Ground Drones Lead Ukr Advance On 3 Fronts While Infantry Risk Reduced

A year ago, Ukrainian ground drones attacking Russian positions was a novelty. Now, it has become a tried-and-true strategic advantage. 

As Ukrainian forces advance on three separate fronts, the growing role of grenade-launcher, machine gun and or kamikaze-mine equipped ground drones leading the way for assault troops is becoming attack doctrine. And with big aerial drones dropping of ground drones in the rear of Russian positions, the potential for disruptive and winning combinations only grow in scale. The Ukrainians have made a virtue of necessity by replacing human soldiers with robotics. And they are winning with it. JL

Giorgio Provinciali reports:

Ukraine's forces are advancing in the Hrekivka–Makiivka sector of Luhansk, on Zapadne near Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast’, and around the Zherebets in Donetsk Oblast’, spreading the pressure across several sectors of the northeastern front. The scale of these attacks, and of deep strikes, is significantly reducing Russia’s ability to hold positions it had taken. Having established air superiority over the areas of the offensives and interdicted resupply in depth, Ukraine’s forces filled the sky with aerial drones that in turn dropped tracked ones onto the ground. Russian soldiers found themselves facing robots as they lost ground, falling back to positions that had already been compromised by further air attacks. With the bulk of the work done by the machines, Ukrainian assault troops turned control into real territorial gains.

Ukraine Destroyed A Russian Field Army, Took 240 Kms And Is Still Advancing

By now, the success of Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi in pushing the Russians back in northern Donbas has become global news. That, in itself, is a victory of sorts as it embarrasses Putin's pretensions and undermines his claims of inevitability. 

The contributing factors will be discussed for a long time: strategic planning, framing the battlefield with mid and long range drone strikes, the role of technology - especially new uses of ground drones both as mine clearers and massive, exploding kamikaze battering rams - as well as the 3rd Corps ability to reintroduce armored vehicles with the grounding of Russian drones. But the even more significant factor is that this is but one of the war's sectors where the Ukrainians are advancing. And that they show no signs yet of being stopped. JL

David Axe reports in Trench Art:

On 22 May Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps attacked Russian positions around Nove, 15 km north of Lyman. Nobody outside the Ukrainian army reported it for three months. Robots demined 11 square miles of contested ground, clearing the way for infantry to advance. "The moment AFU could start moving vehicles through the area, the battle was over. Armor didn't win it, the conditions making vehicle movement impossible were gone." Ukrainian drones were everywhere. And Russian drones, jammed by Ukraine, could barely fly. The salient became a trap as the 3rd Corps exploited the fragility of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army. The Russians have now been pushed back (across) the Zherebets, leaving behind their uncounted dead and their ambitions for a quick march on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The 3rd Corps cut across the salient three weeks ago, trapping an unknown number of Russian stragglers as the Russians "lost 1.5 years of progress."

Only 10% of Companies Can Substantiate AI's Return On Financial Statements

We get it. Absolutely no one wants to hear this. Especially after all the hype, the massive investments - and the danger of being humiliated by those whose own financial commitment to AI means they will flame anyone who dares to doubt AI's grandiosity. 

Threats of extinction aside, the real problem with AI right now is that corporate users are having trouble finding ways to prove its return on investment. So when a major accounting and consulting firm like EY - which has a stake in helping its clients install, adapt and manage AI -  produces a report revealing they could find only 10% of companies that can demonstrate a return on investment it is reasonable to assume that those findings may actually be even lower. And that is the fact raising doubts about the efficacy of continued investments in data centers and related expenditures. JL

GuruFocus News reports and Josh Marshall reports in Talking Points Memo:

An  EY report reveals a growing frustration among companies investing in AI, as many are unable to demonstrate a tangible return on investment (ROI). This has persisted for the past couple of years, leading AI companies to lower prices to attract customers. The report indicates only 10% of firms can substantiate AI's ROI on their profit statements, despite claims of enhanced productivity. This trend has prompted many businesses to reconsider their AI strategies, with some opting for open-source models to mitigate costs. Falling prices for a product that is becoming more expensive to create (suggests) lack of demand. It’s clear that LLMs can do big things and that there is demand and economic utility for those things. The question is whether there is enough demand, enough productivity gains for the companies and consumers who use the product to justify the capital expenditures 

Russia Has Suffered Reverses in Donbas - But Doing Even Worse Everywhere Else

The success of Operation Vivaldi is notable, but it would not have been possible without earlier Ukrainian victories in Zaporizhzhia, Oleksandrivka and Huiliapole which forced the Kremlin to redeploy troops from the Donbas to the south. 

In addition, the Ukrainian virtual neutralization of Crimea, the degradation of the Black Sea fleet and the systematic assault on Russian economic targets in the center of the country have strategically, with patience over time, repframed the war. JL

The World Strategist reports:

The eyes of the world are still on the Donbas. But while the world looks east, Ukraine is winning its war elsewhere. It is winning in the south, where its troops have taken more territory in one season than Russia has in the Donbas all year. The operation along the Oleksandrivka and Huliaipole axs in Zaporizhzhia Oblast regained more than 400 square kilometers since the operation began. (And) the counteroffensive compelled Russia to divert forces from the Donbas. It is also winning in Crimea, which drone strikes have turned into a beleaguered outpost; in the Black Sea, where Russia’s fleet has been driven to the east and crippled its “shadow fleet.” And it is winning in the deep rear, where strikes on refineries, logistics hubs and command posts are eating away at Russia’s ability to keep its war machine going.

3rd Ukrainian Corps' Lyman Counteroffensive Has 'Operational Momentum'

Operational momentum means that the success of Ukraine's counteroffensive north, east and now south of the Lyman sector and into Luhansk, means that Ukrainian commanders can use the gains they have made to expand both the scale of their attacks and the scope of the overall assault because the Russians are struggling to respond to the multiple threats they now face on various points of the front. 

This is making it harder for the Russians to redeploy troops from one threatened sector to another because there are simply too many problems for them to address at one time. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

Operation Vivaldi is a large, real-time proving ground for integration of UGVs into land formations, and the development of new tactical and operational methods to break out of defensive and positions. The counteroffensive has built not just tactical but operational momentum. These victories liberate Ukrainian areas from occupation, provide a morale boost for Ukrainians, and demonstrate that offensive manoeuvre is possible in eastern Ukraine. The 3^rd Corps reorganised its command systems before the offensive began, used drones to execute deep operations by striking Russian fuel pipelines and supply depots, used uncrewed ground vehicles extensively to support the infantry, and deployed ground-based radio beacons to keep its drones flying through heavy GPS jamming. This dimension of the Ukrainian counteroffensive – the return of offensive manoeuvre – matters perhaps even more than the amount of Ukrainian territory liberated over the last couple of months. 

Soviet-Era APC's Used By Ukraine Donbas Attack As Huge Kamikaze Drones

Ukraine unveiled two new technological innovations in its latest, Operation Vivaldi Phase 3 counteroffensive success in Donetsk. 

The first was the conversion of Soviet-era BTR 60 armored personnel carriers into massive ground drones which were deployed to attack the strongest Russian fortifications around Nove, the primary objective of the assault. The converted BTRs obliterated the Russian positions they struck. The second innovation was the use of new ground drones armed with grenade launchers which also successfully attacked Russian strong points without human infantry in support. JL

Daryna Vialko reports in RBC Ukraine:

Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps turned Soviet-era BTR-60 armored personnel carriers into giant robotic kamikaze drones that were used to destroy Russia's strongest fortifications. The improvised strike unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) helped break through Russian defenses in the most heavily fortified areas. The BTR 60 was mass-produced from 1960 to 1976. The 3rd Corps used another a new tactic during Operation Vivaldi, deploying upgraded ground robots equipped with grenade launchers to attack Russian positions without direct infantry involvement.

Major Russian Defeat As Vivaldi Phase 3 Shocks: Land Gains, 250 Prisoners

In a significant Russian defeat in Donetsk, Ukraine's 3rd Brigade launched the third 'season' of its Operation Vivaldi counteroffensive. In taking Nove, a key regional hub, the Ukrainians executed a 'feint' attack for which the Russians fell, drawing them away from the real target. And to take the most heavily defended positions, the Ukrainians employed old Soviet-era BTR armored personnel carriers converted into kamikaze ground robots which advanced on the Russian defenses and then detonated with massive impact. 

The Ukrainian attack so surprised the Russians that over 250 Kremlin troops were captured, some entire units which included drone operators and artillerymen who are usually a relatively substantial distance behind the front line. This is a crushing blow for the Russians as it reveals the Kremlin's forces susceptibility to Ukraine's enhanced technological and strategic strength. JL

Olena Mukhina reports in Euromaidan Press:

Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps defeated Russia at the key settlement of Nove in Donetsk by pointing it the wrong way. Russia had poured its reserves into counterattacks on a feint axis and "slept through" the real strike, in the decisive third season of the Vivaldi offensive. To break the strongest fortifications, it used Soviet BTR-60 armored carriers converted into remote-controlled kamikaze robots, driven into Russia's toughest positions and detonated. Over its first two "seasons," the 3rd Army Corps and attached units retook more than 176 square kilometers and inflicted more than 3,000 casualties on Russian forces. The assault in Nove was its "third season," the turning point of the whole operation. The corps added 51 square kilometers to that taken since the offensive began. Ukrainian forces also took 250 Russians captive as entire units including drone operators, surrendered.