Ukraine Pushing Back Russia In "Master Class of Combined Arms Warfare"

There are three extraordinary and interrelated outcomes from Ukraine's counteroffensive in the Lyman sector. 

First, that they have retaken between 150-200 square kilometers from the Russians in a crucial area that also disrupts the Kremlin's Fortress Belt offensive plan. Second, that the Ukrainians have pioneered a new kind of combined arms maneuver warfare that focuses drones, artillery and fighter jets on softening up the Russians behind the lines as well as at the point of attack and then clears them up with infantry mounted on armor. Finally, this makes the Ukrainian negotiating position stronger as they can rightly say they have no intention of giving up territory which the Kremlin is clearly struggling to hold. Even the increase in Russian terror attacks on Ukrainian civilians and/or the forced mobilization of more untrained Russian men is unlikely to change this equation. JL

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon reports in The Telegraph :

The Ukrainian recapture of more than 200 square kilometres around the Donbas town of Lyman could prove to be one of the most significant land operations of this war. What makes it remarkable is how it was gained. Over four months, the Ukrainians maintained operational security, concealing their intentions while preparing an armored manoeuvre integrated with drones, electronic warfare and precision fires. Ukraine found Russia's weakness, massing combat power at the decisive point and exploiting it before Russia could generate a meaningful reserve. It is a victory for the sort of combined-arms warfare many had prematurely declared dead. This changes the strategic equation at the negotiating table. Zelensky is no longer being asked to negotiate (against) inexorable Russian advance. He can say: why should Ukraine surrender territory when Russia is struggling to hold it?

The Ukrainian recapture of more than 200 square kilometres of its territory around the Donbas town of the Lyman could prove to be one of the most significant land operations of this war.

What makes it particularly remarkable is not simply the ground gained, but how it was gained. Over four months, the Ukrainians appear to have maintained an extraordinary level of operational security, concealing their intentions while preparing an armoured manoeuvre operation integrated with drones, electronic warfare and precision fires. That is precisely the sort of combined-arms warfare many commentators had prematurely declared dead.

Only last weekend, Vladimir Putin told the beleaguered US peace envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner that his price for a ceasefire remained the surrender of the whole of the Donbas. Only then, apparently, might Moscow consider stopping the missile attacks that continue to terrorise Ukrainian civilians. 

Yet even as Putin was demanding that Ukraine surrender its territory, his own forces were being pushed back around Lyman and towards the very border from which they launched their invasion nearly five years ago. If that does not expose the disconnect between the Kremlin's rhetoric and reality on the battlefield, I am not sure what will.

The obvious question is what Putin's generals are actually telling him. Either they are concealing the truth, or the Russian president has become so invested in his own narrative that he simply is not listening. Neither possibility should give anyone in Moscow much comfort.

For Ukraine, however, this matters enormously. It potentially changes the strategic equation at the negotiating table. Volodymyr Zelensky is no longer being asked to negotiate from a position of inexorable Russian advance. He can point to the battlefield and say, quite reasonably: why should Ukraine surrender territory when Russia is struggling to hold it?

The Lyman operation also provides a rather useful corrective to the fashionable view that wars can now be fought principally by drones. Drones are magnificent. They have transformed reconnaissance, targeting, strike operations and battlefield awareness. They can destroy tanks, artillery and logistics at ranges that would have been unimaginable a decade ago. 

But there remains one rather important technological deficiency: there is still no drone capable of occupying ground and holding it against a determined enemy. That still requires soldiers.

Over the past four months, Ukrainian forces have demonstrated that armour can survive and operate on what is undoubtedly the most drone-saturated battlefield in history. Tanks and other armoured vehicles have taken losses, but electronic warfare, jamming, concealment, deception and the use of supporting drones have allowed armoured formations to manoeuvre where many believed they could not.

The Ukrainians have also combined these manoeuvres with their own massed offensive and defensive drone operations and, increasingly, air power. The lesson is brutally simple: control of the air, whether achieved by aircraft, drones, electronic warfare or a combination of all three, remains fundamental to success on the ground. 

The Ukrainians have essentially applied the doctrine of Britain's greatest field commander, Bill Slim: hit the enemy hard, hit him fast, surprise him and hit him where it hurts.

They have found the weakness, massed sufficient combat power at the decisive point and exploited it before Russia could generate a meaningful reserve. That is not a victory for tanks over drones. It is a victory for combined arms. And this is where the implications stretch well beyond Ukraine.

Britain's Strategic Defence Review and the Army's emerging 20/40/40 concept, broadly 20 per cent traditional platforms such as armour and attack helicopters, 40 per cent expendable drones and 40 per cent durable autonomous systems across air, land and sea, look increasingly sensible in light of what we are seeing on this battlefield.

Ukraine is providing the operational laboratory. It is demonstrating that tomorrow's army cannot be an armoured army of the Cold War, but neither can it be an army of drones. It must be both and, crucially, it must retain the manpower to seize and hold ground.

The Lyman operation may ultimately prove to be only one episode in this extraordinary war. But its reverberations should be felt in Washington, Moscow and London.

First, Russia is plainly not winning everywhere, perhaps only in Putin's increasingly detached version of reality. Donald Trump needs to understand that before he makes concessions on Ukraine's behalf simply to secure a political headline ahead of the US midterm elections. A bad peace imposed on Ukraine would not end this war; it would merely give Putin time to prepare for the next one.

Second, if Russia cannot generate enough combat power through its present system of recruitment, the Kremlin may ultimately have to contemplate another general mobilisation. That would be an extraordinary political gamble for Putin, potentially exposing just how unpopular and costly this war has become.

Third, Britain's planned future military structure may indeed be broadly right. But a beautifully designed force on paper is worthless if politicians refuse to pay for it. If Britain genuinely believes the threat from Russia is existential to European security, then the Government must fund the forces it says it needs. Three per cent of GDP on defence by 2030 should be regarded as a starting point, not an impossible dream.

We may be approaching an endgame, politically as well as militarily. The next few months could prove decisive. Sadly, the West currently appears short of any Winston Churchill or Franklin D Roosevelt. In Moscow, however, there is no shortage of Stalinist ambition.

The question now is whether Trump and Andy Burnham rise to the challenge as strategic leaders, or become strategic losers. History is unlikely to give them a second chance.