A Blog by Jonathan Low

 

Sep 23, 2026

Why New Russian Mobilization Will Not Save Putin's War

Ukrainian commanders do not believe that a rumored Russian mobilization of 400-600,000 men will be sufficient to turn around the failing prospects for Putin's invasion of Ukraine, now approaching its fifth year. 

The reason is, as Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman sector and now entering Luhansk has demonstrated, is that the increasing efficiency of Ukraine's reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities along the front, aided by drones and sensor networks, mean that more Russian troops are likely to result in more casualties rather than better Russian performance. The new troops are going to be largely draftees of lower physical and intellectual caliber and lower motivation. Their presence is unlikely to change the drone and electronic warfare driven calculus of the contemporary Ukrainian battlefield. JL

Decimus reports in Daily Kos:
Russia is suffering a frontline infantry deficit that mobilization cannot fix. “Over the past year, an infantry deficit has developed among the Russians. Mobilization (will not) solve the issue for them because a larger quantity of infantry simply translates into a higher volume of casualties.” Tactical outcomes on the modern battlefield are determined by the efficiency of the reconnaissance-strike complex, which pairs real-time target acquisition with precision firepower via sensor networks and unmanned aerial systems. “More Russian infantry will simply produce more dead. Mobilization also carries an inverse effect. Most mobilized personnel are not professional soldiers. Russian mobilization may yield a net positive for us by speeding up internal fractures which are visible, though not yet sufficient,”

If it was intended to rattle Ukraine’s cage or whatever, Russia’s 400k or 600k or is it 800k planned mobilization of new mobiki will not help Russia much according to General Andriy Biletskyi, Commander of the 3rd Army Corps of Ukraine.

Biletskyi knows a thing or two about fighting the Russians. His 3rd Corps has the Russians skedaddling across the Zherebets River in Northeastern Ukraine, cutting off their much vaunted “Northern Pincer” to encircle the Fortress Belt. Recent reports indicate that elements of the Corps are already across the river and fighting the Russians in Luhansk oblast.

The news is all bad for the Russians in this sector … even the general who falsely gave Putin the assurance that Kostiantynivka, the southernmost anchor of the Fortress Belt, Major General Anton Grunis(and was made a Hero of Russia) has died. Ukrainian unmanned forces commander, Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, and his team conducted the operation on September 12, 2026, in a nighttime drone strike by Ukraine’s 427th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade (“Rarog”) in occupied Donetsk Oblast:

Kremlin-Favored Russian General Awarded Medal for Fake City Capture Dies in Action

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/84649

Interestingly, Putin no longer makes it to these Hero of Russia decoration award ceremonies himself. Instead he sends Minister of Defense, Andrei Belousov. What presidential security doing?

Additionally, their setback on the Lyman front has reportedly so rattled the Russians that in order to stanch the losses there, the ISW(Institute for the Study of War) indicates that North Koreans are likely to replace Russians in parts of Northern Ukraine so that Russia could send more of its own troops to the Lyman sector:

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces warned that North Korean forces may replace Russian forces along portions of the frontline, presumably in northern Ukraine, so these Russian forces can redeploy to the Lyman tactical area.

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 16 that some Russian forces may withdraw from their positions to support the Russian defense of the Lyman area and that North Korean forces may replace them. The source claimed that some North Korean officers have already operated “beyond the wire,” likely referring to the international border, to gain experience and conduct reconnaissance. 

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026

This will be a major escalation of North Korea’s role in the war … moving from Kursk in Russia proper into Ukraine. It also further highlights the fact that Russia is bleeding a lot of manpower on the battlefield and the pending mobilization is already more than needed by the folks in charge at Frunzenskaya Embankment(Russian Ministry of Defense Building). One would think that instead of stepping back and reassessing their wasteful war doctrine, the Russians rather double down on it and throw more lives against the Ukrainian defenses. Their reported loss of nearly 2,000 troops overnight(September 16-17, 2026) would under normal circumstances inform any military high command that this is neither good strategy nor is it sustainable.

And General Biletskyi, believes that more bodies will not help Russia. The war has fundamentally changed:

Russia suffers frontline infantry deficit that mobilization cannot fix

“With infantry, they [Russian forces] are certainly in a better position than we are; that is a fact,” he explained.

“But over the past year, we can state that an infantry deficit has developed among the Russians as well. Will mobilization fundamentally solve the issue for them? I don’t think so. Because a larger quantity of infantry simply translates into a higher volume of casualties.”

Biletskyi highlighted that tactical outcomes on the modern battlefield are determined by the efficiency of the reconnaissance-strike complex, which pairs real-time target acquisition with precision firepower via sensor networks and unmanned aerial systems.

“In other words, more Russian infantry will simply produce more dead. Mobilization will undoubtedly introduce certain operational complications for us, but it also carries an inverse effect. Mobilized personnel are not professional contract soldiers. High fatality rates among conscripts will substantially fuel social unrest inside Russia. Therefore, if we hold the line, Russian mobilization may actually yield a net positive for us by speeding up internal collapse within Russia — the initial fractures of which are already visible, though not yet sufficient,” he assessed.

https://english.nv.ua/russian-war/more-russian-conscripts-will-mean-more-kias-in-drone-kill-zones-biletskyi-50642235.html

Unlike Russia which persists in throwing more bodies at the wall in the hopes that something will stick, UKRAINE understands that this war has changed fundamentally into one where “modern battlefield are determined by the efficiency of the reconnaissance-strike complex, which pairs real-time target acquisition with precision firepower via sensor networks and unmanned aerial systems.”

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