This Year, Ukraine Has Stopped Russia From Gaining the Breakthrough It Needed

Sometimes victory can be defined by denying the enemy what they want. The Ukrainians have done more than that this year, as they have actually taken back more territory than the Russians have gained in several sectors at various times. 

But the primary win may have been disrupting the Kremlin's 2026 plans early and conclusively, robbing them of both a tangible gain and of a negotiating and public relations win which further cemented European support while also serving to deny Putin the more fulsome backing of the Trump administration. All in all, an important set of achievements. JL

Owen Warner reports in Medium:

Russia entered the spring and summer of 2026 with one thing it badly needed from the battlefield: movement. Ukraine did not stop every Russian advance. It stopped those advances from becoming the breakthrough Moscow needed. Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive failed to achieve operational maneuver or collapse Ukrainian lines. (And) Ukrainian forces liberated at least 129.81 square kilometers during counteroffensive operations, particularly in the Lyman and Oleksandrivka directions. An army attacking in a major offensive would like to push the defender back more quickly than the defender can recover.  Russia can still move forward. It can still capture villages. It can still concentrate enormous firepower on a single area of the map. However, Ukraine has become increasingly good at making every step costly and preventing the next one.

Ukraine did not stop every Russian advance. It stopped those advances from becoming the breakthrough Moscow needed.

Russia entered the spring and summer of 2026 with one thing it badly needed from the battlefield: movement.

Russia kept attacking, kept feeding men into the front, and did take ground. But by the end of August, the offensive had become something very different from the kind of battlefield momentum Moscow needed. 

Ukraine had turned it into a war of expensive meters.

The Institute for the Study of War found that Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive failed to achieve operational maneuver or rapidly collapse Ukrainian lines.

In August, ISW estimated that Russian troops had secured control of approximately 90.35 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. If areas reached by Russian infiltration groups are taken into account, the figure is still only around 123.53 square kilometers.

This is a significant decline from August 2025, when ISW estimated that Russian forces had captured approximately 505.55 square kilometers.

It was even worse in July. ISW reported that Russia advanced across just 37.85 square kilometers. Russia’s offensive had already started in mid-March, but months later Russian forces were still making tactical advances rather than achieving an operational breakthrough. 

Ukraine did not need to hold every trench to make that happen.

It needed to keep Russia from turning pressure into momentum.

August also contained another uncomfortable number for Moscow.

ISW assessed that Ukrainian forces liberated at least 129.81 square kilometers during counteroffensive operations, particularly in the Lyman and Oleksandrivka directions. ISW said that figure was probably conservative.

That does not mean Ukraine suddenly reversed the entire war. Russia remains on the offensive in important parts of Donetsk Oblast and continues pressing toward Ukraine’s remaining major defensive cities there.

But it changes the meaning of Russia’s summer.

An army attacking in a major offensive would like to push the defender back more quickly than the defender can recover. Instead, Russia made slow advances in some areas during August while the Ukrainian forces captured some land in others.

https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/total-russian-combat-losses-in-ukraine-as-of-august-1-2026

The offensive was on the move, but it was not breaking free from Ukraine’s grip.

The manpower cost makes the situation even worse.

Russian casualties in May, June, July and August were 33,760, 39,290, 42,860 and 42,020, respectively, the Defense Ministry says.

Russian casualties amount to 157,930 in four months, according to Ukrainian figures. While those numbers can’t be independently verified in full, ISW has judged that Russia’s casualty toll is extremely high in light of its territorial gains on multiple occasions.

In August alone, ISW estimated some 465 Russian casualties for every square kilometer of territory Russia seized.

July was worse. The figure was over 1,100 casualties per square kilometer captured.

Russia has far more manpower than Ukraine, but even a much larger army eventually has to deal with what those losses are buying.

Ukraine did not destroy the Russian army this summer.

It did something more realistic than that.

It denied Moscow the kind of battlefield event it needed.

Kostyantynivka, one of the main objectives of Russia’s military operation in Donetsk Oblast, remained contested following months of assaults and infiltration. Russian forces made tactical gains but were unable to trigger a quick collapse of the larger Ukrainian defence line.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian drones, medium-range attacks, and counterattacks continued limiting Russian mobility and making it harder for Russia to carry out large-scale mechanized operations.

That has now become one of the hallmarks of the conflict.

Russia can still move forward. It can still capture villages. It can still concentrate enormous firepower on a single area of the map.

However, Ukraine has become increasingly good at making every step costly and preventing the next one from becoming easy.

That may turn out to be the real story of Russia’s summer campaign.

Moscow spent months trying to build momentum.

Ukraine ensured that Russia had to keep buying that momentum one kilometre at a time.