. The territorial gains show a slow rate of advance, and the casualty estimates suggest that those gains are extremely costly in lives, money, and equipment.

Ukraine, meanwhile, has retained enough defensive cohesion to prevent a collapse and enough technological initiative to make the war costly for Russia far beyond the front.

Its deep-strike campaign, drone production, maritime innovations and software-enabled targeting have changed the strategic geography of the war. Russian refineries, airfields, depots and command nodes are increasingly part of the battlespace.

This does not mean Ukraine is winning in a conventional sense, but it means Russia cannot treat the war as one contained only in Ukraine, but as a campaign fought in the Russian homeland as well.

The most accurate assessment is that the war is going badly for both sides in human and economic terms, but not equally in strategic terms.

Russia is failing to achieve its maximalist objectives quickly, while Ukraine is failing to eject Russian forces from occupied territory at scale.

Russia’s strategy appears to be to exhaust Ukraine and its partners through time, casualties and infrastructure destruction, as well as destruction such as the Gaza War from 2023 to 2024.

However, it’s still a low-level conflict, and then there is the Iran-US/Israel War of 2026, which is pulling support away from Ukraine and which sees the Ukraine War drop down the priority lists of Western Powers.

As for Ukraine’s strategy, it is to survive, prevent breakthroughs, impose costs on Russia, and wait for technological, economic, or political factors to shift the balance of power so it can secure a long-term peace with Russia.

The outcome will depend heavily on air defence supplies, drone production, manpower, Russian economic resilience, Western political commitment and each side’s ability to adapt faster than the other.

The side that will win this war will be the one with the strongest will to fight, the deepest financial pockets and the ability to win the peace at the negotiation table, because that war will end at a peace table; it is only a matter of time to see if Ukraine will stay an independent nation or if Russia will exculpate itself from this quagmire of a war.