Recent Russian Military Setbacks Reflect Broader Strategic Failure

Next week will mark yet another anniversary for Russia's stymied invasion of Ukraine. The past week's Ukrainian counteroffensive - sparked by the cut off of Russian Starlink access - reveals both the weakened state of the Kremlin's forces but also their growing dependence on and vulnerability to pressure from forces it cannot control. 

The broader context has also exposed Moscow's strategic failure: its barbaric attack on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the depths of winter has failed to break Ukrainian resolve, nor has it led to even the hint of concessions. And European support for Ukraine in the face of the Trump administration's Putin favoritism has only strengthened Europe's determination to push back. Meanwhile, Russian oil exports continue to fall, its shadow fleet is being driven from the seas and its economy is weaker. All in all, 2026 is off to a bleak beginning for the Kremlin. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

Since SpaceX shut down Russian access to Starlink in Ukraine, this frontline disruption has had measurable battlefield effects. (At the same time) the systematic multi-winter targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has failed to break Ukraine’s will. Nor has it forced any political or military accommodations from the Ukrainians. At some point in 2026, Putin will have to reckon with the failure of his strategic bombing campaign. (And) Russia's efforts over the past four years to degrade European support for Ukraine has failed. The Europeans have not only reinvigorated their alliance but their defence industry and are pushing back against Russian aggression.

In the past week, StarLink connections for the Russians were severed and it has had an impact on the frontline.

A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that the number of Russian drone strikes against the Ukrainian rear, including with Starlink-enabled fixed-wing drones, has decreased since SpaceX shut down Russian access to Starlink in Ukraine. This frontline disruption has had measurable battlefield effects, particularly impacting Russian battlefield air interdiction efforts.

Russian drone forces have recently been focussing on deep strike operations, aiming to interdict Ukrainian logistics, artillery and headquarters well behind the frontline. This StarLink shutdown will hinder these efforts, although it is unlikely to shut them down totally.

Stefan Korshak has written in his latest (and always excellent) update on the war:

The biggest tactical effect of the shut-down for the Russians appears to be with UGVs (ground robots) because those things use Starlink almost without exception and now the Russian ones have stopped. Since the primary use of UGVs by both sides is carrying supply forward and wounded rearward in drone-dense sectors, it is safe to assume that things got worse for Russian infantry stuck out in some accumulation position or a Russian infantryman wounded and needing evacuation.

While the cutoff of StarLink for Russian forces in Ukraine is currently to our advantage, there is a useful lesson here. What is to stop private companies withholding essential services – communications, OSINT, logistics, etc – from friendly military forces in future conflicts? StarLink was turned off for Ukraine during an attack on Crimea early in the war. There is no reason why it cannot happen again.

One of the biggest impacts of the StarLink shutoff has been observed in ground operations in Zaporizhzhia.

The Ground War. While the Russian main effort on the ground remains focused on offensive operations in the Pokrovsk region, and the capture of the entire Donbas, significant developments emerged in Zaporizhzhia in the past week. Ukrainian forces launched multiple tactical counter attacks to take advantage of the degradation in Russian tactical communications as a result of the StarLink blackout.

Ukrainian ground forces were able to liberate territory near Hulyaipole, as well as the village of Ternuvate and near Borova. These are useful gains, but in the context of the southern Russian campaign, are unlikely to spoil expected Russian attacks here in the Spring. Nor are these Ukrainian gains going to change the overall trajectory of the ground war.

Zaporizhzhia 7-14 February 2026. Maps: ISW

The battle for Pokrovsk continues to be Russia’s main effort in the east. According to reports from he Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Center for Defence Strategies this week, Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations to seize the town and collapse the Ukrainian pocket, though their advance has slowed considerably from the breakneck pace of late 2025.

President Zelenskyy revealed at the Munich Security Conference that Russian forces are losing an average of 156 soldiers for every square kilometre of Ukrainian territory they capture. The regular update by the British intelligence community was released this week. It shows that Russian casualties in December 2025 were 35,000 and in January were 31,000.

Source: @DefenceHQ

Despite these catastrophic losses, Russian forces continue to advance, albeit at rates that would have been considered glacially slow in any previous conflict. The recent report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed that Russia’s advance in Pokrovsk has been slower than the Allied forces during the Battle of the Somme. While these are different eras, the Russian pace of advance is only sustainable if it wears down Ukrainian and European resolve at the same time it wears down the size of the Russian military. That no longer appears to be the case.

The picture on the ground is indicative of Ukrainian resilience and vulnerabilities.

 

Four Years Since the Full-Scale Invasion: An Assessment

Three strategic realities, which I think have been in evidence for some time, were reinforced by the events of the past week. They are worth pondering as we approach the four year mark of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

First, Russia has abandoned any pretense of military efficiency in favour of pure attrition. It is betting that have a superior mobilization capacity relative to Ukraine’s will eventually exhaust Ukrainian resistance. Given the challenges of mobilising manpower in Ukraine, and the lack of conscription for 18-25 year olds, this is a reasonable wager by the Russians. This has been a key driver of Ukraine’s decision to significantly increase their monthly kill targets for Russians in 2026.

Second, the systematic targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, particularly substations supporting nuclear facilities, represents the continuation of a strategy (first initiated at the end of 2022) to make Ukrainian territory ungovernable while maintaining plausible deniability about direct nuclear targeting. But thus far, this multi-winter campaign executed by the Russians has failed to break Ukraine’s will. Nor has it forced any political or military accommodations from the Ukrainians. At some point in 2026, Putin will have to reckon with the failure of his strategic bombing campaign against Ukraine’s cities to shift Ukraine’s political posture, and the slow-rolling military failure that is Russia’s extraordinarily bloody ground campaign.

Third, the diplomatic theatre increasingly resembles a choreographed performance designed to satisfy domestic political requirements in Washington DC rather than any genuine pathway to a sustainable or just peace. Further, it is being used by Putin to continue dragging out the war until he can achieve something - anything – that he might be able to present to Russians as a ‘victory’. As I wrote recently, Putin is nowhere close to that being the case, he cannot afford the war to end yet. He will use negotiations and cognitive warfare against Americans and Europeans to corrode support for Ukraine and increase pressure on Zelenskyy’s administration to accept a deal that gives away territory in exchange for no security guarantees.

For Ukraine’s international supporters, the key question remains whether they can sustain assistance at levels required to offset Russia’s willingness to accept catastrophic losses at least until 2030. The Ramstein meeting held this week included important contributions from multiple nations. In total, 38 billion dollars in military commitments were made. This included:

• UK — £500 million for air defence, £150 million to buying US equipment for Ukraine immediately (PURL). Total for Britain this year:  £3 billion.

• Germany — €1 billion for the purchase of drones for Ukraine, financing to integrated air defense over Ukrainian cities, financing to drone assault units. Total for Germany this year: €11.5 billion.

• Norway — $7 billion promised in 2026, of which $1.4 billion for drones, $700 million for air defense, $200 million for artillery, $125 million for PURL.

• Netherlands — Pledged 0.25% of GDP, about €2.95 billion. Short term €90 million to PURL.

• Belgium — €1 billion promised for 2026, no short-term figure

• Sweden — €1.2 billion in aid, €100 million to PURL. Commitment for 2026 — €3.7 billion.

• Denmark — Commitment to $2 billion in total in 2026.

• Spain — Commitment to $1.2 billion in 2026.

• Canada — $50 million to Ukraine production of arms, $45 million for medical support.

Russia's efforts over the past four years to degrade European support for Ukraine has failed. As this demonstrates, the Europeans have not only reinvigorated their alliance but their defence industry and are pushing back against Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Baltic and elsewhere. The step up in European support for Ukraine has ensured that, as the Kiel Institute notes:

The total volume of aid allocated to Ukraine remained relatively stable in 2025… European military aid rose by 67 percent above the 2022–2024 average, while non-military aid increased by 59 percent.

This step up in support also provides the foundations for a significant military deterrent against Russian aggression elsewhere in Europe. Unlike in 2022, Europe is now awake to Russia’s aspirations and has the capacity to push back. Whether it will continue building the political will and consensus to do so remains to be seen.

Europe must also continue to work on the relationship with the United States of America. Regardless of the careless statements about Europe that emerge from Washington DC at times, this is a relationship that is crucial to both sides. And it is a relationship crucial to the trajectory of the war in Ukraine. As Marco Rubio noted in his speech at Munich:

President Trump demands seriousness and reciprocity from our friends here in Europe. The reason why, my friends, is because we care deeply. We care deeply about your future and ours. And if at times we disagree, our disagreements come from our profound sense of concern about a Europe with which we are connected – not just economically, not just militarily. We are connected spiritually and we are connected culturally. We want Europe to be strong. We believe that Europe must survive, because the two great wars of the last century serve for us as history’s constant reminder that ultimately, our destiny is and will always be intertwined with yours.

The brutal calculus of the past four-years will continue into 2026 unless there is a significant breakthrough in technology, tactics or strategy that changes the deep, close and rear aspects of the overall battlefield dynamic. The only other thing that might significantly change the trajectory of the war is if there is a significant shift in political will in Kyiv or Moscow.

Russia can sustain offensive operations for years if it maintains its current mobilisation and prevents Ukraine from increasing monthly casualty rates. Ukrainian tactical excellence can impose high costs on Russia but cannot fully offset the asymmetry in personnel and industrial capacity.

The coming weeks will see continued Russian pressure in the Pokrovsk area and preparations for the spring offensive operations designed to capture the remainder of the Donbas by Russian forces. Supporting Russian efforts, to draw off Ukrainian strategic reserves, maintain the fiction of Russia’s inevitable victory and seize small parcels of terrain, will continue in southern and northeastern Ukraine. What seems certain to me is that short of some fundamental shift in the military balance or a significant expansion in Western military and economic support, the war between Ukraine and Russia will continue despite the artificial diplomatic deadlines that periodically emerge from Washington DC.

The preference by the Trump administration for Ukraine to make territorial concessions is unlikely to be guarantor of a long-term, stable war termination agreement. As Zelenskyy noted in his speech in Munich this week, “it would be an illusion to believe that this war can now be reliably ended by dividing Ukraine — just as it was an illusion to believe that sacrificing Czechoslovakia would save Europe from a greater war.”